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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

Post  Guest on Sat 3 Jul - 0:56

64.19 Lieutenant N described his target as having adopted a bowling position. The first of the two photographs of Michael Bridge taken by Sam Gillespie shortly before Michael Bridge was shot shows him in a position that could loosely be so described.






64.20 Lieutenant N denied shooting Michael Bridge. His descriptions of the clothes his target was wearing and of the direction from which his target had come are not consistent with what Michael Bridge was wearing or the direction from which he had in fact come. Michael Bridge was shot in the left thigh, but Lieutenant N said that he thought that he had hit his target in the right thigh. As we have already observed,1 civilian witnesses have identified a variety of places from where they believe a soldier shot Michael Bridge. Nevertheless, since no-one else (apart from Margaret Deery, who we are sure was not shot by Lieutenant N) was shot in the thigh, and since for reasons given hereafter,2 we are of the view that none of the other soldiers shot Michael Bridge, we have concluded that the evidence as a whole establishes that Lieutenant N was responsible for the shooting of Michael Bridge.



Lieutenant N’s state of mind

64.21 The question remains whether Lieutenant N believed at the time that he had targeted and hit someone about to throw a nail bomb. He has consistently maintained that this was the case, and though he also told us that he has since agonised over the matter, he said that he remained sure that at the time he believed he was justified in firing.

64.22 Lieutenant N said to the Widgery Inquiry that he had been told that the Rossville Flats were a particularly dangerous spot.1He had approached the flats from his APC knowing that other soldiers of his platoon were ahead of him. Notwithstanding his evidence that he heard no shooting at this stage, we consider that he is very likely to have heard one or both of the shots that hit Jackie Duddy and Margaret Deery, and perhaps the early shots in Sector 3, which we discuss when considering the events of that sector.2He would in our view have been in a state of high alert when he reached the position from where he shot Michael Bridge, who might well have appeared to him to be approaching his soldiers in a bowling posture.


64.23 However, Michael Bridge was approaching the soldiers in front of Lieutenant N. Michael Bridge was on his own and in the open, without any immediate means of escape or cover. For someone to act in this way with a visible nail bomb would have been little short of suicidal and a complete departure from the way in which such weapons were usually deployed, namely from a position of cover. There would have been little time for Lieutenant N to assess the situation, but to our minds a soldier in his position would, or should have, realised that it was at least equally likely that the person was, at worst, coming forward to throw a non-lethal missile.

64.24 Lance Corporal V, Private S, Sergeant O, Private R and Private Q were closer to Michael Bridge than Lieutenant N and would have been able to see him had they been looking in that direction. None of these soldiers gave evidence of seeing Michael Bridge but we consider that one or more must have had him in view, as he was only a few yards away and on his own. None appears to have regarded Michael Bridge as posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.25 In his first RMP statement,1in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,2and in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry,3Lieutenant N gave accounts of seeing or thinking that he had seen smoke coming from the object in the man’s hand.




64.26 There was no smoking object in Michael Bridge’s hands. We do not accept that Lieutenant N, who was not wearing his respirator, could have thought otherwise. In our view Lieutenant N invented this part of his account. We have considered whether he did this simply to make what he believed sound more credible, but in our view, in the circumstances of his case, it is equally likely that he would not have added this false detail had he been sure at the time that he had identified a nail bomber.

64.27 We should note at this point that the Regimental Sergeant Major of 1 PARA (Warrant Officer Class I INQ 2037) told us that after observing the loading of arrestees into a truck in the William Street area, he had gone forward to see what was going on and to find out what had happened to his nephew (Private 005 of Machine Gun Platoon). He was directed to an APC which was, according to him, in the area a little way north of the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He told us that he had found Private 005 with Lieutenant N in the front of the APC and that, when he asked Private 005 whether he was “okay ”, Private 005 had said: “‘yes but he’s not’. ” Warrant Officer Class I INQ 2037 stated that Private 005 “was referring to Lieutenant N who shouldn’t have been in the Pig but was sheltering there because he was scared ”.1


64.28 Both Lieutenant N and Private 005 told us that this did not happen. Private 005 said that he believed that Warrant Officer Class I INQ 2037 was thinking of something that had happened on another occasion.1Since we are unable to reconcile these conflicting accounts, and since, even if Warrant Officer Class I INQ 2037 was correct, we consider that his evidence does not assist in enabling any inference to be drawn as to Lieutenant N’s state of mind when he fired, we do not take his evidence into account in our assessment of that state of mind.



64.29 Lieutenant N shot Michael Bridge in the thigh. He told the Widgery Inquiry that the man was about 30 to 40 yards away.1


64.30 Lieutenant N’s evidence was that he had aimed at the centre of the body: “I brought my rifle to my shoulder and fired an aimed shot at the man’s chest. That was the target we were trained to aim at. ”1We remain in doubt as to whether this is what Lieutenant N did. The fact that his shot hit the thigh and not the torso could indicate either that Lieutenant N had fired in haste without taking proper aim, or that he aimed at the thigh, or that he simply missed the area of the body at which he had aimed.



64.31 Our assessment of the evidence makes us sure that Lieutenant N fired, either in the belief that his target was about to throw a nail bomb, but without any adequate grounds for that belief; or in the belief that his target might have been about to throw a nail bomb, but without being confident that that was so. In either case, it is possible that Lieutenant N fired in a state of fear or panic, without giving proper thought to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

Sergeant O

64.32 In our view the shots fired by Sergeant O on Bloody Sunday did not hit anyone, though his shots towards the corner of the passage between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats may have indirectly resulted in the injuries to Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron, or one of these two. According to his accounts, he fired at and hit a man with a pistol who was behind a Cortina car on the south-east side of the car park; and a man with an M1 carbine or similar weapon towards the south-west end of the lower balcony of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats. He also said that he shot at but probably missed a further man with an M1 carbine or similar weapon at the corner of the passage between Blocks 2 and 3. All these shots are shown on his trajectory photograph.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

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64.33 We have no reason to doubt that Sergeant O fired in the directions shown in his trajectory photograph, but in our view there were no casualties with gunshot wounds at or near the positions where he said that he had hit a man with a pistol and a man with an M1 carbine or similar weapon.

64.34 We have already concluded that there were no casualties of Army gunfire other than those we have identified. We should point out here that any suggestion to the contrary necessarily involves the proposition that the many civilians who gave accounts of what they saw in Sector 2 and in Sector 5 (which was on the other side of the Rossville Flats and which we consider later in this report1) obeyed instructions or somehow knew that they should only mention what had happened to certain individuals, and should keep quiet about others. The instructions would have to have been given and accepted, or this state of knowledge acquired, at the latest very soon after the firing, so that those talking to the media or Kathleen Keville or giving Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) statements would have known both which gunshot casualties they could describe and, more importantly, which they should not. It is not explained how people could have known or been made aware of which casualties could be mentioned and which should be concealed, nor by whom and by what means instructions could have been given to all who might be giving Keville interviews or NICRA statements or talking to the media and who might have seen casualties, so as to ensure that certain casualties were kept secret. It is also not explained how journalists who were on the scene, such as Gilles Peress, could have been persuaded to censor or misreport what they saw.




64.35 In these circumstances we are of the view that any such suggestion has no basis in fact.

64.36 We also reject Sergeant O’s description of the incoming fire that he said occurred in Sector 2. As will have been seen from his various accounts, he appeared to be saying that, with the exception of the men on the south-east side and near the south-east corner of the car park at whom he said he fired, and of the rifleman at ground level he said he saw Private S engaging in the area between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats, the firing from both high and low velocity weapons was coming from about four or five positions in the area of the Rossville Flats, including from the flats themselves. He described it as the most intense firing he had experienced in Northern Ireland in such a short space of time and told the Widgery Inquiry that there had been about 20 to 30 shots in the initial burst; and then continuous fire for about two or three minutes, at the end of which about 80 to 100 shots had been fired. He later told Praxis Films Ltd that his soldiers were spotting gunmen and firing at them, and that the gunmen were eliminated fairly quickly. He also told Praxis Films Ltd that there was automatic fire, though he said to us that this was not so.

64.37 Private T was the only other soldier in Mortar Platoon who said that he fired up at the Rossville Flats, but that was at someone who was throwing down acid or a similar corrosive substance. No soldier other than Sergeant O claimed to have engaged a gunman in the Rossville Flats in Sector 2, though a soldier (probably Private T) fired the shot that injured Patrick Brolly. Thus Sergeant O’s description of a full-scale gun battle between gunmen and soldiers in the car park, in which the gunmen and the soldiers exchanged fire and by the end of which the soldiers had dealt with the gunmen, bears in our view no resemblance either to what happened or indeed to what the other soldiers said had happened. According to those soldiers, there was a man firing an M1 carbine or similar weapon at ground level in the area of the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats, and a gunman or gunmen on the south-east side and near the car park, but otherwise the men at whom they fired were, according to them, deploying petrol, nail or acid bombs and not firearms. Furthermore, Sergeant O’s account of his soldiers engaging and eliminating gunmen in a gun battle is hardly consistent with his evidence that the only soldier he saw firing was Private S, who he said was engaging a gunman at ground level.1




64.38 There is a further consideration. Had the soldiers encountered the degree of incoming fire described by Sergeant O, it seems to us, bearing in mind the short distance between the soldiers and the alleged gunmen, that one or more soldiers would probably have been hit by gunfire, but this did not happen.

64.39 We found Sergeant O’s explanation as to why no soldier had been hit unconvincing. He suggested1that the reason was that “second rate ” men had got hold of “low quality ” weapons which were ready for use in the Rossville Flats and that had experienced IRA snipers been firing, his soldiers would have suffered casualties. Such a suggestion can only be categorised as speculation. It assumes, on the basis of the amount of incoming fire that Sergeant O claimed, that there was a substantial stock of low-grade weapons in the Rossville Flats ready for use, which were then used at short notice by inexperienced people. As we describe elsewhere,2both the Provisional and the Official IRA were at the time short of weapons and jealously guarded those that they had.



64.40 We have found no evidence that suggests to us that there was a stock of weapons and ammunition in the Rossville Flats, to which inexperienced gunmen could have obtained access at short notice.

64.41 There is no doubt that “Fr Daly’s gunman ” (OIRA 4) fired from the corner of the garden wall of 36 Chamberlain Street, after Jackie Duddy had been killed and Michael Bridge had been injured. Sergeant O may have heard this firing, but neither he nor any of the other soldiers said that they saw or heard a gunman firing from there. It is also possible (as Monica Barr told us) that a man with a pistol fired a single shot down from the top floor of the Rossville Flats and that a soldier fired back, though again no soldier said that he did this and we are left in doubt as to whether such an incident occurred. It is probable that Billy Gillespie saw a paramilitary gunman firing from the lower balcony of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats.

64.42 Apart from this, we consider that it would be unwise to rely on the accounts of incoming fire given by other soldiers of Mortar Platoon. We have already expressed our views1on the unreliability of some of these accounts. It should be noted that a number of these soldiers described incoming gunfire at a stage before Sergeant O arrested William John Doherty, while Sergeant O said that the incoming fire only occurred after or towards the end of this event. With the exceptions described in the previous paragraph, we have concluded that it is probable that there was no firing directed at the soldiers of Mortar Platoon.



64.43 Sergeant O denied that he had heard the three shots fired by Lieutenant N at the Eden Place alleyway.1It is possible that he did not hear this firing, though it was only some 75 yards away across an open space, but if he did (which seems to us much more likely) it is possible that with the echo from the Rossville Flats, he might have believed that the firing was coming from there. Some firing by soldiers in Sector 3 (which we consider later in this report2) probably occurred while the events of Sector 2 were unfolding. In addition, there was the substantial firing by soldiers in Sector 2 itself. We have commented more than once in this report on the fact that in a built-up area it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify either the type of weapon being fired or from where it is being fired.



64.44 In view of these matters, and despite his denials, we consider that Sergeant O is likely to have misidentified some at least of the Army firing he heard as paramilitary firing. As will be seen from our examination of the later events in Sector 3,1there was an incident towards the end of the operation in which a number of soldiers mistook Army fire for paramilitary fire. In our view, however, Sergeant O also chose to give an exaggerated and largely false account of what he had witnessed, by describing a gun battle which we are sure did not take place, in order, probably out of misplaced loyalty to his men, to seek to demonstrate that his soldiers had encountered violent opposition and had become engaged in an all-out conflict with paramilitaries equipped with firearms, and thus to support their accounts of what they did.




64.45 We have already noted1that Sergeant O said that, apart from Private S, he had not seen any of his soldiers firing, and that he said that he did not remember seeing any of the Sector 2 casualties.



64.46 It is possible that, apart from Private S, Sergeant O did not see any of his soldiers firing. However, we cannot accept that he failed to see any of the casualties. His explanation for not seeing Jackie Duddy was that he had “tunnel vision ”1while engaging his first two gunmen, but we do not accept this explanation, since in our view Jackie Duddy was shot and lying on the ground before Sergeant O opened fire. As we have already described,2Jackie Duddy was lying on the ground long enough to be tended by Fr Daly and Charles Glenn and to be photographed by journalists, and was then carried right across the car park to Chamberlain Street. Anyone looking into the car park would have been able to see Michael Bridge being shot when he was on his own and then staggering away after being shot. Michael Bradley and Margaret Deery would also have been visible to anyone looking in their direction. In our view Sergeant O must have seen Jackie Duddy and probably saw Michael Bridge, and perhaps Margaret Deery and Michael Bradley, but chose not to admit this, in all probability to avoid saying anything that might have prejudiced any of the soldiers who fired.



64.47 For reasons that we have given,1it is likely that Sergeant O saw and engaged a gunman towards the south-west end of the lower balcony of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats, but we are unpersuaded that he saw a man with a pistol behind a Cortina or a man with an M1 carbine or similar weapon at the corner of the passage between Blocks 2 and 3. In our view his shots at ground level were probably fired in order to keep people’s heads down or to frighten them away, and without any regard to the risk to people in the area. The tactic of firing to keep people’s heads down was something Sergeant O mentioned to Praxis Films Ltd,2though he denied3that this was what he had done on Bloody Sunday.




Lance Corporal V

64.48 In our view Lance Corporal V probably shot Margaret Deery.

64.49 Lance Corporal V and Private S had approached the car park from Lieutenant N’s APC at Eden Place. They were involved in the incident with the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps volunteer Charles McMonagle, which we have discussed in detail earlier in this report.1This incident took place at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses more or less in line with the wire fence that ran along the southern edge of the waste ground. After this incident they continued towards the car park as can be seen in the following enlargement of part of a photograph taken by Colman Doyle.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

Post  Guest on Sat 3 Jul - 0:59



64.50 Both soldiers were wearing respirators when this photograph was taken. Lance Corporal V told this Inquiry that he could not remember whether he was still wearing his respirator when he fired.1We do not know whether or not he took it off before he fired.



64.51 As we have described earlier in this report,1Lance Corporal V originally gave an account of seeing a man throwing a bottle with a fuse attached to it, which hit the ground but did not explode; he said that he then shot the man, who was soon surrounded by four or five people who waved white handkerchiefs and attended to the shot man, whom he did not see again. In his account to John Heritage (who, as described earlier,2conducted a preliminary interview of Lance Corporal V for the Widgery Inquiry) he said that the bottle had a lighted fuse and that the man moved back into the crowd after the bottle had been thrown. When he reappeared, Lance Corporal V fired at the man and believed that he had hit him. In his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he said that he had seen a man holding a bottle with a lit fuse, took aim and though his view was obscured “for a fraction of a second ”,3probably by someone running in front of the man, he fired at the man as soon as he had a clear view; and that the man was thrown backwards to the ground. Lance Corporal V said that all these events had taken place “almost instantaneously ”.4




64.52 Lance Corporal V also told the Widgery Inquiry that when he aimed at the man he was so close that his sight picture was filled with the part he was aiming at.1


64.53 We set out below Lance Corporal V’s trajectory photograph and a map depicting Lance Corporal V’s position, the line of his shot as shown on the trajectory photograph, and the position where we believe Margaret Deery was when she was shot.



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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

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64.54 The line of his shot (according to Lance Corporal V’s trajectory photograph) passed through or very close to the position where we believe Margaret Deery was wounded. What Lance Corporal V said about his sight picture indicates that he was near to his target, though in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he said that his target was 50m to 60m away from him. Margaret Deery said that the soldier who shot her was nearby. According to the soldiers’ trajectory photographs, the lines of the shots fired by other members of Mortar Platoon, apart from Lieutenant N, did not go near where Margaret Deery was shot. We have given above1our reasons for concluding that Lieutenant N did not shoot Margaret Deery. We have found no evidence that suggests to us that any of the other soldiers who fired hit Margaret Deery.


Lance Corporal V’s state of mind

64.55 Lance Corporal V denied shooting Margaret Deery. However, we are sure that there was no petrol bomber, such as he had described. Furthermore, we are sure that he gave the Widgery Inquiry a knowingly false account of what he had done, having realised that in his earlier accounts (particularly the one he had given to John Heritage) he had admitted firing at someone who was not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury; at whom it was therefore not necessary or right for him to fire.

64.56 Although we consider that Lance Corporal V shot Margaret Deery, we doubt that she was his target. However, it seems to us that Lance Corporal V must have realised that he had shot her, albeit by accident. Margaret Deery was only yards from him and had to be carried from where she fell towards and around the corner at the end of the Chamberlain Street houses.

64.57 Although Lance Corporal V told the Widgery Inquiry that he thought that one of the people who had surrounded the body of the man he had shot had been a priest, he denied shooting Jackie Duddy and in our view he did not do so. To our minds the evidence shows that he is the only soldier who could have shot Margaret Deery, who was wounded after Jackie Duddy had been hit. He only fired one shot and, for reasons we give below,1we consider that another soldier was responsible for shooting Jackie Duddy.



