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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:41





Chapter 72: The high velocity shots heard by Corporal P and Private 017

72.1 As we have noted,1 in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,2 Corporal P described hearing two shots as he and Private 017 reached the wall. He stated that he thought that these were high velocity shots that had come “roughly ” from the direction of the rubble barricade and that he heard the crack of the round going overhead. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,3 Private 017 recorded that soon after he had taken up his position at the wall in front of Columbcille Court he heard two high velocity shots “which I believe may have come from around the area of Rossville Flats but I am not sure what the direction of the fire was ”. In his written statement to this Inquiry,4 Private 017 told us he had heard some shots but did not know where they had come from and did not think that they were aimed at him.




72.2 We have found no other evidence from any source to suggest that two high velocity shots were fired from the area of the rubble barricade towards Corporal P and Private 017. It is noteworthy that Private 017 was from the outset uncertain of the direction of fire. In our view these shots were two of the three fired by Lieutenant N up the Eden Place alleyway, an incident that we considered in the context of Sector 2.1 This incident, which occurred quite soon after Lieutenant N had disembarked from his APC, and some 85m from where Corporal P and Private 017 were situated, corresponds in time with the firing that Corporal P and Private 017 said that they heard. We do not accept Corporal P’s account of hearing the shots pass over his head. Had this happened, there is no reason why Private 017 should not also have heard this, but this soldier has never suggested that he came under fire. As will be seen later in this report,2 we have concluded that Corporal P has throughout lied, to the RMP, to the Widgery Inquiry and to this Inquiry. This is an additional reason for not accepting his account that this was incoming fire.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:45


Chapter 73: The initial firing by Corporal P

73.1 In his first RMP statement, Corporal P described firing two shots at a nail bomber who was behind a crowd about 50m away:1

“About 20 of the rioters were advancing towards us and were throwing stones and other missiles at us continually. One of the two chaps with me and armed with a anti riot gun fired a number of rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse the 20 who were attacking us. They were about 50 metres away at this time. The rioters on being hit by these rubber bullets split up.

As they split up I saw a man aged about 23–25 yrs wearing a light coloured jacket just behind the crowd. I saw him light an object in his hand. I saw it fizzle and sparks came from it. I shouted a warning to the chaps with me and then fired two aimed shots. The first I saw strike the ground near the nail bombers feet. The second I saw strike him in the chest, and this knocked him backwards, he fell to the ground.

The crowd then pulled back temporarily about 5–10 metres. The nailbomb did not explode. They then surged forward again and removed the body of the man I had shot. ”



73.2 On Corporal P’s RMP map are marked two positions for him and two positions for his targets. The map was intended to mark not only the position of the nail bomber Corporal P had stated that he had shot but also the position of a man with a pistol he said that he had shot later behind the barricade. We consider the pistol man later in this report,1 but so far as the nail bomber is concerned neither of the positions of Corporal P marked on the map corresponds with the position from which Corporal P had stated that he had fired, though his first target is perhaps intended to be indicated by the more southerly of the two “target ” arrows.2We explain later in this report3that the RMP maps were not prepared or approved by the soldier concerned. The map does not show the wall of the high ramp south of Kells Walk, which may have led the compiler of the map mistakenly to place Corporal P further to the south than this soldier had said he was.



73.3 Corporal P gave a significantly different account in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. In a part of his written statement for that Inquiry that we have previously set out,1he described a group of people coming along the alleyway and the soldier he was with (Private 017) firing a number of baton rounds to disperse them. This statement continued:2

“The crowd on being hit split up and I noticed a man (he appeared to be aged about twenty-five and was wearing a light-coloured jacket) who was taking cover behind the crowd light an object which I would describe as an explosive missile and which seemed to me to be a nail bomb which began to fizz. I told the other soldier I was with to watch out and I took aim at the man and fired two shots. The man fell, dropping the object which did not explode. At that time my attention was directed down Rossville Street but when I re-directed my attention to where I had shot the man, the body had been removed and I could not see any object on the ground. ”




73.4 Corporal P’s trajectory photograph put him at the wall where he can be seen in the photographs set out above,1and his first target at the entrance of the alleyway leading into Columbcille Court.



73.5 The longer of the two lines drawn on this photograph from the corner of the high ramp at the south end of Kells Walk relates to the shot that Corporal P said that he later fired at a man holding a pistol behind the rubble barricade. We note at this point that there is no entry in Major Loden’s List of Engagements1that relates to any of the shots that Corporal P said that he had fired. The reason for this is that Corporal P had gone up to Altnagelvin Hospital with the bodies of three of the casualties at the time when Major Loden was compiling this list.2



73.6 Corporal P initially gave a somewhat similar account of shooting a nail bomber in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry:1

“Mr. GIBBENS: The people behind the barrier, did they just throw a few stones and leave?

A. No, sir, they stayed where they were.

Q. Did they persist in throwing things?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What happened then?

A. Around this time I noticed a group of people coming out from the Columbcille Court alleyway and they started stoning us and bottling us. The other person I was with fired some baton rounds in an attempt to disperse them, which he did, but when they split up I noticed a man standing behind and attempting to light an object, an explosive missile.

LORD WIDGERY: Yes. Describe it.

A. It was black. It was a black object with what seemed to be a fuse sticking out of it and at the time it was fizzing.

MR. GIBBENS: What do you mean by fizzing?

A. Smoking and spluttering – that sort of thing.

Q. Have you ever seen similar things before in your service in Northern Ireland?

A. Yes, three or four times.

Q. What have they proved to be?

A. Nail bombs.

Q. What did you believe this one was?

A. A nail bomb.

Q. What did you do then?

A. I shouted a warning to this soldier I was with and fired two aimed shots at him.

Q. Not at the soldier?

A. At the nail bomber, sir.

Q. What position were you in when you fired those shots?

A. I was standing, sir.

Q. And where was your weapon?

A. At the shoulder.

Q. Did you ever fire any shots from the hip?

A. No, sir, it is not part of our training.

LORD WIDGERY: Forgive me. You and this other soldier who had been with you all the time, were you alone at this stage or were there others close to you?

A. There was a group of people, from what I understand, to the rear of us.

Q. I am talking about other soldiers of your battalion. You and your mate were there by yourselves?

A. Yes. ”




73.7 Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry that the man dropped the object, which did not go off, that his attention was directed to the rear and that when he turned back the body had gone, along with the nail bomb.1



73.8 A little later in his oral evidence Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry that the man with the nail bomb was about 50 to 75m from him.1This distance would suggest that the man was in the area of the rubble barricade, whereas the distance from Corporal P’s position to the Columbcille Court alleyway (and the distance between him and his target according to the trajectory photograph) was only some 20m. A little later in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Corporal P was shown his trajectory photograph. He agreed that the nail bomber would have been right in the open on the concrete pathway; and said that the nail bomber was about 50 yards away; and was positive that he had hit him in the chest.2




73.9 Corporal P initially told the Widgery Inquiry that he had seen the man light the nail bomb:1

“Q. This nail bomb, was it fizzing at the time when the man had it in his hand?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Did you see him light it?