64.58 We find the evidence Lance Corporal V gave about seeing a lit fuse wholly unconvincing and we reject it. At most it is possible that someone in the group of people at the southern end of the western side of the Chamberlain Street houses had thrown a stone or bottle towards the soldiers. It is also possible that Lance Corporal V, who may still have been wearing a respirator which restricted his view, thought that this object might have been a petrol bomb, but this cannot have been more than a suspicion, since even on his account the object did not explode. Furthermore, based on his own original accounts, Lance Corporal V, when he fired, must in our view have realised that his target was no longer posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.59 Margaret Deery was shot in the thigh. Since in our view she was not Lance Corporal V’s target, the fact that the bullet was at this low height, despite being fired at comparatively short range, indicates to us that Lance Corporal V probably fired in haste without taking proper aim. The case of Lieutenant N is different, because we are sure he hit the person at whom he aimed.

64.60 In the circumstances, we have concluded that Lance Corporal V probably fired in the knowledge that his target was not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. It is possible that he fired in a state of fear or panic, without giving any proper thought as to whether his target was posing such a threat.

64.61 The result of Lance Corporal V’s firing was a grave injury to Margaret Deery.

Private R

64.62 In our view Private R probably hit Jackie Duddy with his first shot. Jackie Duddy was the first casualty in Sector 2, killed as he and others (including Fr Daly) ran away from the soldiers when they came into the Bogside.

64.63 Private R had disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street and then ran after it when it continued into the Rossville Flats car park. He described shooting a man, when he had reached Sergeant O’s APC, who he said was about to throw a bomb. He told the Widgery Inquiry that he had taken off his respirator just before he reached the waste ground.

64.64 We set out below Private R’s trajectory photograph (which shows the path of his first shot towards the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats) and a map depicting Private R’s position, the line of his first shot as shown on the trajectory photograph, and the position where we believe Jackie Duddy was when he was shot.
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64.65 There is little correlation between Private R’s accounts of the incident in which he fired at a man who according to him was throwing a bomb and the evidence of the civilians who told us that they saw Jackie Duddy shot and who described what happened to him afterwards. However, it appears from Private R’s account that he fired at his target at a time when there were a number of people still in this area of the car park and close to his target and this does correspond with the accounts of the shooting of Jackie Duddy given by a number of civilians. The line of Private R’s shot (according to his trajectory photograph) passed not far from the position where Jackie Duddy fell. The same can be said of the position where Michael Bridge fell, but he was shot when there was no crowd and the car park was more or less deserted, save for the people tending Jackie Duddy. Furthermore, Private R described hitting his target in the right shoulder. This was where Jackie Duddy was hit, whereas Michael Bridge was hit in the thigh.

64.66 For reasons given below,1 we are satisfied that Private S, Private Q and Private T were not responsible for the shooting of Jackie Duddy. We have already given reasons2 for taking the same view in relation to Lieutenant N, Sergeant O and Lance Corporal V.



Private R’s state of mind

64.67 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1 Private R described being on the lookout for likely snipers or bombers, having heard, according to his account, firing from the area of the rubble barricade in Rossville Street, a couple of explosions he thought were bombs, and weapons being fired from his side of the Rossville Flats.



64.68 We have already concluded1 that no nail or other bombs exploded in Sector 2 and, for reasons given in the course of this report,2 we are of the view that no bombs were thrown or exploded in any of the sectors. We do not know whether Private R invented this part of his account, or simply mistook the firing of other weapons for the explosion of bombs. We also express later in this report3 our view that there was no firing from the rubble barricade, though Private R might have mistakenly thought that there was. We have noted on more than one occasion that in a built-up area it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell from where gunfire is coming. In our view he may have heard the firing by Corporal P in Rossville Street, which we consider in our discussion of Sector 3.4 He may also have heard the firing by Lieutenant N up the Eden Place alleyway, which we have discussed earlier.5




64.69 The sound of gunfire would understandably have put a soldier in the position of Private R on high alert, even if he believed that it was or might have been firing by soldiers, since in that event he would in our view be likely to have assumed that the shots were fired at persons who were posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.70 On the evidence we have discussed in detail earlier in this report,1 we are satisfied that Jackie Duddy was shot when running away from the soldiers but that at the moment of the shooting his upper body was turned towards them, as evidenced by the fact that he was hit in the right shoulder. He probably had a stone in his right hand, but we do not know whether he was about to throw it when he was shot.



64.71 Jackie Duddy did not have a smoking object in either of his hands. We do not accept that Private R could have believed that he had and we reject his evidence on this point. We are sure that Private R invented this detail in order to seek to justify his shot. We did not believe Private R when he told us that he had not seen Jackie Duddy being tended on the ground or being carried across the car park, which to our minds indicates that he was seeking to dissociate himself from the person he knew he had probably shot.

64.72 In our view it is probable that Private R thought that Jackie Duddy might have been about to throw a bomb and shot him for this reason, but we consider that he could not have been sufficiently confident about this to conclude that he was justified in firing. It is possible that Private R fired in a state of fear or panic, giving no proper thought as to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

Private R’s other shots

64.73 For the same reasons that we gave1when discussing Sergeant O’s shots towards the corner of the passage between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats, we are of the view that Private R did not hit anyone else with the shots that he said (and which we accept) that he later fired across the car park, though these shots may have indirectly injured Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron or one of these two, as they sought to escape through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats. In view of his untruthful account of the circumstances in which we believe that he probably shot Jackie Duddy, we can place no reliance on his accounts of seeing gunmen. We are not persuaded that Private R saw a man with a pistol who was shot and fell near the Cortina vehicle in the south-east corner of the car park; in our view the account he gave of this in his second RMP statement cannot be correct, as no-one was wounded in that area. We have concluded that this was a false account, given in order to support what Sergeant O had said about the firing into this part of the car park. In our view Private R probably fired shots across the car park to frighten people or drive them away.



Private Q

64.74 In our view Private Q probably shot Michael Bradley, who was wounded after Jackie Duddy had been shot dead, and after Margaret Deery and Michael Bridge had been wounded. Private Q said that after disembarking from Lieutenant N’s APC he moved to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, and from the north-east corner of that block saw a man throwing what he believed to be nail bombs, one of which exploded about ten yards from Sergeant O’s APC. Private Q said that he then fired at this man’s chest, as the man was about to throw another bomb, and that his shot hit the man.

64.75 We set out below Private Q’s trajectory photograph and a map depicting Private Q’s position, the line of his shot as shown on the trajectory photograph, and the position where we believe Michael Bradley was when he was shot.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 4

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64.76 Private Q located his target at the corner of the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. We are sure that no-one was shot in the position he described, although Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron were indirectly injured in that area as a consequence of gunfire. However, as will have been seen, the line of Private Q’s shot (according to his trajectory photograph) passed close to where we believe that Michael Bradley was shot. Bearing in mind where we believe Michael Bradley was when he was shot, and when he was shot, we consider that it is unlikely that Private Q’s firing resulted in the injuries to Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron.

64.77 The bullet that hit Michael Bradley struck his left forearm and passed across his chest and into his right forearm. There is accordingly a correlation between the injuries he sustained and the part of the body at which Private Q said that he had fired. There is also the fact that Michael Bradley had been throwing stones and was probably about to throw another when he was shot. Private Q said that his target had been throwing objects, though according to him these objects were bombs, not stones.

64.78 We have found no evidence that suggests to us that another soldier shot Michael Bradley. Neither Sergeant O nor Private R suggested that he had fired at a man throwing objects from this corner of the car park, as opposed to a man using a firearm. We consider that Lieutenant N and Lance Corporal V fired at and hit, respectively, Michael Bridge and Margaret Deery, before Michael Bradley was hit. We are satisfied, for reasons given below,1that neither Private S nor Private T shot Michael Bradley.



Private Q’s state of mind

64.79 We are sure that Private Q’s account of having previously seen a nail bomb thrown and exploding was to his knowledge untrue. We have considered whether it is possible that Private Q was convinced that he was justified in firing, but later invented this detail in an attempt to bolster his account and make it more credible to others, but, in the circumstances of his case, we have concluded that he would not have added this false detail had he believed when he fired that he had identified a nail bomber.

64.80 In our view it is possible that Private Q thought that Michael Bradley might have been about to throw a bomb and shot him for this reason, but in our view, even if this was so, he could not have been sufficiently confident about this to conclude that he was justified in firing. Private Q may have fired in a state of fear or panic, giving no proper thought to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

Private S

64.81 Although we accept that Private S fired 12 shots and probably did so from the eastern side of the car park, we are sure that he did not fire at a gunman or gunmen as he claimed in his accounts that he had.

64.82 According to these accounts, about five minutes after he reached a position near the back wall of the last but one house in Chamberlain Street and from that position, he fired four groups of three shots at a man who was firing a rifle in his direction from the gap between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. Private S said that he believed he missed the man with his first group of shots but hit him when he fired his second group. Similarly, he said he believed he missed the man when he fired his third group of three shots but hit him when he fired his fourth group. His evidence was that there was a gap of about 30 seconds between each of his groups of shots, and that on each occasion after he had fired a group of shots, the crowd came between him and the man he was seeking to shoot. He said he did not know whether each group of shots was fired at the same man.

64.83 Private S had come from Lieutenant N’s APC and had been involved in the incident with Charles McMonagle, the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps volunteer, at the wall at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, near the fence that ran along the southern edge of the Eden Place waste ground. He can be seen moving forward with Lance Corporal V after this incident in the photograph taken by Colman Doyle.
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64.84 Private S told the Widgery Inquiry, in our view falsely, that there were a lot of people milling about in the car park even after he had seen a body lying on the ground. Apart from the fact that there is abundant evidence to contradict Private S’s description of people milling about in the car park, it seems to us beyond belief that a gunman or gunmen, let alone a crowd of people, could have behaved in the way Private S described, in the face of his repeated firing only some 50 yards away and the presence of other soldiers in the immediate vicinity. We reject as knowingly untrue the account Private S gave of his firing and of the shots he said were fired at him. There was no casualty in the area in which Private S said that he had shot a gunman or gunmen.

64.85 According to his trajectory photograph, reproduced below, the shots Private S said that he had fired would have passed close to where Jackie Duddy fell.

64.86 In our view Private S did not shoot Jackie Duddy. This casualty was running away to the south when he was shot, but, as Fr Daly told us,1 he was looking over his shoulder from time to time as he ran. The bullet that killed him entered his right side and the minor injuries on his left side indicate that this was the side onto which he fell. It seems to us therefore that he had turned his upper body to the right when he was shot.



64.87 It is important to bear in mind that, as our experts Dr Richard Shepherd and Mr Kevin O’Callaghan pointed out, “The greatest care must be exercised in interpreting the track angles in this injury since the mobility of the shoulder may allow for many different positions of the chest and body with the arm in the same position ”.1 However, it seems to us that it would not have been possible for Jackie Duddy to have turned his body so far to the right as to present his right shoulder to a soldier firing from near the south end of the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, from where Private S fired. Thus it does not seem possible to us that Private S shot Jackie Duddy, despite the fact that his shots, according to his evidence and his trajectory photograph, which we reproduce below, would have passed through the area where Jackie Duddy fell.
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64.88 Private S told the Widgery Inquiry that he had seen what he took to be a body lying on the ground in front of him, at a stage that he thought was after he had taken up his position at the back of 34 Chamberlain Street, but before he had fired his first shots.1 In our view this was the body of Jackie Duddy. He also told the Widgery Inquiry that some time passed, after he took up his position, before he fired his rifle. In his first RMP statement Private S said that the interval was “about five minutes ”,2 but in our view it cannot in fact have been as long as this, though it might have been some time after he had reached his position; and after he had seen the body of Jackie Duddy. These matters further militate against the possibility that Private S shot Jackie Duddy.


64.89 We have no evidence to suggest that Private S might have shot Margaret Deery, Michael Bridge or Michael Bradley and, for reasons given earlier,1 we consider that other soldiers were responsible for these casualties. It is possible, but in our view unlikely, that Private S was responsible for firing the bullet that resulted in the injury to Patrick Brolly. In our view he probably fired his shots in order to frighten people rather than aiming at a particular target, but since he had no possible justification for such conduct it seems to us that he did not wish to admit that this was what he had done and so concocted a fictitious account of firing at the targets he described. It is possible that he was the soldier that Joseph Doherty, in his NICRA statement,2 recorded seeing fire into the ground in order to ricochet the bullets. He might also have been the soldier Isabella Duffy recorded seeing fire up into the Rossville Flats.3 Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that he might have been responsible for the shots that indirectly injured Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron, or one of these two.





64.90 In these circumstances, although it may well be that Sergeant O and Lance Corporal V saw the firing, or some of it, by Private S, we do not accept their evidence in so far as it suggested that Private S was firing at a gunman or that shots were fired at Private S. We are sure that these soldiers invented these aspects of their accounts in order to seek to back up what Private S had falsely said that he had done.

Private T

64.91 There is a considerable body of convincing evidence that Private T fired up into Block 1 of the Rossville Flats at someone he believed was responsible for throwing down bottles containing some form of acid or other corrosive substance. We set out below his trajectory photograph.


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64.92 In our view Private T believed that he was firing at someone who was posing a threat of causing serious injury, and Sergeant O also believed this to be the case. Private T did not hit the person he was aiming at, and though it is probable that one of his shots caused the injury to Patrick Brolly, we are satisfied that Private T did not intend to hit this casualty.

64.93 We have found no clear evidence as to when the acid bomb incident took place, though on both Sergeant O’s and Private R’s accounts this was after at least some of the shooting in Sector 2.

64.94 Earlier in this report1 we expressed the view that the failure of Sergeant O and Private T to give a warning before firing was not a technicality. As we stated, in our view there was a real possibility of ending the threat of acid bombs by giving a warning, so that it was a serious matter for Private T, without warning, to try to kill the man instead. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that Private T had no other way of protecting himself, such as by putting on his helmet (if he was not already wearing it), or moving to a safer position, or seeking to dodge any falling bottles. In these circumstances we do not accept that Sergeant O was entitled to assume that the condition stated in Rule 12 of the Yellow Card would be met, and thus that Private T would be justified in firing.



64.95 On Private T’s evidence, he fired his first shot either as the man released the bottle, or just after he had released it. He then fired a second shot at the man. Quite apart from the failure to give a warning, that second shot was in our view unjustified, since there was, once the acid bomb had been thrown, no further immediate danger from the man.

Summary

64.96 For the reasons we have given above, we have concluded that it is probable that Jackie Duddy was shot by Private R, Margaret Deery by Lance Corporal V, Michael Bridge by Lieutenant N, and Michael Bradley by Private Q. We consider that one or more of Sergeant O, Private R and Private S were responsible for the shots that indirectly injured Patrick McDaid and Pius McCarron. We set out below a map showing the location of Lieutenant N, Lance Corporal V, Private Q and Private R, the trajectories of their shots as shown on their trajectory photographs, and the position of the casualties hit directly by gunfire. We do not include Private S as it is uncertain where he fired his shots, and though one of them might have hit Patrick Brolly, it seems to us that Private T probably caused this casualty. The soldiers and casualties were not, of course, all in the positions shown on the map at the same time. The map, for example, shows the trajectory of Private Q’s shot passing through Michael Bridge. The Tribunal is of the view that Private Q did not shoot Michael Bridge.
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64.97 None of the soldiers who in our view were probably responsible for the casualties shot someone posing a threat of causing death or serious injury, though Private T (who probably fired the shot that injured Patrick Brolly) believed that his target was posing a threat of causing serious injury.

64.98 We are sure that Lieutenant N fired, either in the belief that his target was about to throw a nail bomb, but without any adequate grounds for that belief; or in the belief that his target might have been about to throw a nail bomb, but without being confident that that was so. In either case, it is possible that Lieutenant N fired in a state of fear or panic, without giving proper thought as to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.99 We consider that Lance Corporal V probably fired in the knowledge that his target was not posing a threat of causing death or serious injury. It is possible that he fired in a state of fear or panic, without giving any proper thought as to whether his target was posing such a threat.

64.100 We consider that it is probable that Private R thought that Jackie Duddy might have been about to throw a bomb and shot him for this reason, but in our view he could not have been sufficiently confident about this to conclude that he was justified in firing. It is possible that Private R fired in a state of fear or panic, giving no proper thought as to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.101 We consider that Private Q did not believe when he fired that he had identified a nail bomber. It is possible that Private Q thought that Michael Bradley might have been about to throw a bomb and shot him for this reason, but in our view, even if this was so, he could not have been sufficiently confident about this to conclude that he was justified in firing. Private Q fired in a state of fear or panic, giving no proper thought as to whether his target was posing a threat of causing death or serious injury.

64.102 Private T, one of whose shots probably caused the injury to Patrick Brolly, fired without giving a prior warning, contrary to the provisions of the Yellow Card. We do not accept that he had no other way of protecting himself; and consider that his second shot was also unjustified, since apart from the failure to give a warning, there was no further immediate danger from the man.

64.103 In our view the soldiers in the car park, who fired otherwise than at people, did not believe that they were justified in doing so and fired without any regard to the risk that by doing so they might kill or injure people.

64.104 It is important to note that none of the soldiers who in our view shot people in Sector 2 suggested that he had done so because of incoming fire. None of those killed or injured was deploying firearms or was even said by any of these soldiers to have been in possession of firearms. Thus there is nothing to suggest that incoming fire could somehow be regarded as providing an excuse for the shooting of the casualties in this sector.
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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume IV - Chapter 65



C Company





65.1 C Company of 1 PARA was commanded by Major 221A and consisted of three platoons, 7, 8 and 9. Earlier in this report1 we described the stage when soldiers of C Company went through Barrier 14 in William Street. As we have observed,2 this happened shortly after Support Company had deployed, in vehicles, through Barrier 12 in Little James Street and moved along Rossville Street into the Bogside.



65.2 It appears from the evidence that we consider below1 that 7 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant 110, moved to the corner of Rossville Street and William Street. At least some of the members of this platoon subsequently moved into the Eden Place waste ground and across to the back of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street.



65.3 8 Platoon, under Second Lieutenant 026, moved to the corner of Chamberlain Street and paused before advancing south along that street. The platoon encountered Fr Edward Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy at the junction with Harvey Street. Soldiers of this platoon subsequently made their way further along Chamberlain Street to the edge of the Rossville Flats car park. Members of 8 Platoon were responsible for arresting a number of civilians in 33 Chamberlain Street, the southernmost house on the eastern side of that street. This was the house to which two of the Sector 2 casualties, Michael Bridge and Margaret Deery, had been taken.

65.4 The movements of 9 Platoon are less clear. It appears that they too moved along William Street and some probably got as far as the junction with Rossville Street, but the soldiers of this platoon do not seem to have advanced further into the Bogside.

65.5 7 Platoon was the first platoon of C Company to go through Barrier 14. This platoon was followed by 9 Platoon and 8 Platoon in that order.1



65.6 In this chapter of the report, we deal first with the composition of these platoons and their movements, and then consider the evidence that C Company soldiers gave of hearing non-military fire and of seeing civilian gunmen. In the following chapter1 we deal with the circumstances in which the arrests in 33 Chamberlain Street took place.



65.7 Very few members of C Company gave evidence in 1972. Thus most of the accounts given by the soldiers of this company are what they told us that they recalled decades after Bloody Sunday. In the case of some of these soldiers, we concluded that they had no real or accurate recollections of the day. In the case of other soldiers it was necessary to test their recollections against other material in order to try to assess what weight we could properly give to their accounts. We should note at this point that the recollections of Major 221A, the Commander of C Company, about the movement of his soldiers after they had gone through Barrier 14 were not sufficiently clear to be of much assistance.1We consider his evidence of hearing incoming fire in detail below.2



65.8 We have found no evidence that suggests to us that any soldier of C Company fired his rifle on the day.

The composition and movements of 7 Platoon of C Company

65.9 From the evidence that we have collected, it appears that the following soldiers were members of 7 Platoon, though there may well have been others.

Cipher
Rank
Identified by

1
Soldier 110
Second Lieutenant
Himself1

2
Soldier 003
Lance Corporal
Himself2

3
INQ 5
Private
Himself3

4
INQ 96
Private
Stated to this Inquiry that his Platoon Commander was Second Lieutenant 1104

5
INQ 131
Private
Himself5

6
INQ 444
Corporal
Himself6

7
INQ 554
Private
Lance Corporal 0037

9
INQ 815
Private
Himself8

10
INQ 1582
Private
Himself9

11
INQ 1799
Lance Corporal
Himself10




65.10 Only two members of 7 Platoon gave statements in 1972. We consider their accounts first.

65.11 One of the two was the Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant 110, who gave a Royal Military Police (RMP) statement timed at 1405 hours on 4th February 1972.1 In this account, Second Lieutenant 110 referred to making an earlier statement which was recorded on 3rd February 1972.2 We have not been able to trace this statement,3 and Second Lieutenant 110 told us he had no recollection of making it.4 The statement dated 4th February 1972 does not deal specifically with the movements of 7 Platoon, but instead records Second Lieutenant 110’s account of hearing incoming fire and seeing a gunman, both matters that we deal with later. According to the statement, Second Lieutenant 110 moved to the corner of William Street and Rossville Street and later to “a recess at the rear of houses facing Chamberlain Street ”.5






65.12 The other soldier of 7 Platoon who gave evidence in 1972 was Lance Corporal 003, who gave an RMP statement dated 4th February 1972.1 In this statement, Lance Corporal 003 recorded that he moved with Second Lieutenant 110 from Rossville Street to the corner of 36 Chamberlain Street, the southernmost house on the west side of Chamberlain Street. References in the statement to being “in the forecourt of the flats ” and to being able to “observe the flats ” from this position suggest that Lance Corporal 003 was at the rear of number 36. Lance Corporal 003 stated that after “about twenty minutes ” he was ordered by Second Lieutenant 110 to pull back to the junction of Harvey Street and Chamberlain Street, before being withdrawn further to the junction of High Street and Chamberlain Street.


65.13 In his RMP statement, Lance Corporal 003 gave an account of seeing, as he ran from Rossville Street to 36 Chamberlain Street, a soldier from Support Company fire several shots from a kneeling position in the direction of Columbcille Court, “where gunfire was coming from ”.1 He also stated that from 36 Chamberlain Street he witnessed “quite a lot of firing coming from the flats at this time directed towards us ”. We return to these accounts of incoming fire later in this chapter.2



65.14 Both Second Lieutenant 110 and Lance Corporal 003 gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. According to his written statement to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal 003 ran up William Street with Corporal INQ 444 and Private INQ 554 and reached the south-eastern corner of the junction of Rossville Street and William Street.1 Lance Corporal 003 stated that he thought the whole of his platoon had come up to this point when he, Corporal INQ 444 and Private INQ 554 were ordered to cross the Eden Place waste ground.2 He told us that he ran across with these soldiers and ended up behind the yards of the Chamberlain Street houses at the southern end of that street.3




65.15 It is not clear from the written evidence of Lance Corporal 003 to this Inquiry when he got to this position. He recalled that it was after he had arrived there that Support Company came south along Rossville Street in their vehicles.1 This cannot be right since, as we have observed earlier in this report, Support Company had moved into the Bogside before any C Company soldiers had crossed Barrier 14.



65.16 Lance Corporal 003 gave the following account of what he saw while at the southern end of the Chamberlain Street houses:1

“At some point, I saw a soldier take up a kneeling position near to a Pig on Rossville Street. The soldier was facing south down Rossville Street, and I saw him fire one or two rounds in a southerly direction, from a kneeling position. His approximate position was at the point marked G on the attached map … I saw him fire, and saw the gas extrusion or smoke come off his weapon. He was wearing a helmet, but not a gas mask. I do not know what his height or build was, as he was kneeling down when I saw him. I cannot recall whether he was right or left handed as he fired. I did not see where he was aiming, apart from south down Rossville Street. I didn’t know who the soldier was although I found out later that he would have been from Support Company. There were other soldiers from his Company around him. ”




65.17 The point marked “G” was on Rossville Street just south of the entrance into Pilot Row.1



65.18 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal 003 identified himself on a still from BBC film footage, among a group of soldiers waiting behind Barrier 14.1 We set out that still below.2
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65.19 Lance Corporal 003 told us that he was the first soldier through the barrier.1 He agreed that when he went through the crowd had moved back and there was no prospect of being able to catch any of them.2 Apparently contrary to his RMP statement, he told us that he was not with Second Lieutenant 110 as he crossed the Eden Place waste ground.3He repeated what he had stated in his written statement to this Inquiry, that to the best of his knowledge there was no-one in the car park and no vehicles in the car park when he was at the end of the Chamberlain Street houses.4




65.20 In his written evidence to this Inquiry,1 Second Lieutenant 110 told us that his platoon went through Barrier 14 on foot, and that “The aim of my platoon as the men went through Barrier 14 was to clear the area, prevent further civil disorder and to make as many arrests as possible ”.2 He also told us that on turning the corner into Rossville Street he saw Support Company soldiers further down Rossville Street in the area around Eden Place. Since there was no need for his men to be in the same place he directed his platoon to go south-east across the Eden Place waste ground towards the back of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street. He thought that at this time civilians had already cleared away from the waste ground and he told us that he believed that “the area in front of the Rossville Flats and to the north of the flats as I looked at them was also very open and that there were no people in that area at that time ”.3 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Second Lieutenant 110 accepted that there might have been “one or two people ” in the car park at that time.4





65.21 In the course of his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Second Lieutenant 110 was asked to look at footage filmed by a BBC camera crew showing soldiers running across the Eden Place waste ground and taking up positions to the rear of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street. Second Lieutenant 110 agreed that it might have been his soldiers seen running across the Eden Place waste ground and that his soldiers had taken up positions as shown in the footage.1 In our view this footage does show soldiers of 7 Platoon running across the Eden Place waste ground.



65.22 It can be seen from the film footage that at the time when these soldiers crossed the Eden Place waste ground and ran along the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses there were no longer military vehicles parked in Rossville Street opposite Kells Walk. Instead, a number of vehicles are shown just to the north of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, while three vehicles, one of them a military ambulance, can be seen moving north along Rossville Street. This, as was suggested to Second Lieutenant 110, indicates that this film footage was shot relatively late in the day. For reasons given earlier in this report,1 we have concluded that it was filmed not only after the Army vehicles had moved to the north of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, but after all the casualties had been sustained in Sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5.



65.23 Despite this, Second Lieutenant 110 remained sure that when he reached the junction of Rossville Street and William Street, Support Company vehicles were still present on Rossville Street, although he could not say in which direction they might have been moving.1 He agreed that it was possible that he had waited for some time at the junction of Rossville Street and William Street before moving across the Eden Place waste ground, but he could not remember stopping and his assumption was that he moved through this area “in a relatively short period of time ”.2



65.24 Private INQ 5 was a member of 7 Platoon and Second Lieutenant 110’s signaller.1 As such, he should have remained with his commander.2 However, in his first written statement to this Inquiry,3 Private INQ 5 told us that after going through Barrier 14 he had turned left down Macari’s Lane into the Eden Place waste ground, where he came under fire and took cover behind a burned-out car.4 He also told us that after the shooting had died down he and other soldiers went into one of the back yards of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street, where he found 20 to 30 civilians sheltering. According to Private INQ 5, the civilians were not arrested, but they were told to get out with their hands on their heads.5 At the end of this statement Private INQ 5 asserted that he had not spoken to the press about Bloody Sunday.6




65.25 In a supplementary written statement to this Inquiry,1 Private INQ 5 accepted that he had been interviewed by journalists. He told us that he had forgotten about this when he made his first written statement.2


65.26 Private INQ 5 gave oral evidence to this Inquiry. He accepted that he was wrong in saying that he had gone down Macari’s Lane, and agreed that he had moved with other members of his platoon to the junction of William Street and Rossville Street before crossing the Eden Place waste ground.1 He identified himself as the centre figure in a still from the BBC film footage showing soldiers running across the waste ground.2

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65.27 The impression we gained from Private INQ 5’s evidence to us, including his evidence on incoming fire which is discussed below,1 was that he had little if any independent recollection of events and was relying wholly or to a very substantial extent on what he had been told by others or had otherwise come to believe. He gave accounts to journalists of C Company going into the Bogside, where they were fired on by the IRA and then in effect rescued by Support Company arriving in vehicles. In view of the evidence that we have considered earlier in this report2 this account is at odds with what actually happened.3 Although it is possible he did so, we remained unconvinced by his evidence that he sheltered behind a burned-out vehicle on the Eden Place waste ground, and his account of finding civilians sheltering in a back yard appears to be unsupported by any civilian evidence. In these circumstances, while we do not doubt his identification of himself on the still from the film footage shown above, we consider that it would be unwise to place any reliance on Private INQ 5’s accounts of what he witnessed.




65.28 As already observed,1 the film footage on which Private INQ 5 identified himself shows Army vehicles in the background travelling north. This was after Support Company vehicles had moved forward to the north side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. In our view, for the reasons we have given earlier,2 by this stage all the casualties had been sustained in Sectors 2, 3, 4 and 5.



65.29 Corporal INQ 444, another member of 7 Platoon, told us in his written statement to this Inquiry that after deploying through Barrier 14 he moved along William Street. He recalled that he had not quite got to the junction with Rossville Street when he heard, but did not see, Support Company vehicles moving south down Rossville Street. He stated that he returned back along William Street and turned into Chamberlain Street, from where he entered a small alleyway that led into a large area of waste ground. Corporal INQ 444 was unable to identify the alleyway on the map attached to his statement, but he thought that he moved to the end of it, from where he was able to see Block 1 and “about a quarter ” of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.1



65.30 Corporal INQ 444 stated that from this position he saw a civilian gunman moving between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats, a matter to which we return later.1 He also recalled the following incidents:2

“The second incident that sticks out in my mind is seeing a person standing on the roof of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. I saw this person immediately after seeing the gunman. The person was at position D (grid reference L14) on the attached map [a position at the northern end of Block 1]. I do not know if the person was male or female, I just saw a figure standing up. The person threw a bucket of liquid towards the Pig at position B [close to Block 1, just to the south of the northern end of the block]. The liquid was aimed at some soldiers below the flats who were near to the Pig. I cannot give any description of the soldiers. I can’t recall anyone actually hit with the liquid. I initially thought that it was just water or crap that was being thrown but I suddenly saw a couple of soldiers jumping about and some other soldiers dousing their bodies with water so I knew it was acid. It was maybe the upper body area which was being doused.

Almost as soon as this occurred, a soldier, who seemed to appear from nowhere as far as I can recall, began shooting. This is the third incident that sticks out clearly in my mind. I did not know what target he had found as he was shooting out of my line of sight, but I heard rapid firing and I had never seen that before. I think that the soldier was standing approximately at position E (grid reference L14) on the attached map [the northern edge of the car park, approximately half way between Rossville Street and the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses]. I believe although I do not know that the person who was firing was a man called Lance Corporal H. I have it in my mind it is Lance Corporal H. I think I came to the conclusion it was Lance Corporal H although I did not know him to recognise him, nor can I give any description of him. It was single, distinct shots that I heard from an SLR rifle, but rapid semi-automatic fire. It was not automatic fire.

I remember that the soldier was standing up and he was holding his rifle under his arm at a position between his shoulder and his waist. I could not see the butt of the rifle. He was firing at an angle of 30 to 40 degrees towards Block 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats, in the direction shown on the attached map. I personally thought that he was being stupid firing as he did. I think he fired more than 10, less than 20. Our brief was always to fire aimed shots with minimum force. We always carried out disciplined controlled fire. It is my opinion that he was phased out by the situation, was frightened and he had ‘lost the plot’. That was the impression I formed of him. He is the only person I can recollect seeing firing. He had possibly seen a target, but he did seem to be firing an awful lot of rounds.

I think that Lance Corporal H at that time was fairly new to the battalion. Although I have in my mind that it was Lance Corporal H I saw there is a good chance that I did not know at that time that it was him but that I found out it was Lance Corporal H from either talking about the incident or hearing it was him after the event. I believe that he fired more than ten rounds, but probably less than twenty. I do not recall hearing any return fire towards Lance Corporal H during that period. I do not remember him trying to take cover. I then remember a voice of authority shouting ‘cease fire cease fire’, and Lance Corporal H stopped firing. I cannot remember who gave the command or where that command came from. ”




65.31 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Corporal INQ 444 said that at the time he did not know that the liquid he had described being poured from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats was acid; he said he must have picked this up from talk later. He also said to us that his identification of “Lance Corporal H” (who was in fact a Private, not a Lance Corporal) as the soldier firing indiscriminately was something that he had learned much later. He said that he had a “clear recollection of a soldier firing too many rounds in an indisciplined manner ”, but he thought he had been “far too detailed [in his statement] in certainly the position I put the man in, um, where he was firing, et cetera ”. In addition, he told us that he did not remember exactly when the ceasefire order was shouted, nor whether his memory of the order came from the day itself or from the television footage he had subsequently seen.1



65.32 During the course of his oral evidence Corporal INQ 444 was shown the evidence of Second Lieutenant 110 and Lance Corporal 003, who both described moving from the northern end of Rossville Street, across the Eden Place waste ground, to the backs of the houses in Chamberlain Street. Corporal INQ 444 was told that Lance Corporal 003 had recorded in his RMP statement that he (Lance Corporal 003) had moved in this way with Corporal INQ 444. Corporal INQ 444 was then asked if he accepted that his recollection of being in Chamberlain Street and looking through an alleyway could be at fault:1

“Yes, I do, and this was always my concern, right from the beginning, when I first started to make statements, is how I actually got there. I was convinced that I had come through an alleyway, but it was pointed out to me that there was not an alleyway, but I just could not recollect how I got there. ”




65.33 Corporal INQ 444 was asked about the soldier he said he had seen firing:1

“Q. You describe, if we look at paragraph 34 and we take it in stages:

‘The soldier was standing up and he was holding his rifle under his arm at a position between his shoulder and his waist.’

Can you elaborate, please, on the firing position that was being adopted by this soldier?

A. I am pretty certain he was in the standing position, um, and firing rapidly, probably starting with his rifle properly in his shoulder, but the amount of rounds that he fired, which was a number of rounds, I cannot say exactly how many, the rifle had slipped out of the shoulder and was working its way down the body. At that particular stage he should have stopped firing.

Q. You described it at the beginning of giving your evidence as ‘indisciplined’?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get the impression that this soldier was not firing aimed shots?

A. Yes.

Q. If we look, please, at your map at C444.9, in 2000 when you made this statement, you put the approximate position of the soldier at point E and the arrow indicated the direction of fire. So that we understand your evidence properly: how sure are you today of the position of the soldier?

A. I am not at all sure. Um, with lots of mind searching I believe the soldier come from across the other side of Rossville Street because he seemed to be, um, totally alone; he was in the middle of the open area, um, but I am not sure. I was gently asked to come up with a position and that was probably a totally wrong assumption. I believe he was somewhere in the general area of that wasteground. I could identify, you know, a general area.

Q. What about the direction of fire?

A. The direction of fire was at 45 degrees – between 30 and 45 degrees. It was definitely up in the air, absolutely certain it was up in the air, but I could not say where it was directed to.