A. Yes sir.

Q. How did he light it?

A. Well, he just held it down, struck a match.

Q. Did he have it in his left hand or right?

A. Left.

Q. Did he have the match in his right hand?

A. I believe so.

Q. Did he strike it on a box?

A. I couldn’t be certain.

Q. If he did not strike it on a box, what did he strike it on?

A. I could not be certain, sir.

Q. Could you show me now how you think the man with the nail bomb in his left hand lit it with his right?

A. Well, he had the nail bomb and, as I say, I don’t know how he struck the match. He just lit the fuse.

Q. Would you just go back? Two seconds before you see a lighted match in his right hand. Can you tell me how that match materialized in his right hand?

A. No, I couldn’t say, sir.

Q. You could not say?

A. No.

Q. Did it appear as if by magic?

A. I shouldn’t think so, sir.

Q. Did he have a wall on his right-hand where he may have struck it?

A. He would have an entrance to the alleyway.

Q. When he was in Rossville Street, looking towards William Street, would it not be quite untrue to suggest that he had a wall near his right-hand? Do you recall where you pointed out to my Lord only a few minutes ago where the man was standing?

A. Yes sir.

Q. Are you trying to tell the Tribunal that he would have had a wall near his right hand?

A. No sir.

Q. Did he have a matchbox then?

A. I couldn’t be certain, sir.

Q. If he got it lit, you saw the match come towards the nail bomb?

A. I saw the nail bomb fizzing. ”




73.10 However, at the end of Corporal P’s oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, there was this question and answer:1

“Q. … As regards the man with the nail bomb, did you or did you not see him actually light the match or did you first see the match lit?

A. I did not see the match being lit. I just seen the object spluttering and a certain amount of smoke coming from it. ”




73.11 Private 017 mentioned nothing in his first RMP statement about Corporal P shooting a nail bomber. However, in his second RMP statement1he gave this account:

“Further to my statement of 30 Jan 72 which I made at Londonderry. I would like to add that I was positioned behind a brick wall about 10 metres from No 2 Columbcille Court. There was a crowd of about 50 people milling around in front of the barricade which was built across Rossville St. They rushed towards me so I fired one round from my rubber bullet gun, which split them up. From behind the crowd came a man wearing a blue coat and carrying in his hand what I took to be a nail bomb. It was lit as I could see the smoke coming from the fuse. As he raised his arm to throw the bomb towards us ‘P’ who was located just behind me fired 1 x 7.62 rd from his SLR. I don’t know where the round hit the man but he fell and was quickly enveloped by the crowd. The bomb did not go off and the crowd carried away the injured man. ”




73.12 Private 017 gave a similar account in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry.1In this statement, having described Corporal P firing at the nail bomber, he continued by describing how the crowd retreated behind the barricade but other people ran in and out of the alleyway and threw bricks and stones and bottles.



73.13 Private 017 gave this description of the man with a nail bomb in his written evidence to this Inquiry:1

“Not long after the crowd ran out of the alleyway, P shouted ‘Look out, bomber! ’. There was a crowd just north of the Rubble Barricade in the area marked G on the map (grid references J14 and K14). At first I did not see the bomber because there were a lot of people there. I then saw some blue-white smoke low down amongst the crowd. I saw someone crouched down with a dark object in his hand, which I took to be a nail bomb. He had his arm back as if he was ready to throw. I couldn’t now give a description of the man. I heard a shot. I did not actually see the man struck by the bullet but I saw him spin to his right and go down. I don’t know if he fell on his back or on his face. Within seconds, he was engulfed by the crowd and that was the last I saw of him. When the crowd went back he had gone. The device did not go off. I was waiting for a bang but there was nothing. ”




73.14 In his written evidence to this Inquiry,1Private 017 gave this explanation for making no mention of the nail bomber in his first RMP statement:

“I didn’t mention the nail bomber that [Corporal P] fired at in that statement. I thought seeing the gunman was more important so that is what I mentioned seeing. I think that was what I was specifically asked about. ”




73.15 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 said that he had not mentioned the nail bomber in his first RMP statement “because Corporal P was … dealing with that one ”.1His evidence continued as follows:2

“Q. When you say, ‘Corporal P was dealing with that, ’ had you discussed the matter with Corporal P?

A. No.

Q. Do you mean that he was dealing with it in the sense that he is the one who fired the shots at the nail bomber?

A. Yes.

Q. But nevertheless, if this evidence is right, you had seen a suspected nail bomber fall in front of your eyes?

A. Correct.

Q. Apparently shot by another soldier?

A. Yes.

Q. And presumably that nail bomber had been wounded or maybe killed; is that not right?

A. Correct.

Q. Was that not something sufficiently important to be included in your first statement to the Military Police?

A. Maybe, but they were not interested in it.

Q. How do you know they were not interested in it?

A. They were only interested in the gunman.

Q. Did you tell them about the nail bomber?

A. During that, during that night it could have been, the company commander asked if anybody had seen a gunman and I said I did and he said, ‘You better make a statement, ’ and that is what I made, the early hours of the morning.

Q. Did you tell either the company commander or the RMP that you had seen a nail bomber shot in front of your eyes?

A. No, Corporal P did that.

Q. So you did not tell either the company commander or the military policeman who was taking your first statement, anything about the nail bomber?

A. No.

Q. The reason you did not is that the company commander had asked you whether you had seen a gunman; is that right?

A. I think it was the company commander, yes.

Q. Did it not occur to you that unless you told somebody that you had seen a nail bomber they would not be in a position to tell you whether that was something you ought to make a statement about or not?

A. Could you say that again?

Q. Yes. Did it not occur to you that unless and until you told somebody that you had seen a nail bomber being shot right in front of you, nobody would be in a position to say, ‘Well, you ought to make a statement about that ’?

A. It did not occur to me to, to mention it.

Q. Because you say the Military Police were not interested in the nail bomber?

A. Yes, he was just interested in my encounter with the gunman.

Q. How can you tell whether he was interested in the nail bomber if you had not told him that there was a nail bomber?

A. I took it that Corporal P was dealing with that.

Q. Did the military policeman not say to you in the course of taking that statement was there anything else that you saw?

A. No.

Q. Not at all?

A. Not at all.

Q. You are not suggesting, are you, that you had forgotten about the nail bomber when you saw the RMP?

A. No.

Q. Just that you took a conscious decision not to mention it?

A. Only because Corporal P had been – had given a statement the early hours of that morning about it.

Q. Did you know that?

A. Yes, or everybody that fired had to make a statement that morning.

Q. Do you say that you had no discussion, either before or after making your statement that night, with Corporal P about either what he was going to say or what he had said?

A. No.

Q. You then made a second statement to the Military Police on 4th February; is that not right?

A. Yes.

Q. And if we look at B1484.007, paragraph 46, you refer to that and you say:

‘When we got back to Palace Barracks, we were told that there was going to be an inquiry into what had happened that day. I was interviewed again by someone in civilian clothes … A copy of that statement is attached marked appendix 2. We were told that anyone involved had to make a statement and anyone who had witnessed what had happened that day had to make a statement to back up the statement of the person who fired the round.’

Should we understand that the purpose of the second statement was to back up what Corporal P had said?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember who told you that you were required to make another statement to back up the statement of the person who fired the round?

A. It could have been platoon commander or the platoon sergeant, N or P – sorry, N or O.

Q. N or O. By the time you came to make this second statement, did you know what P had said in his first statement?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Had you still not discussed the matter with P at all?

A. We probably did mention it at 22nd Light Air Defence barracks, but just in talking, not in great detail.

Q. Can you remember anything that he said to you about what he had told the Military Police?

A. No, I cannot.

Q. It may be suggested that the reason why you did not mention the nail bomber in your first statement was that you had not seen the nail bomber and that it was only when you knew what P was saying that you decided to make a statement about the nail bomber yourself, in order to back him up. Is that what happened or not?

A. No. ”




73.16 Private 017 was also asked about his second RMP statement and his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, in both of which he had stated that he had seen a smoking fuse:1

“Q. Let us look at B1484.013, which is the second [RMP] statement. In the account that you give of the incident, you say: ‘From behind the crowd came a man wearing a blue coat and carrying in his hand what I took to be a nail bomb. It was lit, as I could see the smoke coming from the fuse. ’ You have told the Inquiry in your statement of the year 2000 that you do not now remember smoke coming from a fuse?

A. I remember seeing smoke, but not like a fuse the size of a pencil sticking out of the bomb.

Q. Did you see a fuse at all, never mind what size it was?

A. No, just smoke and a dark object in his hand.

Q. If we go to B1484.008, paragraph 49.1 [Private 017’s written statement to this Inquiry], you have said there: ‘I do not think actually I saw a fuse. The RMP taking the statement would have put that in. All I saw was smoke and a dark object. The IRA were famous for using nail bombs, so I probably did say that the object was a nail bomb.’

So you are suggesting, are you, that the military policeman introduced the reference to seeing a fuse when you had not said anything about seeing a fuse?

A. Yes.

Q. Why would the military policeman have done that?

A. He was helping me along with the statement and, um, he has probably done it all before and he put it in.

Q. Did you read through the statement that he prepared before you signed it?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And would you not have spotted, when you read it through, that the reference to seeing a fuse was incorrect?

A. It did not occur to me as I took it it was a nail bomb which would have had a fuse.

Q. Let us look, then, at B1484.015, which is the statement that you made to the Treasury Solicitor. Do you remember making this statement?

A. Vaguely.

Q. Do you recall what the procedure was for taking the statement?

A. No, no, I do not.

Q. Can you remember someone asking you questions or was some other procedure followed?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Do you remember whether you had your Military Police statements in front of you when you made this statement?

A. I am not sure.

Q. If we look in paragraph 3, you say:

‘P then told me to look out as he had seen a man come from behind the crowd. This man was about 25, wearing a light blue jacket and carrying in his hand an object which I could see had a smoking fuse which I took to be a nail bomb. ’

Do you see there that in this statement as well you were saying that you could see a smoking fuse?

A. Yes, I see what you mean, but if I took it it was a nail bomb, it would obviously have a fuse.

Q. Is the position that you might have told the Treasury Solicitor that you could see a smoking fuse, even though in fact you had seen smoke but no fuse?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Did you in fact see anything in the hand of this person?

A. Yes, a dark object.

Q. Did you see smoke around him or around the object?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it clear to you that the smoke that you saw was coming from the object in the hand of this person?

A. Yes. ”



73.17 It will be noted that the accounts Private 017 gave of the position of the nail bomber correspond with that given by Corporal P in his first RMP statement, according to which the nail bomber appeared from behind a crowd advancing from the rubble barricade. The accounts are inconsistent with the second version that Corporal P gave of this incident, according to which the nail bomber had been taking cover behind a crowd that had emerged, not from the direction of the rubble barricade, but from the alleyway leading into Columbcille Court.

73.18 We have concluded that the reason why Private 017 made no mention of a nail bomber in his first RMP statement was that he had not seen one. We find his varying explanations of why there is nothing about a nail bomber in this statement unconvincing and we reject them. In our view, after he had given his first RMP statement, Private 017 made up a false account of seeing a nail bomber in an attempt to provide support for Corporal P’s evidence. In this attempt he appears to have relied upon Corporal P’s original version of shooting a nail bomber who was behind a crowd advancing from the Rossville Flats area; not the later version Corporal P gave of the nail bomber sheltering behind people appearing from the alleyway leading into Columbcille Court. The suggestion made by the representatives of the majority of the families that Private 017 colluded with members of the RMP and the solicitors working for the Widgery Inquiry “to provide an account of events consistent with that of Soldier P ”1cannot therefore be sustained, as their accounts are not consistent.



73.19 There is, however, evidence that Corporal P did fire his rifle at about the time he said that he had shot a nail bomber.

73.20 We have referred above1to the evidence of Brendan Carlin, who told us that he saw a soldier, who from his account we consider must have been Corporal P, fire a shot from the hip over the heads of the people stoning him and the soldier with him.


73.21 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1the photographer Liam Mailey recorded that his impression was that just before he had taken what we have described above2as his third photograph (showing Private 017 at the corner of the wall of the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk), the soldier on the right (Corporal P) had fired about two rifle shots towards the barricade from his hip.




73.22 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Fr Thomas O’Gara described taking up a position about 15 yards south of the barricade in Rossville Street and seeing some soldiers in battle dress who were positioned beside a wall at the Free Derry Corner end of Kells Walk:

“One fired rubber bullets and the other got down on one knee several times pretending to fire. On the last of these occasions a sharp crack rang out and I knew this was live rifle fire. I saw no one fall. The soldier was aiming in the Glenfada park direction. ”




73.23 In the statement that Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times Insight Team took from Eamon Melaugh, there is the following account:1

“The soldiers who jumped out of the pigs caught a young lad and were giving him an unmerciful beating. He was on the g[ro]und and they were giving him a kicking. And a number of us ran forward to try and effect a rescue and we were throwing stones. There’s no doubt about I thre[w] stones. We ran forward for about 10 or 15 yards and then we could hear shooting. I would assume that this shooting was going up Chamberlain St to my right. A number of people turned and ran back up Rossville St. and I did the same. Residents from the first floor of the flats called down to me that I had dropped part of my camera. It was a lens hood. And I walked back down and collected it. I would be at this time the last civilian going up Rossville St. I was the last. I walked back up again to the barricade and I turned round and the a[rm]y were still pouring in on the left hand side of Glenfad[a] Park as I looked at it. There were three troopers who came the furthest up Rossville St. One was a rubber bullet man who was at the front and he was shooting his rubber bullet gun almost as quickly as he could load it. Immediately behind him and slightly further away because they were standing tight into the brick wall one of the troops I know now to be a paratrooper fired two rounds. He didn’t take aim. He fired from the waist. I know he was a paratrooper because it is generally recognised now that they were all paras.