Q. … How sure are you now that these shots were being fired in between the blocks and towards the car park?

A. Not sure at all. ”




65.34 A little later in his evidence Corporal INQ 444 said that he was not sure how many shots the soldier had fired: “It could have been six to 15 ”. However, he stood by his recollection of a soldier somewhere in the waste ground, firing at least six shots in an undisciplined manner.1 He told us that he did not recall seeing a Lance Corporal’s stripe on the soldier’s uniform, and that he had somehow gained the belief that the soldier was a Lance Corporal when he first started making his statement.2


65.35 With regard to the soldier that he said he saw firing indiscriminately, Corporal INQ 444 described him as being about 50 yards away somewhere in the area of a circle that he drew on the following map, the letter “A ” representing Corporal INQ 444’s approximate position.1
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65.36 Corporal INQ 444 told us that he was not certain of the direction in which this soldier was firing, but it “was up in the air at 45, 30 to 40 degrees as I remember it, from a standing position ”. He also told us that his earlier evidence about the soldier probably starting to fire with the rifle at his shoulder with the rifle then slipping down was “something I worked out; I did not see it ”.1



65.37 Corporal INQ 444 told us that he had no recollection, apart from the soldier firing indiscriminately, of any other soldiers firing into the area of the Rossville Flats car park.1


65.38 We formed the view that Corporal INQ 444 was doing his best to assist this Inquiry. He was careful to make clear that he was now not sure about the sequence of events or about how he reached the back of the Chamberlain Street houses. He also told us that some of his account was based on what he had heard afterwards from others. We consider that an example of this was his recollection of something being poured on soldiers from the roof of the Rossville Flats, which we believe to be an inaccurate version of an incident concerning Private R and Private T that we have considered earlier in this report.1 While in our view it would be unwise to place much reliance on his recollection of his movements, we do accept his account of seeing a soldier firing in an indiscriminate manner.


65.39 In the light of the fact that Corporal INQ 444 had in our view arrived at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses at a late stage, and believed that the soldier firing indiscriminately had come from the other side of Rossville Street, it seems to us that it is unlikely that this was Private S or another soldier from Mortar Platoon, as suggested by the representatives of the majority of the families.1 It also seems unlikely that it was Corporal P, since it appears that the shots this soldier described firing were fired at an earlier stage, as we discuss later in this report.2


65.40 Corporal INQ 444 was at pains to explain that the only reason that he thought the soldier was Private H (of Anti-Tank Platoon) was because of information that he received after the events of the day. We consider this matter later in this report,1 where we conclude that it is somewhat more likely than not that Corporal INQ 444 saw Private H, though we remain far from certain. We return later in this chapter2 to the evidence of Corporal INQ 444 of hearing incoming fire and of seeing a civilian with a rifle.

1 Paragraph 105.29 2Paragraphs 65.127–129 and 65.206

65.41 Private INQ 131 and Private INQ 1582 gave evidence that they were members of 7 Platoon, and that after they went through Barrier 14 they moved along William Street to the junction with Rossville Street and then across the waste ground to the back of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street.1



65.42 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 131 told us that he believed that he was one of the first to climb over Barrier 14 and, with Lance Corporal 003, among the first soldiers to turn south from William Street into Rossville Street.1



65.43 We formed the impression from his oral evidence1 that Private INQ 131 really had little if any clear recollection of events.



65.44 Private INQ 1582 did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry, but he did make a written statement. He told us that Second Lieutenant 110 was his Platoon Commander,1 and recalled running across waste ground to the back yard of one of the houses on Chamberlain Street. He described hearing a lot of firing, but was not sure whether this was as he was running across the waste ground:2

“There seemed to be a lot of firing going on and although I had been in fire fights before, there had generally not been that much firing. Generally a terrorist would fire then disappear and soldiers would only have a chance to fire once or twice at a target. However, on this occasion I was conscious of more shooting than that going on to the right of me (west). Although that I know I wasn’t fired at personally, I did not know who was firing what, at whom, or why. ”




65.45 In respect of his movements on the day, Lance Corporal INQ 1799 recorded in his written statement to this Inquiry that he turned into Chamberlain Street from William Street,1 but during his oral evidence he seemed inclined to think that he reached the rear of the Chamberlain Street houses from Rossville Street.2 We discuss below3 Lance Corporal INQ 1799’s evidence of seeing two gunmen on Bloody Sunday: first, a civilian with an automatic pistol whom he saw shortly after his deployment through Barrier 14; and second, a man with an M1 carbine in the vicinity of the Rossville Flats. We also consider below4 Lance Corporal INQ 1799’s evidence of what he described as the first gunfire he had heard that day, namely two bursts of automatic fire from a Thompson sub-machine gun after he had taken cover in a doorway.




65.46 Listening to Lance Corporal INQ 1799 we came to the conclusion that he too had little clear recollection of events. He agreed that he had difficulties with his memory in confusing things that he had been told with things that he actually recalled.1



65.47 Private INQ 815 did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry, but he did make a written statement. In this he told us that he was the driver of one of the two Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) of 7 Platoon.1 Again it seemed to us that this soldier had little clear recollection of events. However, he did state, and we accept, that after Barrier 14 had been moved, he drove his (empty or almost empty) APC through, and stopped behind his Platoon Commander’s Pig on William Street, approximately level with the northern end of Chamberlain Street.2



65.48 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 96 told us that his Platoon Commander was Second Lieutenant 110, which would put him in 7 Platoon.1 According to his account, having crossed the barrier he went along William Street, turned left into Macari’s Lane, south across the Eden Place waste ground and then turned and went north up Chamberlain Street. He told us he was following Private INQ 5. He also told us that he did not encounter any snipers on the day nor did he feel under fire at any stage: “By the time I went in, I suspect that the shooting was already over. ”2



65.49 Private INQ 96 did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry. If, as he recalled, he was following Private INQ 5, then it seems to us that he was probably mistaken in believing that he had gone into the Eden Place waste ground through Macari’s Lane. Although Private INQ 5 initially thought that this was the way he had gone, he later agreed that in fact he must have come into the Eden Place waste ground from Rossville Street.

65.50 Private INQ 554 told this Inquiry that he was in 9 Platoon. However, he recalled taking cover “in an area of rubble ”,1 and Lance Corporal 003 believed that the two of them were together on the day.2 Both of these pieces of evidence suggest that Private INQ 554 was actually in 7 Platoon. We return to his account when considering evidence of C Company soldiers of non-military fire.



65.51 It is possible that Private INQ 559 was a member of 7 Platoon, but his evidence to us was to the effect that he went down Chamberlain Street,1 and so on the whole it seems more likely that he was part of 8 Platoon.



65.52 Our consideration of the evidence reviewed above1 leads us to conclude that the soldiers of 7 Platoon who moved into the Eden Place waste ground and along the back of the Chamberlain Street houses did so at a late stage, after all the casualties had been sustained in all the sectors.


The composition and movements of 9 Platoon of C Company

65.53 We do not know for certain who commanded 9 Platoon. Private INQ 587 suggested it was Sergeant UNK 925.1 However, the Ministry of Defence informed us that this soldier was not in Northern Ireland on Bloody Sunday. A more likely candidate is UNK 410. He is referred to in the written evidence to this Inquiry of Second Lieutenant 026, Platoon Commander of 8 Platoon.2 Since Second Lieutenant 026 correctly identified the Platoon Commander of 7 Platoon, he may be correct in his recollection that UNK 410 was the Commander of 9 Platoon. Lance Corporal INQ 1056, whom we believe to have been a member of 9 Platoon, told us that he thought that the Platoon Commander was UNK 410, although he could not recall him being present on Bloody Sunday.3 We were unable to obtain a statement from UNK 410.



65.54 No member of 9 Platoon gave evidence in 1972. We traced a number of soldiers whose accounts indicate that they were or may have been among the members of this platoon, although it is likely that there were others.

Cipher
Rank
Identified by

1
UNK 410
Unknown
Second Lieutenant 0261

2
INQ 488
Sergeant
Tribunal, on the basis that his platoon did not advance beyond the junction of William Street and Rossville Street2

3
INQ 587
Private
Himself3

4
INQ 736
Corporal or Lance Corporal
Tribunal, on the basis that he stated that he was with Sergeant INQ 488 and that he remained around the junction of William Street and Rossville Street4

5
INQ 956
Private
Himself5

6
INQ 1010
Private
Himself6

7
INQ 1056
Lance Corporal
Himself, by implication from his statement7

8
INQ 1093
Private
Himself8

9
INQ 1594
Corporal
Himself, tentatively, on being told that Private INQ 587 believed that he was in 9 Platoon9

10
INQ 1910
Lance Corporal
Himself10

11
INQ 2057
Private
Tribunal, on the basis that he stated that he was ordered to remain by “a junction ”11




65.55 Much of the evidence that we have obtained from soldiers of 9 Platoon as to their movements is muddled and inconsistent, which is not surprising in view of the fact that they were first asked to give their accounts long after Bloody Sunday.

65.56 Sergeant INQ 488 gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. He told us that he could not remember which platoon he was with on the day.1 He recalled that his platoon was the first across Barrier 14, and that it did not advance further than the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, and he had no recollection of other platoons of C Company doing so either.2



65.57 Private INQ 587 told this Inquiry that after going through Barrier 14 he moved along William Street towards Rossville Street. As we discuss below,1 he stated that he heard gunfire, including incoming rounds, before reaching the junction. He took cover until his APC was brought forward and then exchanged the baton that he was carrying for his self-loading rifle (SLR). He subsequently moved into the northern end of Rossville Street, but did not proceed beyond the block of buildings on the south-east corner of the junction with William Street.2



65.58 Lance Corporal INQ 1910 told us, in his written evidence to this Inquiry, that he moved along William Street to the junction with Rossville Street following 9 Platoon’s deployment through Barrier 14. He recalled hearing shots and temporarily detaining and searching civilians on the waste ground to the north of the junction, something that he said was done “for their own safety as much as anything ”.1 Lance Corporal INQ 1910 did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry.



65.59 Since we are satisfied from the evidence considered above1 and below2 that soldiers of 7 Platoon did go further than the junction of William Street and Rossville Street and that 8 Platoon went down Chamberlain Street, it seems more likely than not that Sergeant INQ 488 was with 9 Platoon on the day.



65.60 INQ 736 told us in his written statement to this Inquiry that he was either a Lance Corporal or a Corporal on the day.1 He gave an account of going through the barrier with Sergeant INQ 488 and stated that the Sergeant called for him to follow.2 He thought that he was not among the first to go through the barrier, but not among the last either, and he recalled running west, straight along William Street. We discuss below3his evidence of hearing incoming shots, high velocity fire and explosions. INQ 736 described looking round the corner of the buildings on the eastern side of Rossville Street (ie the buildings that extended a short distance from the south-eastern corner of the junction with William Street), and seeing soldiers from Support Company in aiming positions, including a soldier leaning against a wall near Kells Walk. INQ 736 told us that he stayed by the buildings on the eastern side of Rossville Street, but he neither saw nor heard anything else of significance.4 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that he did not see any members of Support Company attempting to make arrests “because the crowd had dispersed as soon as the shooting started ”.5






65.61 In the course of his oral evidence INQ 736 gave an account of Support Company initially entering the Bogside on foot and being met by hostile fire. In response, according to INQ 736, Support Company’s vehicles were brought forward, and the men returned to them in order to re-arm.1


65.62 The evidence given by INQ 736 of the movement of Support Company into the Bogside is inconsistent not only with the evidence of members of that company but also with the photographic and other evidence of what in fact happened, as we have set out earlier in this report.1 On listening to his evidence we formed the view that it would be wise to place little reliance on INQ 736’s account of what he said he heard and saw on the day, though his references to Sergeant INQ 488 and the fact that he did not seem to move from the area of the junction of William Street and Rossville Street indicate that he was probably a member of 9 Platoon.


65.63 Private INQ 1093 appears to have been the signaller for 9 Platoon who accompanied the Platoon Commander on Bloody Sunday.1 He told us that he recalled following behind Support Company, walking at a brisk pace, and said that he saw the soldiers of Support Company “dismounting ” near the Rossville Flats. He recalled walking along a “terraced street ”, but he was unsure whether this was Chamberlain Street or Rossville Street.2 We consider below3 his evidence of seeing the strike of a burst of automatic fire that “danced down the street ” in front of him.4






65.64 It is far from clear from this account where Private INQ 1093 went. If he had gone down Chamberlain Street he could not have seen the Support Company vehicles entering the Bogside, and he could not have “followed behind ” them.1 However, it is difficult to accept that he advanced very far (or at all) along Rossville Street. There is no other evidence that suggests to us that 9 Platoon went further along Rossville Street than the houses at the south-eastern corner of the junction with William Street, and Rossville Street cannot be described as a “terraced street ”. In our view it would be unwise to place reliance on the evidence of Private INQ 1093.



65.65 It is possible that Private INQ 2057 was a member of 9 Platoon, but according to his written evidence to this Inquiry1 he had little recollection of the day, save that he was at a junction.



65.66 We refer to the evidence of other soldiers who appear to have been members of 9 Platoon when considering the evidence of C Company soldiers of non-military fire. We consider that 9 Platoon, after crossing Barrier 14, did not advance further than the buildings on the south-eastern corner of the junction of William Street and Rossville Street.

The composition and movements of 8 Platoon of C Company

65.67 Counsel to the Inquiry prepared what we consider to be an accurate summary of the evidence relating to the composition of 8 Platoon on the day, which with few alterations we set out below:1



1. According to Sergeant INQ 2000, Platoon Sergeant of 8 Platoon, he, Corporal 007
and Private INQ 12 were members of a 17-man patrol commanded by Second Lieutenant 026.1



2. Second Lieutenant 026 identified himself as a Second Lieutenant and the Platoon Commander of 8 Platoon, which consisted of 22 men on Bloody Sunday.1 He named Private INQ 12,2 Corporal INQ 579,3 Private INQ 876,4 Lance Corporal INQ 13345 and Lance Corporal INQ 21216 as having been under his command that day.




3. Corporal 007 identified himself as a Corporal and a Section Commander in 8 Platoon.1 He further identified Private INQ 876, Private INQ 12 and Lance Corporal INQ 2045,2 Sergeant INQ 2000,3 Private INQ 437 and Lance Corporal INQ 2121.4


4 Day 310/12


4. Private INQ 12 was a Private in 8 Platoon.1 He identified Corporal INQ 579,2 Lance Corporal INQ 1334,3 Sergeant INQ 20004 and Lance Corporal INQ 20455 as members of 8 Platoon present on Bloody Sunday.




5. Private INQ 437 identified himself as a Private in 8 Platoon.1


6. Private INQ 471 identified himself as a radio operator in 8 Platoon, although on Bloody Sunday he operated as a rifleman.1 He claimed that Private INQ 12, Lance Corporal INQ 1334 (who he thought was his Section Commander2) and Lance Corporal INQ 2121 travelled from Belfast in his Pig, which was driven by Private INQ 876.3 According to Private INQ 471 there would have been eight men in the back of the Pig and two in the front.4 He also identified Corporal INQ 579 and Corporal 007 as members of 8 Platoon although he was not sure that either man was there on the day.5




7. Corporal INQ 579 identified himself as a Corporal and Section Commander in 8 Platoon.1 He also identified Private INQ 12 and Sergeant INQ 2000.2



8. Private INQ 876 confirmed that he was a member of 8 Platoon.1 He identified Private INQ 12 and Lance Corporal INQ 1334,2 who he believed might all have been in his Pig from Belfast to Londonderry.



9. Private INQ 1073 stated that on 30th January he travelled in a Pig with Private INQ 12, Private INQ 437, and Lance Corporal INQ 1334 from Palace Barracks, Belfast to Londonderry.1


10. Private INQ 1296 identified himself as being in 8 Platoon.1 He cited Corporal INQ 579 and Lance Corporal INQ 1334,2 and Lance Corporal INQ 21213 as members of 8 Platoon.




11. Lance Corporal INQ 1334 identified himself as a member of a platoon commanded, he thought, by Second Lieutenant 026.1


12. Lance Corporal INQ 1574 identified himself as a member of 1 PARA, C Company, 2 Platoon. However, he described travelling from Belfast to Londonderry in the company
of Private INQ 12, Private INQ 437, Private INQ 876, Private INQ 1073, Sergeant INQ 2000 and Lance Corporal INQ 2121.1



13. Lance Corporal INQ 2045 confirmed he was a member of 8 Platoon.1 On his account, other members of this platoon included Private INQ 12, Lance Corporal INQ 1334, Corporal INQ 579, Private INQ 876, Sergeant INQ 2000, Lance Corporal INQ 2121 and Lance Corporal INQ 1574.2



14. Lance Corporal INQ 2121 identified himself as a member of 8 Platoon. He also named Sergeant INQ 2000.1



15. Lance Corporal INQ 2151 declined to co-operate with this Inquiry, but he was identified in a photograph1 standing face on to the camera at the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street by both Second Lieutenant 026 and Private INQ 12.2



65.68 The table below summarises this evidence.

Cipher
Rank
Position/Identified by

1
026
Second Lieutenant
Platoon Commander. Identified by Lance Corporal INQ 1334 and Sergeant INQ 2000.

2
007
Corporal
Section Commander. Identified by Private INQ 471 and Sergeant INQ 2000.

3
INQ 12
Private
Identified by Corporal 007, Second Lieutenant 026, Private INQ 471, Corporal INQ 579, Private INQ 876, Lance Corporal INQ 1056, Private INQ 1073, Lance Corporal INQ 1574, Sergeant INQ 2000 and Lance Corporal INQ 2045.

4
INQ 437
Private
Identified by Corporal 007, Private INQ 1073 and Lance Corporal INQ 1574.

5
INQ 471
Private
Identified by himself.

6
INQ 579
Corporal
Section Commander. Identified by Second Lieutenant 026, Private INQ 12, Private INQ 1296 and Lance Corporal INQ 2045.

7
INQ 876
Private
Identified by Corporal 007, Second Lieutenant 026, Corporal INQ 444, Private INQ 471, Lance Corporal INQ 1574 and Lance Corporal INQ 2045.

8
INQ 1073
Private
Identified by Lance Corporal INQ 1574.

9
INQ 1296
Private
Identified by himself.

10
INQ 1334
Lance Corporal
Identified by Second Lieutenant 026, Private INQ 12, Private INQ 471, Private INQ 876, Private INQ 1073, Private INQ 1296 and Lance Corporal INQ 2045.

11
INQ 1574
Lance Corporal
Identified by himself and Lance Corporal INQ 2045.

12
INQ 2000
Sergeant
Platoon Sergeant. Identified by Corporal 007, Private INQ 12, Corporal INQ 579, Lance Corporal INQ 1574,
Lance Corporal INQ 2045 and Lance Corporal INQ 2121.