I was in front of the barricade going down towards Rossville St at this time – on the rossville st. side of the barricade. When this happened I got up on top of the barricade and I attempted to take a photograph of the guy who had shot, but he saw I had long telephot[o] lens he turned his back to me and he walked down the length of the wall and he kept taking a quick glance over his shoulder to see if I had my camera to my eyes.

When I saw he had twigged on to what I was trying to do I got down off the top of the barricade into the Free Derry side. ”




73.24 Although Eamon Melaugh claimed in his oral evidence to this Inquiry1that some of the contents of these notes did not reflect anything that he had said to Peter Pringle, he did tell us that he remembered seeing a soldier fire two rounds from behind another soldier who had a baton gun; and that he attempted to photograph the soldier who had opened fire.2 We should add that we are of the view that Peter Pringle probably did record accurately what Eamon Melaugh told him.



73.25 Thus there is evidence from three civilians and a priest that Corporal P fired at least one shot, if not two, at the stage under consideration.

73.26 For reasons that we give later in this report,1there is no doubt that the first person to be shot in the area of the rubble barricade was Michael Kelly. There is equally no doubt that he was shot by Lance Corporal F of Anti-Tank Platoon, since the bullet recovered from his body matched Lance Corporal F’s rifle. There is no evidence from any source (including journalists but apart from that of Corporal P and Private 017) that anyone was shot in Sector 3 before Michael Kelly; and we are sure that Michael Kelly was the first casualty in that sector.



73.27 It follows that we reject Corporal P’s account that he shot a nail bomber. Thus in our view either Corporal P fired at someone, or at more than one person, but missed, or he fired otherwise than at people. There is nothing to suggest to us that Corporal P fired by way of last resort, in order to avoid being caught by the crowd. Nor have we found any other evidence that suggests to us that he fired at someone with a nail bomb. On the basis of the evidence to which we have referred we have concluded that Corporal P fired from the waist or hip over the heads of the people further south on Rossville Street, as a means of frightening them off; and then made up accounts of shooting a nail bomber in order to conceal this firing. We can see no possible justification for this use of his weapon, fired in contravention of the provisions of the Yellow Card.



73.28 The false accounts that Corporal P gave of shooting at a nail bomber in our view make it difficult to rely on the accounts he gave of his later shots. We consider these accounts later in this report.1


73.29 At this point we record that Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry1that when he disembarked from the APC he was wearing a respirator. He gave no evidence about whether or when he took it off. It is not possible from the photographs of Corporal P that we have discussed earlier in this report2to see whether or not he was wearing a respirator when they were taken.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:48


Chapter 74: Private 017’s gunman

74.1 Private 017 has given consistent accounts of this incident, starting with his first RMP statement. In the part of this statement that we have reproduced above,1Private 017 described a group of four to five male persons coming close to him from around a corner to his right and stoning him. He then stated that as he ran towards the corner a man came round it towards him:2

“He was a young man of about 19/20 years of age. He was wearing a blue shirt and a dark jacket. I could only see the part of the man above his knees. He was about 20 metres away from me. In his hand, I cannot say now which hand, he had a black object I recognised as a hand weapon; either a pistol or a revolver. I raised my baton gun and fired a round at the man. I did not hit him. I turned and ran off. As I did so I heard two small calibre weapon shots behind me as if the man had fired twice at me or other troops. ”




74.2 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Private 017, after giving an account of the nail bomber, continued:2

“4. After this had happened the crowd then went behind the barricade and continued to throw stones and bottles in our direction. Also bricks and stones and bottles were also being thrown at us by people who were running in and out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. I noticed one man in particular who was throwing bricks from this position and I realized that I could arrest him. I therefore decided to run towards the alleyway. As I did so I saw a man walk around the corner towards me. From where I was he was about 15–20 metres away from me. He was aged about 20 and was wearing a blue shirt and a dark jacket. In his hand he had either a pistol or a revolver. I raised my baton gun and fired a round at him. I do not know if I hit him because my main concern was to get out of his line of fire so I turned and ran off back to where I had come from. As I did so I heard two small calibre weapon shots behind me as if the man had fired twice at me or other troops in my area. ”



74.3 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017, after giving the account we have rejected concerning the nail bomber, told us:1

“Not long after that, I looked west down the alleyway immediately to my right (the one leading to Columbcille Court). I could see rubble and old prams lying around, across the alleyway. Four or five youths had formed a line and were throwing bottles or bricks towards me. In particular, I saw a guy with long hair and I decided to arrest him. As I ran forward, the youths doubled back and ran away and I saw a man with a pistol come around the corner, from the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, into the alleyway towards me. The gunman was about 20 to 30 yards from me. I don’t remember which hand his gun was in, but I could see that it was a pistol. He was pointing it in my direction. I fired a rubber bullet at him and he shied away. I then ran round the corner, back into Rossville Street and called P. I can’t be certain, as I did so, whether or not the man with the pistol fired at me, but I think that he did. The gunman was a young man, not fat but of normal build. If I had seen him again that day I would have recognised him. ”



74.4 During the course of his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 was closely questioned about the gunman he said that he had seen and at whom he had fired his baton gun.1He did not resile from the accounts that he had previously given about this.



74.5 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 marked with a red arrow on a photograph the location from which he said that the gunman had come.1 The photograph is reproduced below.2 The blue arrow shows where Private 017 put his own position.




Private 017 and the Loden List of Engagements

74.6 In the course of our consideration of the events of Sectors 1 and 2,1we referred to what we described as the Loden List of Engagements, which Major Loden compiled from information provided to him by soldiers soon after the shooting on Bloody Sunday. We consider the preparation of this list elsewhere in this report.