13
INQ 2045
Lance Corporal
Identified by Corporal 007, Private INQ 12 and Lance Corporal INQ 1056.

14
INQ 2121
Lance Corporal
Identified by Private INQ 471, Private INQ 1296, Lance Corporal INQ 1574 and Sergeant INQ 2000.

15
INQ 2151
Lance Corporal
Identified by Second Lieutenant 026 and Private INQ 12.


65.69 It is likely that there were other soldiers forming part of 8 Platoon on the day, but the evidence does not allow us to identify them with any certainty. However, it seems on balance that Private INQ 559 was also in this platoon, as he described running down a narrow street after he had gone through the barrier.1,2


2 Counsel to the Inquiry prepared an Appendix which dealt with other possible members of this platoon. In our view it is not necessary to reproduce that Appendix in this report (CS9.61-63).


The evidence of Second Lieutenant 026

65.70 In his RMP statement dated 4th February 1972, the Commander of 8 Platoon, Second Lieutenant 026, gave the following account:1

“About 1615 hrs, 30 January 1972, my entire platoon of 22 men all moved down Chamberlain Street towards Rossville Flats. We had one APC carrying some of the Platoon, while some of us were on foot. Our object was to secure our left flank and to consolidate at the end of Chamberlain Street.

As we moved down Chamberlain Street a crowd of about 80 persons were confronting us. They moved backwards as we approached and shouted abuse at us. They remained 50 yards ahead of us all the time. Nothing was thrown at us.

When we reached the end of Chamberlain Street, the crowd disappeared into the Rossville Flats complex. The APC moved into a position at MR 43311681, and the Platoon deployed around it. ”



65.71 The grid reference given by Second Lieutenant 026 indicates that the APC moved to a point at the southern end of Chamberlain Street.

65.72 Second Lieutenant 026 did not give evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, but he did give written and oral evidence to this Inquiry.

65.73 According to Second Lieutenant 026’s written statement to this Inquiry, 8 Platoon went through Barrier 14 after 7 and 9 Platoons. He stated that Major 221A, the Commander of C Company, gave him orders “to take my Platoon down Chamberlain Street and secure the Battalion’s left flank ”. The platoon climbed over the barrier, turned left and went on foot down Chamberlain Street.1



65.74 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Second Lieutenant 026 told us that he was “as certain as I can be ” that 7 and 9 Platoon went through Barrier 14 before his platoon. He recalled that one of his APCs had broken down, which had delayed his men. He told us that he assumed that the platoons of C Company had all been given the task of arresting rioters. He said that the other platoons were no more than a few hundred metres ahead of him and that “7 and 9 Platoon went off down William Street and I was, at that stage, caught up with Major 221A and was tasked to go down Chamberlain Street ”.1 He had earlier stated that he was met by Major 221A “at the barrier ”.2



65.75 We are of the view that Second Lieutenant 026 was with his soldiers when they went into Chamberlain Street. He said that “There was absolutely no reason why I would lag behind, I was the platoon commander ”.1


65.76 Second Lieutenant 026 recorded in his written evidence to this Inquiry that having entered Chamberlain Street, he advanced towards the junction with High Street. He said that he saw a crowd, which he did not judge to be a threat, ahead of his platoon at the southern end of the street, and that he could tell from the debris on the street and the smell of CS gas that a riot had recently been dispersed.1



65.77 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Second Lieutenant 026 stated that he preferred the account that he had given in 1972 of pushing an abusive and confrontational crowd backwards as his platoon moved along Chamberlain Street.1 Initially he added that “there were a few stones that were thrown, but they were not going to hit us, they were probably … too far away for that ”.2 However, on being shown the section of his RMP statement in which he stated that “Nothing was thrown at us ”, Second Lieutenant 026 retracted his comment to this Inquiry and accepted his earlier evidence.3 In response to being asked how he came to the conclusion that the crowd ahead of his platoon was riotous, he said:4

“The riotous behaviour, as I recall, had taken place in the area of Waterloo Street and was dispersing by the time we, C Company, went in there. So we were following up a rioting situation.

I had every reason to believe, based on the fact that the crowd was dispersing and the crowd were throwing – were shouting abuse at us, that those people on Chamberlain Street had been part of the, part of the rioters. ”




65.78 Second Lieutenant 026 was shown a photograph taken by Gilles Peress, reproduced below, of the scene in Eden Place just before, as we discuss earlier in this report,1 Lieutenant N of Mortar Platoon fired a shot up this alleyway. Second Lieutenant 026 said that he did not see any such scene, nor did he recall civilians being present in Eden Place.2
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65.79 Second Lieutenant 026 told us that he and his platoon advanced to the junction of Chamberlain Street and High Street. From there, he saw Fr Daly coming north up Chamberlain Street with a group carrying a body. This must have been the group carrying Jackie Duddy. He said that he sent Lance Corporal INQ 1334 “to quickly check the person who was being carried ”.1In his oral evidence, Second Lieutenant 026 stated that he did not think that he had been in Chamberlain Street for “very long ” before encountering the group carrying Jackie Duddy.2



65.80 Second Lieutenant 026 recalled that he then moved with his men to a point about halfway along Chamberlain Street, where he was joined by an APC driven by Private INQ 876. The platoon and the APC advanced to the end of Chamberlain Street, where Second Lieutenant 026 saw two frightened women crouching behind a small car. “The women were clearly in fear and we persuaded them to come to us. We then arranged for them to move further up Chamberlain Street to a place of safety. ”1We have no reason to doubt this recollection of Second Lieutenant 026, but we do not know who these people were.



65.81 Second Lieutenant 026 gave the following evidence of what he saw as he looked into the Rossville Flats car park from the southern end of Chamberlain Street:1

“My memory was that the people who had moved down the Chamberlain Street ahead of us, some dispersed into the bottom left house at the – I do not know the number – and some dispersed across the car park. It was very quickly – the car park was very quickly empty of all people, apart from the two women. ”




65.82 Second Lieutenant 026 told us that he heard gunfire as his platoon crossed the barrier but before they moved into Chamberlain Street. This was “shooting going on in the general area of west, somewhere in the area of Rossville Street and beyond”. However, he said that he was not aware of any further firing from the time that he entered Chamberlain Street until the time that he reached the southern end of that street.1 We discuss below2 Second Lieutenant 026’s evidence of hearing incoming fire from that position.


The evidence of other members of 8 Platoon

65.83 Corporal 007 gave two statements to the RMP in 1972, in which he dealt with his actions and movements shortly after 8 Platoon moved through Barrier 14. In his first statement, dated 4th February 1972, he said that his platoon:1

“… moved along Chamberlain Street, Londonderry, towards Rossville Flats. Our intention was secure the left flank. We were confronted by a mob of about 80–100 persons who shouted abuse at us but moved back as we approached. As we came to the end of Chamberlain Street the mob disappeared into surrounding houses. ”




65.84 The account that Corporal 007 gave in this statement is similar, in both content and phraseology, to that which Second Lieutenant 026 gave to the RMP on the same day.1 Both of these soldiers were interviewed by the same person, Staff Sergeant Middleton-Jones, within 20 minutes of one another.2


65.85 In his later statement, dated 19th May 1972, Corporal 007 gave a different version of events:1

“About 1600 hrs, 30 Jan 72, a group of rioters who had been throwing stones [at] the Security Forces left WILLIAM ST and ran into CHAMBERLAIN ST. We gave chase, but when we reached CHAMBERLAIN ST they had disappeared [emphasis added] … I assumed that they had gone into the ROSSVILLE Flats area. ”




65.86 As will be seen from the discussion that follows,1 this account is in somewhat similar terms to those given by Private INQ 12 and Sergeant INQ 2000, who were interviewed by the same member of the RMP shortly before and shortly after Corporal 007.2


65.87 Corporal 007 told this Inquiry that he could not recall seeing civilians in Chamberlain Street, but he could not be sure that there were none.1 He said that he had no recollection of being confronted by a crowd in the way described in his first RMP statement.2 He also said that he did not remember seeing Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy.3




65.88 Private INQ 12 gave three statements in 1972, two of which dealt with his actions and movements shortly after 8 Platoon deployed through Barrier 14. In a statement dated 10th March 1972, Private INQ 12 told a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officer that he had seen one man throwing stones from within a hostile crowd that had confronted troops at the barrier. When C Company deployed, this man “ran up Chamberlain Street and into a house ”.1 Private INQ 12 told the RMP in a statement dated 19th May 1972 that although his patrol gave chase to a group of rioters who had run from William Street to Chamberlain Street, “on our arrival in CHAMBERLAIN ST they had disappeared ”. It was not until he subsequently entered a house (33 Chamberlain Street) that he saw again those who he believed had been throwing stones in William Street.2 As is noted above,3 this second account is in somewhat similar terms to the evidence given by Corporal 007 and Sergeant INQ 2000 to the same RMP interviewer on the same day.


65.89 During his oral evidence to this Inquiry it was suggested to Private INQ 12 that these two statements were inconsistent, on the basis that his evidence to the RUC officer suggested that he had seen the man running up Chamberlain Street, whereas in his RMP statement he had stated that the rioters had disappeared by the time his patrol reached Chamberlain Street. When asked which was true, Private INQ 12 answered, “The both of them really ”; when pushed as to how that could be, he replied: “It is how the question was asked, sir, that is the only way I can answer that. ”1 In our view, in the light of the other evidence of the situation when 8 Platoon soldiers reached the north end of Chamberlain Street, we consider that on this point Private INQ 12’s RMP statement is likely to be closer to the truth than his account to the RUC officer.



65.90 In his evidence to this Inquiry, Private INQ 12 gave an account of moving into Chamberlain Street, hearing incoming fire and then taking cover in the doorway of a house until his APC arrived. He stated that he subsequently retrieved his SLR from the APC and held his position for ten to 15 minutes.1 At some stage after that, he said he recalled entering a house where he found a number of people whom he recognised as having been involved with the civil rights demonstration and rioting. He said that he did not know that these people were in the house until after he had entered it.2



65.91 We consider below1 Private INQ 12’s evidence of hearing incoming fire and seeing civilian gunmen. In the next chapter2 of this report we discuss his role in arresting people in 33 Chamberlain Street.



65.92 Sergeant INQ 2000 gave an RMP statement dated 19th May 1972 in which he said the following:1

“About 1600 hrs, 30 Jan 1972, we were chasing rioters who had left WILLIAM ST and entered CHAMBERLAIN ST. There were about 50 persons in this group, mostly male. This group disappeared on reaching the top of CHAMBERLAIN ST and I assumed that they had gone into the ROSSVILLE Flats area, because on our arrival at the top of CHAMBERLAIN ST they were nowhere to be seen. The patrol was then approached by a woman, who came from 33 CHAMBERLAIN ST. She asked if we could call for an ambulance as a person who had been shot was in the house. ”




65.93 This account is in similar terms to those given by Corporal 007 and Private INQ 12 on the same day and to the same interviewing soldier. However, the context of Sergeant INQ 2000’s statement suggests that he was referring to the southern end of Chamberlain Street as the “top ”. Number 33 was the southernmost house on the eastern side of the street and, as we discuss in the next chapter,1 members of 8 Platoon were not alerted to the presence of injured people there until they had moved most of the way along the street. Sergeant INQ 2000’s RMP statement is not inconsistent with the evidence considered above2 to the effect that a crowd was present on Chamberlain Street as 8 Platoon advanced along it.



65.94 In his evidence to this Inquiry, Sergeant INQ 2000 stated that he could not remember anything about the events of Bloody Sunday, but he accepted that his RMP statement accurately reflected what he remembered at the date on which he gave it.1


65.95 Lance Corporal INQ 1334 gave an account to this Inquiry, which we discuss below,1 of hearing incoming gunfire shortly after he moved through Barrier 14. He told us that William Street and Chamberlain Street seemed “completely empty apart from a crowd of about two dozen people, who were trying to get into a house at the far end of Chamberlain Street ”.2 Lance Corporal INQ 1334 said that he was the soldier who approached Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy as they made their way up Chamberlain Street;3 this can be seen in the photographs and television footage discussed below.4



65.96 Private INQ 471 told this Inquiry that by the time his platoon moved through Barrier 14 the crowd that had been in William Street had “dispersed around the corners ”.1 He recalled moving towards or into Chamberlain Street and pausing at a corner, before hearing gunfire and then moving to his APC in order to exchange his baton for a rifle.2 He did not believe that there were any civilians in Chamberlain Street when he entered it,3 but shortly afterwards he saw Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy moving north along the street towards his platoon.4




65.97 Corporal INQ 579 said in his evidence to this Inquiry that as he advanced down Chamberlain Street he saw a crowd of about 30 civilians who had retreated to the southern end, close to the flats. He recalled that the crowd were looking towards his platoon and had their backs to the flats, “but they were not causing us any trouble ”. He thought that they were “just bystanders, onlookers ”. He told us that the crowd retreated as his platoon advanced, and that the “vast majority ” of this crowd went into the last house on the eastern side of Chamberlain Street (number 33). He did not recall seeing any other civilians on Chamberlain Street or the surrounding side streets.1 We discuss below2 his evidence of being fired upon and taking cover as he moved down Chamberlain Street.


65.98 Private INQ 1073 told this Inquiry that when he entered Chamberlain Street the street was empty except for a crowd of people at the southern end.1



65.99 It follows from the evidence of these soldiers, and that of Second Lieutenant 026, that there is some uncertainty as to whether there were any civilians on Chamberlain Street when 8 Platoon deployed down it. The RMP accounts given by Second Lieutenant 026 and Corporal 007 on 4th February 1972 suggest that a confrontational and verbally abusive crowd of about 80–100 people were present, and that they moved back as 8 Platoon advanced, before dispersing into the area of the flats or into surrounding houses. Sergeant INQ 2000’s RMP statement may also suggest that the soldiers saw, and indeed chased, a crowd along Chamberlain Street. However, the statements given by Corporal 007 and Private INQ 12 on 19th May 1972 record that the crowd of rioters that these soldiers had seen on William Street had “disappeared ” by the time 8 Platoon reached Chamberlain Street. The evidence given to this Inquiry by members of 8 Platoon on this issue can be divided between those who cannot remember any civilians being present on Chamberlain Street (Corporal 007 and Private INQ 471) and those who thought that there was a crowd at the southern end of the street, possibly comprising people who subsequently went into a nearby house (Lance Corporal INQ 1334, Corporal INQ 579, Private INQ 1073 and Second Lieutenant 026 in his written evidence to this Inquiry).

65.100 Before reaching our conclusions on this issue, we turn to consider the photographic and television footage material that we have seen of 8 Platoon’s movements down Chamberlain Street.

Photographic evidence

65.101 In the course of their evidence to this Inquiry,1 Second Lieutenant 026 and Private INQ 12 identified some of the soldiers of 8 Platoon as those grouped on the western side of the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street on the following photograph. From right to left, the following were identified: Corporal INQ 579 (standing with one foot on and one foot off the pavement, with his visor pulled back to the rear of his helmet); Private INQ 12 (looking in the same direction as Corporal INQ 579); Lance Corporal INQ 2151 (facing the camera); Lance Corporal INQ 2045 (holding a weapon with a large sight); and Sergeant INQ 2000 (standing with his back against the wall). The final soldier, who was holding his SLR to his shoulder, was not identified by Second Lieutenant 026 or Private INQ 12.
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65.102 It is not clear whether James Dakin (a Daily Express staff photographer) or Frederick Hoare (a photographer working for the Belfast Telegraph) took this photograph. It appears from their evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that both of them were in this area at relevant times.1


65.103 There are two further photographs taken by James Dakin that help to establish the order of events. As can be seen from his contact sheet, they were taken in the following order.





65.104 The first photograph is of two soldiers at the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street. It seems to us that these were probably Lance Corporal INQ 2045 (with a sniping rifle which had what was known as a Starlight sight) and Sergeant INQ 2000.1



65.105 The second photograph shows members of 8 Platoon, including Lance Corporal INQ 2045 with his sniping rifle, running in Chamberlain Street. By this time an APC has arrived in that street.

65.106 After taking these photographs James Dakin took a further sequence of photographs looking south along Chamberlain Street. These were of the approach of the group, including Fr Daly, carrying the body of Jackie Duddy. The sequence of photographs can be seen on James Dakin’s contact sheet.

65.107 The last of this sequence is available as a full-size photograph, which we have also shown when describing where Jackie Duddy was taken to after he had been shot.1
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65.108 The moments in which the group carrying Jackie Duddy approached 8 Platoon at the corner of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street are also captured on BBC television footage.1 As can be seen, and as we have discussed earlier in this report,2 Jackie Duddy was carried into and along Harvey Street.


65.109 Frederick Hoare, whose movements at that time were similar to those of James Dakin, also took a photograph of the group as it walked along Chamberlain Street.



65.110 Two men can be seen behind the group carrying Jackie Duddy. On the right, carrying a television camera, was David Green of CBS.1 On the left, carrying a stills camera, was the photographer Fulvio Grimaldi.2 Unfortunately, the Inquiry was unable to obtain any of the footage shot by David Green at that time. However, Fulvio Grimaldi told this Inquiry that he took the following photograph from the southern end of Chamberlain Street.
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65.111 From Fulvio Grimaldi’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, it appears that this photograph was taken shortly before Fr Daly and others carried Jackie Duddy into Chamberlain Street from the Rossville Flats car park.1 The photograph shows an APC and several soldiers, who must have been from 8 Platoon, towards the northern end of Chamberlain Street. The sign for the 720 Bar and a nearby lamp post are visible on the right-hand side of the frame; these stood on the corner of Harvey Street and Chamberlain Street. It can be seen that the APC is some way to the north of this corner, as are most of the visible soldiers. It follows that this photograph was taken earlier than those reproduced above showing the group carrying Jackie Duddy approaching 8 Platoon and the APC.