74.7 The seventh entry in this list is in the following terms:

“7. 1 gunman with pistol fired 2 rounds at a soldier armed only with a baton gun at GR 43231688 (Alleyway). Soldier fired one baton round and withdrew swiftly. ”




74.8 Private 017’s position, as indicated by the grid reference, is shown in blue on the following map, prepared for the purposes of this Inquiry by the legal representatives of one of the families


74.9 As is explained elsewhere in this report,1we take the view that the grid references contained in the list as a whole do not necessarily indicate the precise positions that those interviewed by Major Loden wished to convey, as inaccuracies undoubtedly arose as a result of the difficult circumstances in which the list was created. However, the similarity between the account of his encounter with a gunman given in Private 017’s first RMP statement2and in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,3and the details recorded in the seventh entry in Major Loden’s List of Engagements leave us in no doubt that he was the source for that entry. Private 017 could not remember being interviewed by Major Loden, but did remember telling someone about his encounter with the gunman, and agreed that he might have spoken to Major Loden as well as the RMP.4




74.10 It is our view, for reasons that we give when considering the list and individual entries in it,1that entries 1 to 7 in Major Loden’s List of Engagements record engagements involving members of Mortar Platoon, entry 8 is an account given by a member or members of Machine Gun Platoon, entries 9 to 11 concern Anti-Tank Platoon and entries 12 to 15 refer to Composite Platoon (Guinness Force). From this it would appear that Major Loden interviewed members of each platoon in turn, and that Private 017 was the last member of Mortar Platoon to see his Company Commander.



74.11 There are thus consistent accounts from Private 017, the first given to Major Loden soon after the events of the day, of an encounter with a civilian carrying a handgun
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:54


Chapter 75: Other evidence of a man with a handgun in Rossville Street


Military witnesses

75.1 Only one other military witness gave evidence of seeing a gunman in the area to which Private 017 had gone. This was Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383.

Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383

75.2 This officer was the Assistant Provost Marshal in Northern Ireland at the time and was present on Bloody Sunday. He told us that he had followed Support Company through Barrier 12. He was on foot and in civilian clothes. After hearing firing he saw a pistol man emerge from and withdraw behind a wall. According to his written statement to this Inquiry he did not recall whether the man fired, or his exact location, though he described the wall as being in Rossville Street.1



75.3 Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383 gave oral evidence to this Inquiry, during the course of which he was shown a photograph of the area. On this he marked his position as being on the eastern corner of the junction between William Street and Rossville Street when he caught a fleeting glance of a gunman who appeared from behind a wall in the area of the southern end of Kells Walk. He said: “… it appeared he had a pistol in his hand, fleetingly, and then disappeared. ”1 We set out below the photograph (not taken on Bloody Sunday) marked by this officer.




75.4 Colonel INQ 1383 was unable to recall any details of the age or hair colour of the gunman he said that he had seen, though he told us that he might have been wearing a raincoat.1



75.5 We have no reason to doubt Colonel INQ 1383’s account of catching a glimpse of a gunman in Rossville Street. Since this sighting appears to have been made at about the time when Private 017 was at the corner of the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk, we think it possible that Colonel INQ 1383 saw the gunman described by Private 017, but in view of the lack of detail in his account, we cannot be certain of this.

Civilian witnesses

Fr Thomas O’Gara

75.6 Fr Thomas O’Gara is dead and gave no evidence to this Inquiry. However, he gave a written statement for the Widgery Inquiry and oral evidence to that Inquiry.

75.7 We have already noted1that in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,2Fr O’Gara described seeing two soldiers, who in our view were Private 017 and Corporal P, the former firing his baton gun and the latter kneeling and pretending to fire, though Fr O’Gara then heard the sharp crack of rifle fire. In the next paragraph of the statement, Fr O’Gara described the scene at the barricade:

“Secondly my attention was taken by some young lads on the barricade at the Flats. They were screaming for the mass of the people at Free Derry Corner to come back. None of them had fire-arms or nail bombs or petrol bombs. They shouted both at the army and their own people and I can vaguely recall some stones being thrown. I stood there for about 1 minute and heard some other muffled shots like rubber bullets all from the William Street area. I didn’t realise the danger. ”




75.8 Fr O’Gara continued:

“The third incident which I can clearly recall happened about thirty seconds after the soldier discharged his shot. A young man appeared from the Cathedral side of Kells Walk unknown and unseen by soldiers, drew a pistol from his pocket leaned over a wall at the end of Kell’s walk and fired three shots quickly. The soldiers didn’t even recognize his presence and he disappeared. This was the only weapon I saw throughout that day. The man wore a ‘longish ’ coat. He was completely separated from the main crowd even those around the barricade on Rossville Street. There was at no stage any gunfire from behind me or beside me. I am certain the revolver was fired after the troops opened fire. ”


1 H19.5-6

75.9 Fr O’Gara gave a similar account of this gunman in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. He added that the gunman “could not possibly have hit any troops but was possibly aiming at a Saracen car that was parked on Rossville Street about 25 yards away, I would say ”.1



75.10 It is not entirely clear from his account where Fr O’Gara put the gunman. From his viewpoint behind the rubble barricade “the Cathedral side of Kells Walk ” could indicate the western side of Kells Walk. His evidence could also be interpreted as meaning that the gunman appeared between the walls of the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk. However, in view of the other evidence that we have considered above,1we consider this unlikely, as Corporal P and Private 017 had already gone south of these walls and other soldiers were not far away. To our minds the description Fr O’Gara gave could also apply to the wall extending south from the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk, which would put him in a position, and his firing at a time (soon after Corporal P had fired), that would correspond reasonably closely with the place and time given by Private 017. Fr O’Gara told the Widgery Inquiry that the soldiers did not see this gunman, but it remains possible that he either did not see Private 017 firing his baton gun or did not associate this with the gunman.



Marian McMenamin

75.11 Marian McMenamin was 17 at the time of Bloody Sunday. She gave a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) statement1in which she made no mention of seeing a civilian gunman, but in her written statement to this Inquiry she described running south from the junction of William Street and Rossville Street with her mother as the Army vehicles came in. Her account continued:2

“As we were running away, I saw a civilian with a gun. I hate myself for saying this; I have never told anybody about this before, not even my husband and we have been married for over 25 years. I feel disloyal to the innocent men who died on Bloody Sunday, but I did see him and I feel that the truth must now be told. The gunman was in an alleyway, near the pram ramp at the south gable end wall of Kells Walk. I have marked his approximate position on the attached map point D (grid reference K12).

The man was at ground level in the area around the pram ramps, but not actually on the pram ramp. To the best of my recollection, he had his back to the gable end wall of Kells Walk. He was young, probably in his mid to late 20s, about 5'8 " tall, average build, dark hair and wearing dark clothing (¾ black coat). He did not have his face covered with a mask or balaclava. He was on his own – there was no-one around him; he was just a single gunman. He had a quite big, squarish, hand gun in his right hand. He was holding the hand gun out in front of him, but not aiming it. I did not see him fire it. He appeared from behind the wall, walked east towards Rossville Street, looked south towards the Rossville Flats’ shops and then withdrew again. I do not know where he went after that. ”




75.12 The part of the map on which Marian McMenamin marked point D is reproduced below.




75.13 In her oral evidence to this Inquiry, Marian McMenamin said that “it is still hard after 30 years to actually pinpoint ” the gunman’s location.1 Initially, she told us that the gunman was in the area immediately south of the low walls at the southern end of Kells Walk, but she later expressed doubt about this as she would not have been able to see him if he had been in that area.2 Later, she said that “quite possibly ”3 he could have been in the area of the alleyway leading off Rossville Street between Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court.