65.112 It is evident from the photographs and television footage considered above1that there were very few civilians on Chamberlain Street shortly before and during the moments when Fr Daly and others carried Jackie Duddy from the Rossville Flats car park. The earliest photograph, that of Fulvio Grimaldi, shows an almost empty street, with only two civilians visible in doorways on the western side. The later photographs of James Dakin and Frederick Hoare, and to a more limited extent the BBC television footage, also indicate that other than those with and following Jackie Duddy, there were very few people present.
65.113 In the light of the foregoing evidence, we consider that the soldiers of 8 Platoon were the last of the three platoons of C Company to come through Barrier 14 and that, as the photographs show, this platoon initially grouped at the corner of Chamberlain Street and William Street before moving south down Chamberlain Street.

65.114 Earlier in this report1 we considered the incident in which Lieutenant N fired three shots up the Eden Place alleyway. In that context we examined the evidence given by Gilles Peress, to whose photograph of the Eden Place alleyway we have referred above.2 In our view that evidence establishes that Gilles Peress was one of the last civilians who moved down Chamberlain Street from the area around Barrier 14, when the vehicles of Support Company came into the Bogside. Nothing in his evidence suggests that there was still a crowd in Chamberlain Street who were confronting 8 Platoon as the soldiers of that platoon moved down that street. The other evidence we have considered in relation to that incident indicates to us that, initially at least, people were moving down Chamberlain Street, not because soldiers were advancing down that street, but because Army vehicles had come through Barrier 12.


65.115 Our assessment of the evidence as a whole leads us to conclude that by the time soldiers of 8 Platoon started to move down Chamberlain Street, Lieutenant N had fired his shots up the Eden Place alleyway and virtually all the people who had been in Chamberlain Street had either moved to the southern end of that street or had otherwise dispersed, so that the street was more or less empty. We do not accept that 8 Platoon soldiers pushed back a confrontational and abusive mob as they moved along Chamberlain Street. The photographic evidence establishes that soldiers had not moved very far along Chamberlain Street and had not reached, or had only just reached, Harvey Street when Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy came along Chamberlain Street. At that stage there were very few people in Chamberlain Street and no sign of a crowd at the southern end of that street.

65.116 On the evidence we have already considered1 about when the casualties in Sector 2 occurred, by the time 8 Platoon met the group carrying Jackie Duddy at the junction of Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street, Margaret Deery, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley, as well of course as Jackie Duddy, had already been shot, and it is probable that Patrick Brolly had been injured. It is possible that Pius McCarron and Patrick McDaid had also been injured by this stage, though this is not so certain. It is however clear in our view that by the time Second Lieutenant 026 and other soldiers of 8 Platoon reached the southern end of Chamberlain Street, and Second Lieutenant 026 had looked into the car park, all the casualties of Sector 2 had been sustained.

65.117 We return below1 to consider the evidence that Second Lieutenant 026 and other soldiers of 8 Platoon gave about hearing gunfire.
65.118 We also return to 8 Platoon in the next chapter,1 when we deal with the arrests of people at 33 Chamberlain Street, the southernmost house on the eastern side of Chamberlain Street. As we have already described,2 it was to this house that Margaret Deery and Michael Bridge were taken after they had been wounded by gunfire in the car park of the Rossville Flats.

65.119 Several members of 8 Platoon told this Inquiry that at some stage after they had moved through Barrier 14, and in response to hearing shots fired, they were sent to their APC or APCs in order to exchange batons and baton guns for rifles.1 There is no reference to this happening in any of the existing accounts given by 8 Platoon soldiers in 1972 (ie those given to the RMP and RUC by Second Lieutenant 026, Sergeant INQ 2000, Corporal 007 and Private INQ 12), but it should be noted that these accounts were relatively brief and focused on specific issues. BBC television footage does show a number of soldiers at the top of Chamberlain Street carrying batons and without SLRs.2 The position of these soldiers at the time shown in the footage strongly suggests that these were members of 8 Platoon. It is possible that at some stage after hearing gunfire some members of 8 Platoon did exchange their batons and baton guns for rifles, but we remain in doubt about this.

65.120 We now turn to examine as a specific topic the evidence of C Company soldiers relating to non-military firing. This necessarily involves some duplication with the accounts that we have examined above.
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The evidence of C Company soldiers relating to non-military firing

65.121 The Inquiry obtained evidence from 44 members of C Company, many of whom gave accounts of hearing incoming or non-military gunfire on Bloody Sunday. The most significant of these accounts can be grouped into four broad categories: those who said that they heard such firing while at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street; those who said that they heard such firing while on the Eden Place waste ground to the east of Rossville Street; and those who were at the northern and southern ends of Chamberlain Street. It should be borne in mind that this division of the C Company evidence is for the purpose of analysis of the evidence and should not be taken as suggesting that there were four separate incidents, or that the evidence of soldiers in different geographical groups is necessarily unconnected.

65.122 In addition to the witnesses who are included in the four categories listed above, it is important to bear in mind that 14 members of C Company gave evidence that they either did not hear, or did not recall, or could not positively identify incoming fire, or otherwise did not comment about incoming fire. These were Private INQ 2057,1 Private INQ 939,2 Sergeant INQ 2000,3 Private INQ 1296,4 Private INQ 559,5 Corporal INQ 1594,6 Private INQ 96,7 Private INQ 429,8 Private INQ 437,9 Private INQ 815,10 Warrant Officer Class II 204,11 Private INQ 1574,12 Private INQ 158213 and Lance Corporal INQ 1916.14




65.123 A further four soldiers gave evidence of hearing shots while they were stationed at or near Barrier 14, and before going through that barrier: they were Private INQ 876,1 Corporal INQ 457,2 Lance Corporal INQ 9453 and Private INQ 1582.4 With the exception of Private INQ 1582, these soldiers, none of whom gave accounts in 1972, were in our view mistaken in their recollection about this, since they described a volume of firing which we are sure did not occur at this stage. As for Private INQ 1582, who described hearing “a couple of rounds ” fired, it is possible that he heard some of the firing further west in the William Street area, to which we have referred5 in our consideration of the events of Sector 1. Private INQ 1010 told us that he thought that a soldier was shot in front of him as they went through Barrier 14.6In our view he was mistaken. There is no other evidence from any source to suggest that this happened.




C Company soldiers at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street

65.124 As we have noted above,1 7 Platoon of C Company advanced from Barrier 14 to the corner of William Street and Rossville Street. At least some members of 9 Platoon seem to have moved in this direction as well.


65.125 A number of soldiers from these platoons gave evidence of hearing incoming fire, stating that they heard it either as they moved to the junction or once they had arrived there.

65.126 Second Lieutenant 110, who commanded 7 Platoon, told the RMP that he heard a burst of eight Thompson sub-machine gun shots while standing at the corner, and he thought that they came from “a two storey block of flats west of Kells Walk ”.1 In his evidence to this Inquiry he stated that he could no longer recall the detail of his 1972 statement, but he assumed that it recorded his recollection at the time.2 Instead, he said that he remembered hearing a mixture of high velocity and low velocity fire as he moved towards Rossville Street.3




65.127 Corporal INQ 444, another member of 7 Platoon, stated in his written evidence to this Inquiry that he heard Thompson sub-machine gun fire after he had moved through Barrier 14, and while he was moving along William Street. He recalled that there were two bursts of fire, with six to seven rounds in each. He initially stated that the firing came from somewhere to the south-west of his position on William Street, but he later expressed some uncertainty as to the location of the gunman or gunmen, and the time at which he heard the bursts of fire. Nonetheless, he stated that he was convinced that the firing in question came from a Thompson sub-machine gun.1



65.128 Corporal INQ 444 also told us that at some stage he heard high velocity rifle fire coming from the direction of Glenfada Park. The firing continued for some time, and he formed the impression that he was listening to an ongoing gun battle; he told us that he did not himself feel threatened by this firing.1



65.129 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Corporal INQ 444 stated that he was “fairly sure ”, but not certain, that as he ran along William Street he heard the sound of nail bombs exploding in the area of Glenfada Park and Kells Walk.1 In his oral evidence he agreed that it was possible that the noises that he heard were the shots fired by Lieutenant N along the Eden Place alleyway,2 which we have discussed above.3For reasons given elsewhere in this report,4we are sure that no nail bombs exploded in any of the sectors on Bloody Sunday. In our view (assuming his recollection of hearing sounds is accurate) what Corporal INQ 444 heard was the firing of baton rounds or the shots fired by Lieutenant N up the Eden Place alleyway.




65.130 Lance Corporal INQ 1799 of 7 Platoon also told this Inquiry that the first gunfire he heard was two bursts of Thompson sub-machine gun fire after he had moved through Barrier 14. Initially he recalled moving into Chamberlain Street, but during his oral evidence he stated that he was no longer sure that this was the case. However, he told us that he remained “absolutely certain ” that he heard Thompson sub-machine gun fire.1 As we have commented above,2 we came to the conclusion that this soldier had little clear recollection of events. We consider below3 Lance Corporal INQ 1799’s evidence of seeing armed civilians, including a man with an automatic pistol in the area of Chamberlain Street or William Street.



65.131 INQ 736, who appears to us to have been in 9 Platoon, told this Inquiry that either while he was at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street, or as he moved there from Barrier 14, he heard high and low velocity rounds. He said that while it was difficult to distinguish (Army) SLR fire from (IRA) M1 carbine fire, he thought that he heard the latter. He attributed the low velocity shots to the firing of a Thompson sub-machine gun, but he could not recall whether these rounds were fired in bursts. INQ 736 also recalled hearing outgoing shots, fired from closer to him, but he thought that there was more incoming fire than outgoing and that it was, with one exception, the heaviest firing that he heard in Northern Ireland. INQ 736 thought that the incoming high and low velocity shots sounded like they were coming from the south, from the direction of the Rossville Flats, and were aimed towards his position.1 He told us he recalled seeing Support Company moving as if they were under fire.2



65.132 INQ 736 also told us that he recalled hearing two small explosions, which were louder than a baton round or a gas canister and could have been from a nail bomb. He said that he did not pay any particular attention to them, as he knew they were too far away to be directed at him.1 In his written statement to this Inquiry, INQ 736 recorded that he heard these explosions as he ran down William Street.2 However, in his oral evidence he said that he could not remember where he was when he heard the noises, but he thought that they occurred after he had passed through Barrier 14, but before the Support Company vehicles went into the Bogside.3



65.133 For reasons given earlier,1 we have taken the view that it would be wise to place little reliance on the accounts given by INQ 736 of what he saw and did. As we have already concluded, there were no nail bomb explosions on Bloody Sunday.



65.134 Private INQ 1093, a signaller in 9 Platoon, told this Inquiry that he saw the strike of rounds fired from what he took to be an automatic weapon about 10m to 12m in front of him as he advanced down either Chamberlain Street or Rossville Street. We have earlier expressed the view1 that it would be unwise to rely on his evidence.2


65.135 Private INQ 587, another member of 9 Platoon, later became a weapons instructor. He told this Inquiry that as he moved towards the junction of William Street and Rossville Street he heard a mixture of firing, which went on for 20 minutes. He estimated that 20 per cent of the shots that he heard on Bloody Sunday came from non-military sources.1 Private INQ 587 said that he thought that the first weapon he heard was a Thompson sub-machine gun, and that this was followed by shots from SLRs and a Garand rifle (a high velocity weapon that was not carried by soldiers on 30th January 1972).2 However, he stated that he could only identify these weapons in retrospect years later, and that he would not have been able to identify the types of fire at the time.3



65.136 In our view it would be unwise to rely on this retrospective identification of the sound of weapons, years after the event.

65.137 Private INQ 131, a member of 7 Platoon, told us that he heard incoming fire from a low velocity, low calibre weapon as he reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street; he was sure that this was not SLR fire.1 Lance Corporal INQ 1056 of 9 Platoon told us that he recalled hearing small arms fire at some point shortly after he moved through Barrier 14, but his precise location at the time was not clear.2



65.138 Sergeant INQ 488 stated to this Inquiry that he heard low velocity gunfire coming from the south when he was about 20 yards from the corner of Rossville Street.1 He was not able to identify the type of weapon from which this came.2 During his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Sergeant INQ 488 expressed himself as sure that what he heard was not the sound of baton rounds, because he had heard the “crack and then thump ” which he said applied to both high and low velocity rounds but not to baton rounds.3In our view Sergeant INQ 488 was mistaken in seeking to distinguish low velocity rounds from baton rounds on the basis that the former made a “crack and then thump ”. He was correct in describing the “crack ” as the sound of a round passing overhead or close by4and the thump as the explosion in the breech of the weapon, but the “crack ” is the sound of the round breaking the sound barrier, which is why it is heard before the “thump ” of the weapon being fired. A low velocity round does not exceed the speed of sound, so that the sound of the bullet (if heard at all) will not be heard before the sound of the weapon being fired.5It follows in our view that we cannot accept Sergeant INQ 488’s basis for distinguishing between low velocity rounds and baton rounds, both of which are subsonic. His written description of hearing a “booming ” sound is in our view apt to describe the sound made by the firing of a baton gun.6




C Company soldiers on the Eden Place waste ground

65.139 After they had deployed through Barrier 14 some C Company soldiers, including the Officer Commanding, Major 221A, and a significant proportion of 7 Platoon, eventually made their way onto the waste ground to the east of Rossville Street. We have heard evidence from some of these soldiers that while they were in this area they heard incoming fire or saw the strikes of incoming rounds on the ground.

65.140 Major 221A prepared a statement, dated 31st January 1972, which included a Diary of Operations. This contained the following entry for the time period 1610–1620 hours:1

“During asslt [assault] 22 persons were arrested. I heard gunfire from my right. I quite definitely heard an M1 carbine firing from Rossville Flats across the open ground to the North. I saw the strike of several enemy rounds in the Rossville/William St area. ”



65.141 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Major 221A said that he had no aural recollection of any shooting on the day, and nor did he remember seeing rounds striking the ground. However, he had no reason to think that his 1972 statement was untrue.1 He also stated that at the time of Bloody Sunday he would have had considerable knowledge as to the different sounds made by different weapons.2 He told us that he recalled that he made his way to the Eden Place waste ground via Chamberlain Street and Eden Place, and once there he saw that Support Company had taken up defensive positions.3 He was unable, though, to help us further as to the timing of his movements.4 He also commented that he believed that he would have included a reference to hearing automatic gunfire in his Diary of Operations, had he in fact done so.5



65.142 Lance Corporal 003, a member of 7 Platoon, gave the following account to the RMP on 4th February 1972:1

“I had moved from Rossville Street with [Second Lieutenant] 110 to the corner of number 36 Chamberlain Street where I was able to observe the flats … There was quite a lot of firing coming from the flats at this time directed towards us. I was unable to locate any gunmen.

When we ran from Rossville Street to the corner of No 36 Chamberlain Street I saw one member of Support Company, I do not know who he was, take up a kneeling position and fire several rounds in the direction of Columbcill Court where gunfire was coming from. I did not see any gunman fire from that area but I heard automatic fire coming from there. It could possibly have been a Thompson MG [machine gun]. ”




65.143 Number 36 Chamberlain Street was at the southern end of the terraced houses that backed onto the Eden Place waste ground. Lance Corporal 003’s evidence of hearing shots once he had moved to that position, or at least as he moved to that position, contrasts with Second Lieutenant 110’s 1972 account, discussed above,1 of hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire while at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street.2 However, Second Lieutenant 110 told this Inquiry that he did move to the back of 36 Chamberlain Street,3 and it is clear, as is noted above,4 that he gave an earlier statement to the RMP on 3rd February 1972, which has not survived and in which it is possible that he might have referred to further incoming fire.




65.144 We consider Lance Corporal 003’s 1972 account of seeing a member of Support Company firing several rounds in the direction of Columbcille Court when examining the events of Sector 4.1



65.145 In his evidence to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal 003 told us that he recalled that he heard Thompson sub-machine gun fire as he ran from the corner of William Street and Rossville Street to the back of the houses at the southern end of Chamberlain Street.1 He also stated that he saw the strike of rounds on the ground.2 He said that he was sure that the incoming fire was that of a Thompson sub-machine gun and attributed the more equivocal identification contained in his RMP statement to the statement taker’s choice of words.3 He told us that he thought that the fire was coming from the general direction of Columbcille Court and not necessarily the complex itself, as had been implied by his RMP statement.4He also told us that he was not aware of any shooting until he was crossing the Eden Place waste ground.5






65.146 Lance Corporal 003 was asked about the reference in his RMP statement to incoming fire from “the flats ” which was directed towards his position. In his written statement to this Inquiry, he told us that he understood this to mean shots from the Rossville Flats and that although he no longer recalled such firing, “if I said it then, we were fired at ”.1 During his oral evidence, it was suggested to Lance Corporal 003 that what he had said to the RMP was “just wrong ”. He replied: “No, at the time I would say that that is the truth, but I cannot recollect it now, to this day, not now. ”2However, a little later in his evidence Lance Corporal 003 told us that “we were not fired at while we were at the back of Chamberlain Street ” and that the firing that he had recorded in his RMP statement was that which he heard as he was crossing the waste ground.3



65.147 Private INQ 131 told this Inquiry that he was with Lance Corporal 003 as they ran across the waste ground.1Lance Corporal 003 did not mention being with Private INQ 131 at that time, but his evidence about who he was with was slightly uncertain and not wholly consistent with that of his supposed companions.2 As is explained above,3 Private INQ 131 told us that he recalled that he heard shots from a low velocity weapon (and not an SLR) as he approached the corner of Rossville Street and William Street. He told us that he recalled that this shooting continued for some time, and that as he ran from the corner to the back of the Chamberlain Street houses he saw the dirt jumping from the bullet strikes on the ground.4 He stated that the shots could have come from anywhere, but he thought that they were being fired in his direction.5 Private INQ 131 stated that he also heard SLR fire at this time, which he believed came from members of Support Company who were then positioned in the Kells Walk area.6 In contrast to Lance Corporal 003, Private INQ 131 told us that he did not recall hearing any automatic gunfire.7





65.148 Lance Corporal 003 gave no evidence of being with Private INQ 131 as they ran across the Eden Place waste ground; indeed, he believed that he was with Corporal INQ 444 and Private INQ 554.1 Lance Corporal 003 also recalled that he was armed with an SLR and not, as Private INQ 131 thought, a baton.2



65.149 We have earlier1 expressed the view that Private INQ 131 really had little if any clear recollection of events.


65.150 As we have already noted,1 though Private INQ 554 told this Inquiry that he was in 9 Platoon, it appears to us that he was in 7 Platoon. Private INQ 554’s recollection of events was limited, but he told us that he recalled hearing either a mix of high and low velocity fire, or high velocity fire from different areas.2 He also thought that he heard small arms fire, such as that from a pistol, a shotgun or a Garand rifle (a weapon that he only identified in retrospect).3 Although he could not be sure where he was when he first heard the firing, he recalled taking cover “in an area of rubble ”,4 which we consider is likely to have been a reference to the Eden Place waste ground. Private INQ 554 did not recall hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire, and he thought that he would have remembered this had he heard it.5




65.151 Private INQ 5, a member of 7 Platoon, told this Inquiry that as he arrived at the Eden Place waste ground he became aware of incoming fire, which caused him to take cover behind a burned-out car.1 He stated that the firing, which was “definitely heavy ” and probably lasted for some minutes, came from a mixture of small arms and heavy calibre weapons, including some machine gun fire. However, he could not identify exactly which weapons were used.2 Private INQ 5 told us that he did not know from where the firing was coming, and that he could not respond anyway as he was only armed with a baton.3 He said that he did not recall hearing any SLR fire as he sheltered behind the car.4




65.152 Private INQ 5 gave interviews to a number of media organisations.1 In these he gave broadly consistent accounts of hearing incoming fire before and as he took cover on the Eden Place waste ground.2 On some occasions he stated or implied that the firing came from the Rossville Flats.3 He told this Inquiry that this was an assumption on his part, and that he could not, in fact, be sure of the source or sources of the hostile firing.4




65.153 We have already1 expressed the view that it would be unwise to rely on the accounts given by Private INQ 5.


65.154 Lance Corporal INQ 1799, also a member of 7 Platoon, gave evidence to this Inquiry that he heard a mixture of incoming single shots from an unidentified weapon, SLR rounds and “distinct slow automatic fire which I would say came from a Bren gun, or an LMG [light machine gun], possibly the 303 version ”.1In his written statement, Lance Corporal INQ 1799 told us that he thought that he was at the southern end of Chamberlain Street when he heard this firing, but in his oral evidence he accepted that he was somewhere on the Eden Place waste ground.2Lance Corporal INQ 1799 said that he did not think that the incoming fire was aimed at him, but was instead “off to the side ”.3




65.155 According to Lance Corporal INQ 1799, the Company Commander, Major 221A, and his radio operator were with him when he heard this incoming fire.1Major 221A, whose evidence is considered above,2told this Inquiry that he heard M1 carbine fire, but he did not comment on the incoming shots recalled by Lance Corporal INQ 1799.3As we discuss below,4while Lance Corporal INQ 1799 stated that he saw a civilian gunman at this time, Major 221A did not remember such an incident, although he did not rule out the possibility that it happened.5




65.156 We have earlier1expressed the view that Lance Corporal INQ 1799 had little clear recollection of events.



C Company soldiers at the northern end of Chamberlain Street

65.157 Lance Corporal INQ 1334, a member of 8 Platoon, told this Inquiry that as he entered Chamberlain Street he heard the “distinct sound ” of one or two short bursts of Thompson sub-machine gun fire,1which he believed was being fired on William Street rather than at him.2He was “absolutely certain ” that the sound he heard was a Thompson sub-machine gun firing,3and he said that he did not recall hearing any high velocity shots at that time.4Lance Corporal INQ 1334’s evidence was that he heard these shots before he saw Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy moving up Chamberlain Street.5




65.158 Lance Corporal INQ 2045, another member of 8 Platoon, told this Inquiry that while he was in Chamberlain Street he “had the impression ” of hearing automatic Thompson sub-machine gun fire, and he was also “aware ” of single shots, which he thought were high velocity, passing over his head as he heard the sound of a “crack ”. However, his memory of the events of Bloody Sunday, and particularly of the sequence in which they occurred, was very limited.1Lance Corporal INQ 2045 told us that he initially thought that he heard the relevant shots when he had advanced about three-quarters of the way down the street to the south.2However, as he believed that he did not see Fr Daly and the group carrying Jackie Duddy until after he had heard the shooting, he thought it possible that he was actually far further to the north than he had originally recalled.3



65.159 Lance Corporal INQ 2045’s evidence appeared to be that these shots took place in the context of a short and intensive gun battle, involving Thompson sub-machine gun fire and high velocity, single shots which he thought probably came from SLRs.1He said that he did not think that he would have confused the sound of Thompson sub-machine gun fire with baton rounds.2He described the Thompson sub-machine gun fire as having come from the south-west of his position, although he could not be sure on this point.3




65.160 Private INQ 1073 also told this Inquiry that he heard Thompson sub-machine gun or small arms fire as he turned into Chamberlain Street. He stated that he was not sure where the firing was coming from, but it did not seem to be directed at his position and “nobody commented about it ”. He stated that he did not recall hearing any high velocity fire.1


65.161 Private INQ 12, another member of 8 Platoon, gave evidence to this Inquiry of coming under fire and taking cover, as he and his colleagues turned into what we are confident was Chamberlain Street.1He said he thought that the source of the incoming shots was either a semi-automatic rifle, or from a bolt action rifle that was fired rapidly, although he also thought it possible that the shots came from more than one weapon.2He said that he did not think that the firing sounded like SLR fire or baton rounds.3In his written evidence to this Inquiry he described the shots as being high velocity.4In his oral evidence he said first that they were lower velocity than an SLR, and then that they were low velocity; but when the discrepancy between this evidence and his written statement was pointed out, he said that he must have been mistaken and that the shots were high velocity after all.5




65.162 Private INQ 12 stated throughout his evidence to this Inquiry that after the shots were fired, he and his platoon took cover.1Some people dived in the gutter, but he kicked open a door of a family home and hunkered down in the doorway, while another soldier entered the hallway.2He also stated, in his oral evidence, that he saw the strike of rounds hitting the ground,3and that he thought that they were fired straight down the road towards them.4




65.163 Private INQ 12 told us that from his position in cover, he heard SLR fire and then saw a civilian gunman on the roof of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats. Private INQ 12 said that he did not have a weapon at that stage and so he could not fire at this man; in any event, he said he recalled hearing the Lieutenant commanding 9 Platoon telling soldiers not to fire as Support Company was in that building.1 We discuss this aspect of his evidence further below.2



65.164 Private INQ 12 made statements to the RMP and the RUC in the months after Bloody Sunday.1These dealt with the arrests that he made on Bloody Sunday and made no reference to his having heard incoming fire or having seen a gunman. He told this Inquiry, and we accept, that he was not asked to include this aspect of his evidence when he made those statements.2


65.165 Having listened to Private INQ 12, we formed the impression that he had very little real recollection of Bloody Sunday and that it would be unwise to place much reliance on his evidence. We return to this soldier’s evidence when considering the arrest of civilians in 33 Chamberlain Street and their subsequent treatment.1



65.166 One member of 8 Platoon, Private INQ 471, told this Inquiry that he was sure that he did not hear Thompson sub-machine gun fire as he entered Chamberlain Street. He stated that he knew the sound of the weapon as he had been injured by one.1Private INQ 471 said that he did hear shooting either while he was at the corner of William Street and Chamberlain Street, or at a time when he had advanced to the junction of Eden Place and Harvey Street.2Initially he thought that he heard hostile rounds followed by a pause and then a return of fire.3However, he later accepted that the first shots might have been those fired by Lieutenant N along Eden Place and into Chamberlain Street, and that it was quite possible that soldiers were responsible for all of the fire that he heard.4He was unsure as to the direction and type of the first firing that he heard.5



65.167 Lance Corporal INQ 1056, a member of 9 Platoon, gave evidence to this Inquiry that he heard small arms fire and then high velocity rounds shortly after he moved through Barrier 14. The small arms fire came from his left and the high velocity shots from his right. His evidence was unclear as to where he was when he heard these shots, but he may, on his account, have been somewhere close to the northern end of Chamberlain Street.1


C Company soldiers at the southern end of Chamberlain Street

65.168 Second Lieutenant 026 commanded 8 Platoon. In an RMP statement timed at 1640 hours on 4th February 1972, he recorded that he witnessed the following events after his platoon, accompanied by an APC, had taken up positions at the southern end of Chamberlain Street:1

“At this time I heard the sound of two distinct weapons firing between 20–30 rounds within a space of five–ten minutes. The fire was not directed at us but the projectiles passed across our front. One weapon was almost certainly a M1 Carbine while the other was possibly of a .303 calibre. It was definitely not a 7.62 weapon.

I could not see the target in question, neither was I able to pinpoint the exact position of the gunmen. I could not see any weapon or flashes indicating firing position consequently we did not return any fire.

From my own observations, I am of the opinion the both weapons were located on the roof of Rossville Flats in the immediate vicinity of a lift-housing. I have marked the area concerned on the map the approximate map reference being 43281675. ”


65.169 The map to which Second Lieutenant 026 referred has not survived. However, the grid reference indicates that the position to which he was referring was the south-east corner of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, as is shown on the following image, which was created for this Inquiry.
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65.170 In his evidence to this Inquiry, Second Lieutenant 026 told us that he recalled hearing, while at the southern end of Chamberlain Street, two or three shots from a high velocity weapon, which sounded to him (and to some of his men) like an M1 carbine.1He said that he was sure of this identification, and that he did not think that he would have mistaken the sound for that of SLR fire.2The shots were fired rapidly, and he thought that there might have been two gunmen.3He was not sure of the position of the firer or firers, but he thought that they were above ground level and in or on Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.4He told us that the shots were not aimed at him or his men and passed in front of them, having been fired in a north-westerly direction.5




65.171 In relation to his RMP statement, Second Lieutenant 026 told us that he believed that the details of the incident would have been clearer in his mind in 1972.1He was happy to stand by that statement as being correct,2although he did suggest that it was the RMP who first mentioned the lift housing on top of Block 2 of the flats.3




65.172 Second Lieutenant 026 told this Inquiry that, as far as he was able to recall, he reported these shots to his Company Commander on the radio.1C Company’s Commander was Major 221A, who, as is explained above,2also gave evidence in 1972 of hearing an M1 carbine firing from the Rossville Flats, albeit while he was somewhere in the region of the Eden Place waste ground.3Major 221A made no reference in his evidence to receiving a message concerning incoming fire from Second Lieutenant 026, and there is no log for the C Company net, on which such a report would have been transmitted. Whether Second Lieutenant 026 was right in thinking he recalled that he had made a radio report to his Company Commander remains in doubt.



65.173 Corporal 007 also gave evidence of hearing M1 carbine fire at a time when he was at the southern end of Chamberlain Street. He gave the following account in an RMP statement timed at 1700 hours on 4th February 1972:1

“From where I was standing, behind the APC I heard the sound of about 4 or 5 shots. I heard only one weapon firing, which in my opinion was a M1 carbine. It was definitely not 7.62 calibre. The shots panned across our position, and I do not believe the fire was directed at us.

From what I could see the gunman was in the vicinity of a lift housing on the roof of Rossville Flats. I did not actually see him or the weapon concerned, and I base my opinion on my experience alone and the sound of the weapon. I estimate the distance of the gunman from us to be about 100 yds. His position would be approximately MR 43281675 [the same reference as was given by Second Lieutenant 026, which is marked on the image above2]. ”



65.174 This Inquiry is in possession of the original handwritten notes of the RMP interviews conducted with Second Lieutenant 026 and Corporal 007. These show that both men were interviewed by the same RMP statement taker, Staff Sergeant Middleton-Jones. According to the timings given, the interviews took place within 20 minutes of one another.

65.175 As is noted above,1Second Lieutenant 026, who gave his statement before Corporal 007, told us that he thought that the reference to the lift housing in his statement was suggested to him by the interviewer.2The same words, and the same grid reference, are contained in Corporal 007’s statement.3Corporal 007 told us that his RMP evidence on this point was an “assumption made after the event ”, the result of being taken through “suggested areas ”, in a “process of elimination ”.4Staff Sergeant Middleton-Jones is dead. He gave no evidence to this Inquiry.




65.176 Despite the caveat as to the location of the gunman, Corporal 007 gave a similar account to this Inquiry as he had done to the RMP. He recalled that as he was standing behind an APC at the southern end of Chamberlain Street he heard three to four high velocity shots fired in quick succession.1Although in his written evidence he stated that the shots “seemed to me to be from an M1 Carbine ”, he said in his oral evidence that “Standing here today I could not say that [the shots came from an M1 carbine as opposed to another weapon], but obviously at the time I believed it was [an M1 carbine] ”.2He told us he thought that the shots passed across the front of the vehicle and were not aimed at his position; that he did not know the exact location from which they were fired; and that he did not see anyone or any weapon.3He said that this was the first gunfire that he could recall hearing since moving through Barrier 14.4




65.177 Lance Corporal INQ 1334, whose evidence of hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire shortly after moving through Barrier 14 is summarised above,1also told this Inquiry that he heard an M1 carbine while with 8 Platoon at the southern end of Chamberlain Street.2He said he thought that the incident occurred at around the time that people arrested by other members of his platoon were being brought out of 33 Chamberlain Street, although he accepted that his recollection of relative timings was hazy.3Lance Corporal INQ 1334 told us that he did not feel that the firing was aimed at him,4but was confident that the sound was that of an M1 carbine and not an SLR.5He said he thought that the gunman was firing “‘double taps’ ” (two shots in quick succession) and that there were a large number of shots fired, although he could not specify how many.6He said that he did not see the source of the firing, but thought that it came from the central area of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats.7




65.178 Lance Corporal INQ 1334 told this Inquiry that while he was at the southern end of Chamberlain Street he also heard low velocity pistol or single shot sub-machine gun fire. He thought that this came from the direction of Block 3 of the Rossville Flats, and that it was possible that more than one weapon was being fired. He was not sure how many rounds were fired, but he was confident that he heard these shots after he had heard the M1 carbine fire.1


65.179 According to his evidence to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal INQ 1334 was with his pair, Private INQ 1596, when he heard the firing at the southern end of Chamberlain Street.1Private INQ 1596 gave no evidence to this Inquiry. However, Second Lieutenant 026 told this Inquiry that he thought that Lance Corporal INQ 1334 might well have been one of the soldiers who were with him when he heard M1 carbine fire at the bottom of Chamberlain Street.2



65.180 Corporal INQ 579, who was also a member of 8 Platoon, told us that he recalled being aware of high velocity fire aimed towards him as he moved down Chamberlain Street. He told this Inquiry that when he was about halfway down Chamberlain Street he heard the crack and thump of a high velocity round passing him. He said that he thought that this had been fired at him from a position in the Rossville Flats area. Corporal INQ 579 and his colleagues took cover, and within seconds a second shot was fired from the same direction. He said he asked if anyone had seen a gunman, but no-one had. It was his recollection that 8 Platoon then advanced under cover to the end of Chamberlain Street.1



65.181 Corporal INQ 579’s account is to be contrasted with that of Second Lieutenant 026, who told us that he was not aware of any gunfire from the time he went into Chamberlain Street with his soldiers until he got to the Rossville Flats end of that street.1Corporal 007 also stated that he did not hear gunfire until he reached the southern end of Chamberlain Street.2Had there been gunfire along Chamberlain Street, we are sure that Second Lieutenant 026 would not only have remembered it, as it would have meant that his soldiers were under attack, but would also have made mention of it in his RMP statement. In these circumstances we do not place any reliance on the account of firing given by Corporal INQ 579.



Consideration of C Company soldiers’ evidence of non-military fire

65.182 We were greatly assisted by the report prepared by RA Davis, Michael Lower and Stuart Dyne of ISVR Consultancy Services, who advised us on various aspects of sound and sound perception in relation to the firing of weapons.1We accept the views of these experts.


65.183 In general terms, and according to most definitions, a high and medium velocity weapon fires a supersonic bullet, the former at a greater speed than the latter, while a low velocity weapon fires a subsonic round. When a high velocity weapon is fired, a listener in front of the firearm and close to the passage of the bullet will, if he or she is some distance from the weapon, hear a crack and then a thump or boom. The crack is the sound of the bullet breaking the sound barrier. The thump or boom is the sound of the blast from the muzzle of the weapon. The latter noise travels at the speed of sound and is accordingly heard after the crack of the supersonic bullet. Thus the closer the listener is to the weapon, the less the interval between the two different sounds. The presence of a crack sound would enable an experienced listener to deduce that the shot was from a high velocity firearm. The absence of a crack sound does not permit the listener to draw any conclusion regarding the type of firearm.

65.184 Part of the ISVR Consultancy Services report considered the feasibility of conducting experiments to test the abilities of listeners to identify firearms subjectively.1The conclusion was that experiments would be extremely difficult to carry out, the results would be difficult to interpret, and the findings would be of limited use to this Inquiry.



65.185 The reasons for this conclusion were as follows:1

“Test conditions

The witnesses on Bloody Sunday were in an urban environment with sound reflections and shielding by buildings, considerable background noise, and many distractions. Firearms sounds may have occurred with little or no warning, and any decision made by an individual about the type of weapon being fired would have relied on a spontaneous judgement. Any identification of a weapon may also have been based on other cues, particularly visual cues, on the individual’s surmise about or knowledge of

what had happened, or on the individual’s expectations of which weapons were likely or unlikely to be extant. It is obviously not possible to reproduce the above conditions for the purposes of an experiment, although the effects of buildings on the propagation of sounds can be reproduced to some extent in a similar environment.