75.14 Marian McMenamin marked with an arrow on the following photograph the area where she thought there was “a good possibility ” she had seen the gunman.



75.15 She told us that the gunman was moving slowly along the wall of a block of flats with his back to it.1 He came out towards Rossville Street but then withdrew without actually putting his foot onto Rossville Street. The wall was “much higher than him ” and “sort of in a covered area ”. She could only see the man from his knees upwards. On this basis it is possible that Marian McMenamin saw a gunman moving along the eastern wall of Columbcille Court and then approaching the low wall shown in this photograph from its western side.



75.16 Marian McMenamin told us that the man was confronted by a steward who told him to leave and that he would have been seen by “maybe half a dozen people ”.1



75.17 It is not surprising that Marian McMenamin cannot be precise. She had not previously spoken of the incident. She was running with her mother in a noisy, frightening and confusing situation as Army vehicles were coming south down Rossville Street. Nevertheless her accounts put a gunman close to where, according to Private 017, one appeared shortly afterwards.

Michael Lynch

75.18 Michael Lynch, who was then 16 years old and observing from the living room of a flat on the seventh floor of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, told us that he saw a young man with a handgun, who was wearing a three-quarter-length parka with its hood covering his head, come from the north-east side of Glenfada Park North.1 Michael Lynch saw the gunman after the soldiers entered the Bogside and before he saw people lying on the barricade, one of whom was apparently dead. He stated that this man fired twice towards soldiers on Rossville Street by putting “his hand round the corner ”.2 He marked the gunman’s position with an arrow on the following photograph.



75.19 It was suggested to Michael Lynch, who gave no statement in 1972, that he might have been confused and might in fact have seen the gunman we discussed when considering the events of Sector 2,1 who has become known as “Father Daly’s gunman ” (OIRA 4), while looking from the bedroom of the flat that overlooked the Rossville Flats car park. Michael Lynch acknowledged the possibility that he might have been looking out of the bedroom window rather than the living room window, but said that he still believed that this was not so and that he had seen the gunman when looking onto Rossville Street, though his confidence in this belief became somewhat less certain in the course of his evidence.2



75.20 In our view Michael Lynch probably saw a gunman when looking onto Rossville Street. The gunman he described appears to have been dressed differently from OIRA 4; and there is some question as to whether OIRA 4 would have been visible from the flat from which Michael Lynch was watching. In addition, Michael Lynch described the gunman as having run both out of and back into an alleyway, and referred to “the speed of how quick he run out and run back again ”,1 which does not correspond to the actions of OIRA 4.



75.21 Not surprisingly, after so long Michael Lynch found it difficult to give any sort of estimate as to the length of time that passed between seeing the gunman and seeing the bodies on the rubble barricade.1He told us that he did not see any reaction from the soldiers but explained that he was not right up against the window so that his view was limited.2He was shown what Fr O’Gara had said about a gunman and agreed that it was possible that they were both describing the same man.3




Margo Harkin

75.22 Margo Harkin also watched events in Rossville Street from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. She was in her grandmother’s fifth floor flat. She told this Inquiry that although she was not sure of the sequence of events, at a time when people were lying dead in Rossville Street, she saw two young men emerge from the alleyway separating Glenfada Park North and Columbcille Court. One of the men took a handgun from the other, “swung round the corner ” and fired one unaimed shot southwards down Rossville Street.1 Margo Harkin told us, in her written evidence to this Inquiry, that the gunman “went to the edge of the gable, ducked his head around the gable end to his right – and fired ”. The gunman then appeared to return the gun to his companion.2 The two young men (who Margo Harkin thought were aged between 16 and their early twenties and wearing jackets3), ran off in the direction from which they had come and then separated, the one who appeared to have the gun going to the left (towards Abbey Park) and the other to the right.4 According to Margo Harkin, this incident occurred as a soldier was inching his way down the eastern wall of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, and this soldier reacted to the shot by turning round.5 Margo Harkin remained confident, as she was questioned, that the two young men had come from, and returned along, the alleyway to the north of the pram-ramp at the north-eastern corner of Glenfada Park North, and not to the south of it. She was also certain that the gunman had fired in a southerly direction, not northwards.




75.23 There is no other evidence of a soldier moving or reacting to a shot in the way Margo Harkin described. However, we are of the view that she probably did at some stage see a gunman firing in Rossville Street, though it may well be that with the passage of time, her memory of the details of that sighting has become blurred. Thus whether this was the same gunman that Private 017 said that he had seen remains uncertain.

Liam Mailey

75.24 We have previously referred to some of the photographs taken by the freelance photographer Liam Mailey.1 He recorded in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry that after he had taken the photograph that we have reproduced above,2of civilians advancing over the rubble barricade in the direction of the soldiers, and before he took the six further photographs that we have numbered and reproduced above,3 he moved towards the Rossville Flats, and that as he did so he heard:4

“… 3 single shots which appeared to be of lower calibre than the rifle shots. They appeared to be fired from the area of Glenfada Park or Kells Walk. I cannot give the direction. ”




75.25 During his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Liam Mailey said that the sound of low calibre shots came from Kells Walk but “possibly in a built-up area it could have come from somewhere else ”.1



75.26 According to Liam Mailey’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, therefore, these shots were fired at a relatively early stage, before he took the photographs of Private 017 at the corner of the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk, and before other soldiers arrived at the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk.

75.27 Liam Mailey did not mention these shots in his 1972 Sunday Times and NICRA interviews.1 In his written evidence to this Inquiry he told us that he recalled hearing approximately three or four low calibre shots, but he could not remember exactly when he heard them or where he was when he did so. He told us that he thought that these shots came from the area of either Glenfada Park North or the southern end of Columbcille Court, with the latter being perhaps more likely.2 Liam Mailey was unable to assist further during his oral evidence,3 and said that he considered his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry to be his most accurate account.4




Consideration of the evidence of a gunman in Rossville Street

75.28 Our consideration of the evidence we have set out above leads us to conclude that Liam Mailey heard shots fired by a civilian gunman, and that Lieutenant Colonel INQ 1383 and the civilian witnesses saw a civilian gunman, on the western side of Rossville Street after the soldiers had come in.

75.29 There are differences in the accounts of a gunman that the witnesses have given. Private 017 described the gunman as a young man of normal build, wearing a blue shirt and a dark jacket. Colonel INQ 1383 thought that the gunman might have been wearing a raincoat. Fr O’Gara described the man as young and wearing a “longish ” coat. Marian McMenamin described the gunman as young, probably in his mid or late twenties, of average build, with dark hair and wearing a dark three-quarter-length coat. Michael Lynch described the gunman as a young man wearing a three-quarter-length parka with its hood covering his head. Margo Harkin described two young men wearing jackets, one of whom took a handgun from the other and fired southwards down Rossville Street. There are also differences between the accounts of the witnesses as to when and where the gunman appeared.

75.30 The differences between, and in some case within, the various accounts do not in our view establish that there was more than one gunman operating at the time and in the area of Rossville Street under consideration. The confusion, noise and panic created by the arrival of the soldiers, the short time during which the witnesses caught a glimpse of a gunman, the different viewpoints of the witnesses, and the fact that in most cases the witness was trying to recollect something seen decades ago, could well explain these differences. It could also be the case, for example, that Margo Harkin saw the same gunman as described by other witnesses but at a later stage. At the same time, we cannot reject the possibility that the witnesses were describing more than one gunman, though with the exception perhaps of Margo Harkin, we consider it more likely than not that they were describing the same man.

75.31 Much of this evidence supports the account that Private 017 gave of encountering a man with a handgun who shortly afterwards fired his weapon. Although his misguided attempt to support Corporal P’s account of shooting a nail bomber leads us to treat Private 017’s evidence with caution, in the end we are sure that he did, as he described, encounter a man with a handgun after Corporal P had fired. We are also sure that this gunman then fired one or more shots, possibly at Private 017.

75.32 We should note one further matter. With the exception of Colonel INQ 1383, no other soldier has given evidence of seeing a gunman at or about the same time and place as Private 017. There is thus nothing to suggest that this incident had anything to do with what happened very soon afterwards, when soldiers in Rossville Street fired towards the rubble barricade and killed people at or near that barricade.

75.33 No-one has admitted being the gunman discussed in the previous paragraphs, nor has either the Official or the Provisional IRA accepted that it could have been any of its members. We do not know who this gunman was.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:56


Chapter 76: Other firing of baton rounds in Sector 3



76.1 For the reasons that we gave when discussing the events of Sector 2,1we consider it probable that Private 112, a baton gunner, disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC when it briefly stopped in Rossville Street. After this he assisted Private U in the arrest of Charles Canning and then took up a position at the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.



76.2 In his RMP statement,1 in which he did not mention being involved in the arrest of Charles Canning, Private 112 recorded that he took up a position at the corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and fired a number of baton rounds to disperse rioters, but he did not specify which corner, or where the rioters were located.



76.3 In his written statement to this Inquiry,1 he told us that he went first to the north-east corner of Block 1 and from there fired baton rounds towards stone-throwers who had emerged from the passage between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats. Then he moved to the north-west corner of Block 1. A group of men advanced towards him from the rubble barricade, throwing bricks and rubble. He fired, on his estimate, about six baton rounds in their direction. They retreated and dispersed.



76.4 Private 112 also told us that as soon as he reached the north-west corner of Block 1 he noticed a body lying on top of the rubble barricade, apparently unconscious or dead.1 This appears to indicate that he did not fire baton rounds towards the group of men who advanced from the rubble barricade until after at least one person had been shot at the barricade. However, in his oral evidence to this Inquiry,2 he said that he could not remember whether he fired these baton rounds before or after he saw the body. We are left in doubt as to when Private 112 fired these baton rounds.




Lance Corporal 018

76.5 This soldier was a member of Anti-Tank Platoon who probably travelled in the last of the vehicles to enter the Bogside, ie the APC commanded by Sergeant INQ 1694.

76.6 In his RMP statement timed at 1915 hours on 4th February 1972,1Lance Corporal 018 recorded that he was armed only with a baton gun. He stated that after disembarkation he was initially positioned “ten metres south of the north east corner of a Block of Flats, against the east wall. The flats were situated forty metres west of the junction Eden Place, Rossville Street. ”



76.7 On the basis of this description it would seem that Lance Corporal 018 was initially a short distance down from the northern end of the Kells Walk flats.

76.8 Lance Corporal 018 recorded in his RMP statement that while he was in this position he was:1

“… fired on by a gunman located on the ground beside the doorway to Block 1 of Rossville Flats, near the south west corner of the block. I did not see anyone engage this gunman as he was operating from behind a crowd of people at a barricade.

The gunman’s shots fell short of my position by about twenty metres and nearly hit a camera crew who immediately ran to cover. I am unable to describe the gunman. ”




76.9 Lance Corporal 018’s RMP statement continued:1

“I then moved my position by the Block of Flats and took up a similar position by the south east corner of the same block. From this position I fired at the crowd behind the barricade. The distance was about 120 metres and the direction south. The barricade was positioned near to the southern end of Block 1 of Rossville Flats and stretched across Rossville Street.

I moved positions again and took up a position behind the north east corner of a block of flats in Glenfada Park. The Block was situated about fifty metres west of block 1, Rossville Flats. I fired one baton round from this position at a woman who emptied liquid from a glass jar onto troops below. The round must have been weak because it did not reach the flats. I fired a further round from this position at people behind the barricade. I did not see a strike on any occasion. ”




76.10 Lance Corporal 018 gave written evidence to this Inquiry,1but was too unwell to give oral evidence. He told us that his recollection now differed from what was in his RMP statement; and that he believed that the latter contained some details that were not accurate and that some of the incidents were out of sequence.2He stated that he initially took up position at the northern end of Kells Walk, and lost contact with the rest of his platoon, whom he thought had moved to the other (western) side of Kells Walk.3He made no mention of firing his baton gun before he fired at the woman in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, which in this statement he told us that he did from a position at the southern end of Kells Walk.4He also recorded in this statement that (while he was still on his own) he fired a further baton round from the same position towards the rubble barricade in order to try to repel a group of people that had gathered on the south side of the barricade, some of whom were starting to throw pieces of rubble. He stated that he aimed this baton round at the ground in front of the barricade, in order not to hit anyone directly.5Lance Corporal 018 then told this Inquiry that:

“Shortly after I fired the round, I noticed the group of men on the side of the Barricade nearest to Block 1 of the Flats move towards the middle of the Barricade … Then a gunman appeared from the doorway at the (southwest) corner of Block 1 of the Flats. His approximate position is marked ‘F ’ on the map (grid reference J16). I would estimate that he was a man in his mid 30’s. He was wearing dark clothing and, I think, a casual jacket. He was not wearing any head gear or a mask. He came out quickly from the doorway and fired two shots in quick succession from a weapon which looked like an M1 Carbine. He did not have time to get into a really steady position and I do not think the shots were aimed at any particular target. I do not think he was aiming at me, but the shots were fired in the general direction (northwards) up Rossville Street. After the shots were fired, the man moved quickly back into the doorway of the Flats and I did not see him again. ”