Test subjects

The individual witnesses who heard gunfire or similar sounds on Bloody Sunday would have fallen into several categories, including soldiers, police and civilians. They would not be from a single, homogeneous group. To have been able to discriminate between weapons, or to identify particular types of weapon from the sounds produced, individual witnesses would not only have to have been exposed to weapons noise previously, but they would have to have seen, or known for certain, which type of firearm was being fired at any time, so that they could learn to associate a given sound with a given type of weapon. The opportunities available to each individual to obtain such experience, and the range of firearms encompassed by that experience, must have varied considerably from person to person and cannot be quantified. It is therefore obviously impossible to match the experience of potential subjects to the experience of the individual witnesses to Bloody Sunday. If an experiment were to be carried out the abilities tested would be those of the subjects participating, and it would not be possible to relate their abilities to the abilities of the original witnesses.

Test firearms

We do not know what types of weapon and ammunition, if any, were used on Bloody Sunday other than by the Army. Thus the choice of any firearms or ammunition to be used in a subjective listening experiment would be arbitrary and not necessarily representative of the firearms and ammunition which might possibly have been used on Bloody Sunday. It would also not be possible to include test firings of one of the most important firearms, a baton gun with ammunition of the type used in 1972, because the particular type of ammunition has long been superseded.

Practical difficulties and design complexities

It is extremely difficult, even with the best of loudspeakers, to reproduce waveforms of very short-duration, very high-level, impulsive sounds of nearby gunfire at a realistic level or with convincing realism. Therefore we concluded that any experiment should involve listeners hearing real rather than recorded gunfire. Live firing experiments would be limited because, for safety, listeners would only be able to hear gunfire from behind or to the side of the firer, and certainly not in front.

We carried out some informal pilot tests using ourselves as subjects to listen to live firing. Close to the firing point, about 50 metres away, with an unobstructed sound path between us and the firearms, and with the benefit of a direct comparison, we could hear clear differences in sound level and character between the high- and low-velocity firearms (i.e. between rifles and pistols) fired in succession from the same position. However it was also clear that the benefit of direct comparison between sounds from different firearms made the discrimination relatively easy. If we wished to test the abilities of listeners to identify firearms from single shots we would need to take precautions to prevent listeners having an opportunity to compare directly sounds fired from the same spot and we would not be able to allow the listeners to hear more than one firearm at a time without changing the firing position, the listening position, or both.

At greater distances, or when screened by buildings, our observation was that the sounds of some of the high-velocity and low-velocity firearms could become very similar in character, although the actual sound levels of high-velocity weapons were still higher. This meant that if two shots were fired in succession from the same point, one from a rifle and one from a pistol, it could be deduced that the louder shot was obviously from a rifle and the quieter from a pistol. Again we would have to prevent listeners from making a comparison. We also considered that in some circumstances the sound of a rifle a given distance away could be similar in character to the sound of a pistol being fired at a shorter distance. This observation reinforced the conclusion that any formal experiment must be designed to allow the distance between the firing point and the listeners, and the direction of firing relative to the listeners, to be readily and randomly changed between successive shots.

These informal tests confirmed the practical and logistical difficulties which would be involved in carrying out a formal scientific listening experiment. In particular, the precautions which would need to be taken to prevent listeners from hearing more than one firearm at a time from any given firing position and at any given listening position would make an experiment long and unwieldy, and probably impracticable.

In some very specific circumstances, the sound of a firearm may assist identification. These circumstances are when a bullet from a high-velocity firearm passes close to the listener or witness. The presence of a ‘crack’ sound from a supersonic bullet’s shock wave will identify the firearm as a high-velocity type to an experienced listener, whereas the absence of the crack will not assist identification. We do not know how

close a listener would need to be to the bullet’s path to be able to hear the crack of the shock wave. This particular point was not addressed in our Report No. 5903 R04, but is covered in our Report No 5903 R06 and summarised in Section 7 below. ”




65.186 An SLR and an M1 carbine both produce a crack sound. Revolvers and Thompson sub-machine guns, which fire subsonically, do not.1



65.187 The evidence of Colour Sergeant 002 of Composite Platoon, Support Company (a weapons training officer) was that in a built-up area it is not possible to identify from the sound the type of weapon being used.1The evidence of Colonel James Ferguson, Commanding Officer of 22 Lt AD Regt, was that in a built-up area such as Londonderry, it would be very difficult for individual soldiers to know who was shooting and from where: “One shot was all that it might take for everyone to believe that they were coming under fire. ”2Colonel Roy Jackson, Commanding Officer of 1 R ANGLIAN, gave evidence to much the same effect, noting in particular that the topography of Londonderry made it “almost impossible ” to identify from where a shot was fired unless the flash from the weapon on firing could be seen.3In the light of the ISVR report, we prefer the evidence of these soldiers to those (such as Private INQ 587) who were positive that they were able from the sound to distinguish between different types of weapons and from where and in which direction firing was coming.




65.188 Bearing in mind these difficulties in the identification of weapons from the sound of firing, we turn to consider the evidence of C Company soldiers about non-military firing.

65.189 On the basis of the available material and as is explained above,1we consider that soldiers of 7 Platoon did not move across the Eden Place waste ground until a late stage, by which time the vehicles of Mortar Platoon had been moved to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and some Army vehicles were moving from there back along Rossville Street. In the course of this report,2we consider what was happening in Sector 3 after the vehicles had moved forward. We have found nothing that suggests to us that there was at that stage non-military firing of the kind described by soldiers of 7 Platoon into the area of the Eden Place waste ground.



65.190 There was (as we discuss in the context of the later events in Sector 31) late firing by soldiers of Support Company and Composite Platoon at a window on the western side of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and in our view this is likely to be what the 7 Platoon soldiers heard from the Eden Place waste ground. As will be seen,2in our view other soldiers mistook this firing, or some of it, for firing by paramilitaries.



65.191 In these circumstances we do not accept the evidence of non-military firing given by soldiers of 7 Platoon who went across the Eden Place waste ground. In our view what, if anything, they heard was firing by soldiers of Support Company.

65.192 As to the 8 Platoon soldiers, as we have already observed,1it seems to us that before these soldiers had gone far along Chamberlain Street, the group carrying Jackie Duddy had come along that street and turned up Harvey Street; and that by the time soldiers had got to the southern end of Chamberlain Street and Second Lieutenant 026 had looked into the car park, all the casualties in Sector 2 had been sustained. We do not find convincing the evidence of non-military fire from soldiers who were at the southern end of Chamberlain Street. They did not suggest that it was directed at them and in our view it is much more likely that what they heard were some of the shots fired at a late stage by soldiers at a flat in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, which we consider in detail later in this report.2



65.193 We are of the view that there was no non-military firing along Chamberlain Street, as was suggested by Lance Corporal INQ 2045, Private INQ 12 and Corporal INQ 579. In our view, had 8 Platoon come under fire in Chamberlain Street, Second Lieutenant 026 would have noticed it or been told of it and would have recorded the fact that his soldiers had come under fire in his 1972 account.

65.194 We now consider the remaining accounts of non-military firing.

65.195 For the reasons given above,1we are unable to accept the evidence of those soldiers of C Company who said that they were able to distinguish between different types of high or medium velocity weapons. In our view it must also be borne in mind when considering what reliance to place on the evidence of C Company soldiers of non-military fire, that shortly after they crossed Barrier 14, Lieutenant N fired three shots up the Eden Place alleyway; and soon after that other soldiers of Support Company opened fire in Sectors 2 and 3, followed by further Army fire in Sectors 4 and 5. We discuss this firing in detail in our consideration of the events of the five sectors.2Within a short space of time, probably ten minutes or less, Support Company soldiers fired over 100 rounds, as well as a substantial number of baton rounds. In our view this must have given rise to a belief among soldiers who had come through Barrier 14 that 1 PARA soldiers had become engaged in a full-scale gun battle. In these circumstances some soldiers at least would be expecting to hear non-military fire, and would be ready (albeit in good faith) to ascribe some of what they heard to such firing. As will have been noted, Corporal INQ 444 and Private INQ 1582 in effect told us that this is what they thought. In our view there was in fact no such gun battle, as will be seen from our detailed consideration of what took place in the five sectors; but soldiers of C Company could understandably have mistaken what was going on.



65.196 As to those who described hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire, much the same considerations apply. As will be seen from our consideration of the events of Sector 5,1soldiers on the City Walls described hearing and in one case seeing Thompson sub-machine gun fire from Glenfada Park North. We are sure, for the reasons we give, that there was no such firing from there; and in our view what these soldiers thought was sub-machine gun fire was in fact a soldier firing repeatedly at the corner of Glenfada Park North and Rossville Street. To our minds this instance provides a striking example of soldiers mistakenly attributing repeated high velocity Army gunfire to fire from a Thompson sub-machine gun.



65.197 The only evidence of Thompson sub-machine gun fire given in 1972 by members of C Company was that of Second Lieutenant 110 and Lance Corporal 003. The former recorded that he heard a burst of eight rounds fired from a two-storey block of flats west of Kells Walk,1while he was at the corner of Rossville Street and William Street. The latter recorded that as he ran across the Eden Place waste ground with Second Lieutenant 110 he saw a member of Support Company fire several rounds in the direction of Columbcille Court, from where he could hear automatic gunfire, “possibly ” from a Thompson.2There is nothing in the evidence from the soldiers of Support Company who went into the Bogside that suggests to us that there was automatic gunfire from Columbcille Court or elsewhere to the west of Kells Walk.



65.198 Corporal INQ 444 told us that he recalled hearing two bursts of Thompson sub-machine gun fire, of six to seven rounds each, as he was moving along William Street, but in view of the state of his recollection, on which we have commented above,1it is difficult to rely on his account of where he was when he said he had heard this firing.



65.199 Lance Corporal INQ 1334, Lance Corporal INQ 2045 and Private INQ 1073, all of 8 Platoon, also described hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire when they were in or turning into Chamberlain Street. However, there is no record of such firing by Second Lieutenant 026 (the Commander of 8 Platoon) in his 1972 account. As already noted, Private INQ 471 (also of 8 Platoon) told us that he knew the sound of this weapon as he had been injured by one; but he did not recall hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire as he entered Chamberlain Street.

65.200 We have already expressed the view1that it would be unwise to rely upon the accounts given by INQ 736 and Private INQ 1093. We have also expressed the view2that it would be unwise to rely upon the retrospective description of Thompson sub-machine gun fire given by Private INQ 587 and that Lance Corporal INQ 1799 had no clear recollection of events.



65.201 In all the circumstances we are doubtful whether any of the soldiers of C Company heard or witnessed Thompson sub-machine gun fire. It is possible that some of them did, but it is in our view more likely that what happened was that they mistakenly thought or came to believe that some of the substantial firing by soldiers of Support Company was that of paramilitary gunmen with Thompson sub-machine guns. Elsewhere in this report1we consider other evidence about Thompson sub-machine gun fire, and give reasons for our conclusion that although we cannot eliminate the possibility that there was some such firing on Bloody Sunday, we consider it more likely that there was not.



65.202 As to other low velocity gunfire, it is possible that some soldiers did hear what little low velocity firing there was in the sectors; but for the reasons already given,1it is our view that it is equally likely that they were mistaken about this.



Evidence from C Company soldiers of seeing civilian gunmen

65.203 Some members of C Company gave evidence of seeing a civilian gunman or civilian gunmen on Bloody Sunday. Their accounts can be divided into soldiers who claim to have seen or been aware of a man with a rifle running at ground level in the vicinity of Block 1 or Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, those who thought that there was a gunman on the roof of one of the blocks of the same flats, and the account of Lance Corporal INQ 1799 of seeing a man with an automatic pistol on either Chamberlain Street or William Street.

A gunman at ground level in the vicinity of Block 1 or Block 2 of the Rossville Flats

65.204 Second Lieutenant 110, the officer in command of 7 Platoon, gave the following evidence of seeing a gunman in his RMP statement of 4th February 1972:1

“At approximately 1600 hrs I was positioned in a recess at the rear of houses facing Chamberlain St observing in the direction of Rossville Flats. Whilst in this position I saw a male person aged about 25 yrs and was wearing jacket and trousers. The distance between this person and myself was about 100 metres, so I could not say what colour of clothing he was wearing.

I observed that this person was carrying a weapon under his right arm, all I saw was the butt of the weapon sticking out from underneath his arm. Again fire was not returned to the best of my knowledge. ”



65.205 Second Lieutenant 110 gave a similar account of seeing a civilian carrying a gun in his evidence to this Inquiry. He told us that he recalled that the man moved from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to Block 2 at ground level and then disappeared from view. Second Lieutenant 110 stated that he recalled that the man was carrying a long weapon, of which he could see both the butt and the barrel. Second Lieutenant 110 stated that he did not fire at the gunman as he only had a baton.1He marked his position and that of the gunman with red and green arrows on the following photograph.2
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65.206 Another member of 7 Platoon, Corporal INQ 444, also gave evidence of seeing, from a position at the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, a man with a rifle close to the corner of Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. In contrast to Second Lieutenant 110, Corporal INQ 444 recalled that the gunman passed from Block 2 to Block 1. Corporal INQ 444 stated that events took place so quickly that he was unable to take any action and only had a fleeting glimpse of the man in question. He added that the gunman, who was alone, was carrying the rifle in both hands and making no effort to conceal it. The gunman, according to Corporal INQ 444, did not aim the weapon. Corporal INQ 444 stated that he was “pretty certain … not 100 per cent, but … pretty certain ” that the man was carrying a rifle.1



65.207 Lance Corporal 003, also of 7 Platoon, told this Inquiry that he was with Corporal INQ 444 as they moved across the Eden Place waste ground and to the back of the Chamberlain Street houses.1He stated that at some point during the time they spent at the back of the houses he heard Corporal INQ 444 ask whether or not he had seen a man with a weapon between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. Lance Corporal 003 told us that he did not see this, nor any gunman.2Lance Corporal 003 did not mention this incident in his RMP statement, although he did state that he was “unable to locate any gunmen ”, despite being aware of incoming fire.3In his evidence to this Inquiry, Corporal INQ 444 said that he did not recall shouting a warning to anyone in his platoon, but he thought that it was possible that he might have done so.4





65.208 Lance Corporal INQ 1799, again of 7 Platoon, recorded in his written evidence to this Inquiry that while he was sheltering behind a “boulder ” at the southern end of Chamberlain Street he saw a civilian gunman lying prone with an M1 carbine at the low wall in front of the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats. He nearly fired at this man, but did not due to the proximity of a civilian, who he thought was seeking to restrain the gunman. He also recalled that Major 221A, the Commander of C Company, was with him and gave an order not to fire at that time. The gunman, on Lance Corporal INQ 1799’s evidence, crawled back towards a “pillar type object ”.1


65.209 In his oral evidence Lance Corporal INQ 1799 said that he was “Absolutely certain ” that he had seen a man armed with an M1 carbine, but he thought that he, Lance Corporal INQ 1799, might have been in the Eden Place waste ground, while the gunman was in the waste ground to the north of Block 1.1He did not, however, see any Army vehicles or soldiers in the vicinity of the gunman.2Lance Corporal INQ 1799 said that he saw the gunman at a time when he could hear the firing that is described above.3,4




65.210 In his evidence to this Inquiry, Major 221A stated that he did not recall being with Lance Corporal INQ 1799 at the southern end of Chamberlain Street, but, as he gave oral evidence before Lance Corporal INQ 1799, he was not asked about the latter’s change of evidence as to his and the gunman’s position.1 Major 221A stated that he had no recollection of the incident described by Lance Corporal INQ 1799 and no reference to it appeared in his 1972 statements; however, he thought it was still possible that it happened as Lance Corporal INQ 1799 described.2


65.211 We have already expressed the view1 that it would be unwise to rely on the accounts given by Lance Corporal INQ 1799.


65.212 In our view it is unlikely that Second Lieutenant 110 and Corporal INQ 444 saw a gunman. As we have already concluded,1 by the time Second Lieutenant 110 and Corporal INQ 444 had got to the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, from where they said that they had seen a gunman, the shooting in Sector 2 had finished, but there were soldiers and Army vehicles in the area of the Rossville Flats. In these circumstances it seems to us that a gunman would be foolhardy in the extreme to come into the open with his weapon in full view, when the Rossville Flats provided a ready means of moving, concealed from the soldiers.


A gunman on the roof of one of the blocks of the Rossville Flats

65.213 Private INQ 12, a member of 8 Platoon, told this Inquiry that as he advanced down Chamberlain Street he saw a gunman, armed with a rifle and dressed in civilian clothing, on the roof of the block of flats 300 to 350 yards in front of him (which would have been Block 2 of the Rossville Flats).1He said that he saw this man just after he had heard incoming fire; his evidence of this firing is discussed above. Private INQ 12 told us that he recalled that the man emerged from behind a structure on top of the roof and looked as if he was getting into a firing position, but that he did not see him fire;2and that the gunman subsequently stood up again and walked away.3Private INQ 12’s evidence was that he could not engage the target as he did not have a weapon; and that in any event he heard one of the Lieutenants, who he believed was in command of 9 Platoon, shout three times that no-one was to fire as Support Company was in the building.4




65.214 As already noted,1we do not have any evidence from anyone who claimed to have commanded 9 Platoon.


65.215 Private INQ 12’s evidence of seeing a man with a rifle close to a structure on top of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats is comparable to the 1972 accounts, described above, of Second Lieutenant 026 and Corporal 007. Both of these soldiers, also members of 8 Platoon, thought that they heard rifle shots fired from the area around what was described in their RMP statements as the “lift housing ” at the eastern end of the Block 2 roof.1Neither Second Lieutenant 026 nor Corporal 007 claimed to have seen a gunman, and both expressed reservations as to the extent to which the description of the source of fire reflected their memory, as opposed to the RMP statement taker’s interpretation.2



65.216 This Inquiry has a number of photographs showing the roof of Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, but in none of these is there any evidence of the presence of what might be described as lift housing. There was a raised structure running all the way along the southern edge of the roof, but we doubt whether this would have been visible to a soldier at ground level at the southern end of Chamberlain Street.
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