76.11 The position marked “F ” on Lance Corporal 018’s map was at the south-western end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.1Lance Corporal 018 told us that as far as he could recall, there were no other soldiers in the area around him when the shots were fired and that he did not remember hearing any other gunfire at about the same time.2




76.12 As to his RMP statement, Lance Corporal 018 told us that the details he gave of the gunman “are not quite as I remember them ”. He told us that his recollection was that he was behind the low wall at the southern end of Kells Walk when he saw the gunman; and that he did not remember seeing the gunman’s shots falling short of his position. “I do remember seeing a camera crew running for cover, but I recall that they did so as a result of shots fired before the incident involving the gunman at the door of the Flats. ” He explained that at the time he made his RMP statement, “I had so many images flashing through my mind that I could not give any details as to description ”.1



76.13 So far as his baton gun firing is concerned, it is far from clear at what stage Lance Corporal 018 fired any of his rounds. In his written statement to this Inquiry he told us that the reason he fired at the woman was not that she was pouring something from the window, but rather for her own protection, since by then he had heard live fire.1In view of what he had recorded in his RMP statement, it is difficult to accept this explanation.



76.14 We also find it difficult to accept his accounts of seeing a gunman. According to his RMP statement, the shots the gunman fired “nearly hit a camera crew, who immediately ran to cover ”.1We have no evidence from any other source that this happened. If Lance Corporal 018 was at the northern end of Kells Walk, while there was still a crowd at the rubble barricade, there must have been soldiers of his platoon, or Composite Platoon, or both platoons in front of him. The account Lance Corporal 018 gave in his written statement to this Inquiry was to the effect that he was on his own when he saw the gunman and further south on Rossville Street. However, as will become clear in this report, by the time Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers had moved from Rossville Street, the rubble barricade was deserted or virtually deserted and remained so thereafter.



76.15 In his RMP statement Lance Corporal 018 recorded that he was unable to describe the gunman. This statement was given on 5th February 1972, and we find unconvincing Lance Corporal 018’s explanation for why he was unable at that time to give the detailed description he provided to us.

76.16 We did not have the opportunity to question Lance Corporal 018 about these matters. It is possible that what he had recorded in 1972 related to an incident, which we consider later in this report,1in which at a late stage a gunman fired a handgun from the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and that over the years his recollection of events has become distorted. In the end we concluded that we should place no reliance on Lance Corporal 018’s account of seeing a gunman. We have no reason to doubt that he fired his baton gun, though we have no other evidence about the round that he stated that he fired at a woman in Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, or the further round that he said that he fired at people behind the rubble barricade, nor is it clear at what stage he fired any of his rounds.


76.17 Private 017, Private 112 and Lance Corporal 018 are the only soldiers who gave evidence in 1972 that they had fired baton guns towards the rubble barricade. In his written statement to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal 010, a member of Composite Platoon (Guinness Force) who travelled in the second of the two lorries of that platoon, told us that he fired a baton round at the rubble barricade.1However, he had not mentioned doing so in his RMP statement,2and in his oral evidence to us3he said that he thought that his recollection that he had fired a baton round was incorrect. In these circumstances we consider it unlikely that Lance Corporal 010 fired his baton gun on Bloody Sunday.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 21:57


Chapter 77: The injury to Seamus Liddy

77.1 Seamus (or James) Liddy was 49 at the time of Bloody Sunday. He was arrested on Bloody Sunday. He is dead and gave no evidence to this Inquiry.

77.2 Peter Pringle of the Sunday Times Insight Team interviewed Seamus Liddy on 18th May 1972. According to the note of the interview, in which his age is incorrectly noted as 43, Seamus Liddy ran into Glenfada Park when the Army entered the Bogside. The note continues:1

“There was a group standing by the gable and he went over to it. He could see a soldier across near the barricade, standing at the bottom of the Rossville flats. The soldier fired a rubber bullet which hit Liddy in the chest close to his heart. He is not a strong man, is 43, and it hurt him badly. He was helped by his brother Barry and Fr Bradley. The next thing he saw was a group bending over the body of Michael Kelly… ”



77.3 In his Keville interview,1 Seamus Liddy had made no reference to this incident, claiming instead that the Army had detained him in William Street while he was on his way to work. It is likely that since he was at that time employed as a bar steward in the NAAFI (the bar run by the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes) at Fort George,2 he was concerned at the time of that interview not to admit that he had been among the crowd in Glenfada Park North or in the area of the rubble barricade.



77.4 There is other evidence to confirm that Seamus Liddy received an injury from a baton round. His brother Barry Liddy, who was 45 years old at the time and who is also dead, did not make a statement to this Inquiry, but mentioned the incident in his Keville interview.1 In an undated handwritten statement, Barry Liddy recorded that while he was at “the Gable End house ” in Glenfada Park, someone shouted that his brother had been shot. He went to where a crowd had gathered and found his brother in a distressed condition. He helped him into the shelter of the houses and discovered that a baton round had struck him.2




77.5 Paddy Doherty, who was accompanied on the march by his brother-in-law Joseph Donnelly, said in his written statement to this Inquiry that he was standing just out from the south-east corner of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North when he saw a “quite short and stocky ” soldier with a rubber bullet gun step out from the northern end of that block. The soldier “made to fire ” his baton gun whereupon everyone ducked or made for cover, but an older man behind Paddy Doherty, whose name he later heard was Liddy, was not fast enough and was hit in the chest by a rubber bullet when the soldier fired. He fell to the ground on the western side of Rossville Street just south of the entrance to Glenfada Park North. When Paddy Doherty offered assistance, Seamus Liddy said not to worry about him as a young man had been more badly hurt. Seamus Liddy was pointing to Michael Kelly when he said this.1 Paddy Doherty mentioned the incident briefly in his NICRA statement of 1st February 19722 and also in his oral evidence to this Inquiry.3




77.6 Joseph Donnelly told us in his written statement to this Inquiry that he saw Seamus Liddy standing just south of the wall at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, hunched over in some pain, and receiving assistance from two men. He recalled that Seamus Liddy had said that a baton round had hit him in the chest.1 The incident is briefly mentioned in Joseph Donnelly’s NICRA statement2 and in his oral evidence to this Inquiry.3




77.7 In a statement dated 23rd February 1972, John O’Kane recorded that he saw Seamus Liddy in terrible agony, standing with the help of people around him who were opening his collar and tie. John O’Kane recorded that he saw blood coming from Seamus Liddy’s front and heard that a baton round had hit him; and that this happened before the shooting of Michael Kelly.1 In a supplementary written statement to this Inquiry, John O’Kane told us that he no longer remembered this incident, although he had “a vague recollection ” of Seamus Liddy being there.2 In his oral evidence, he said that “As far as I remember ” he came across a man in Glenfada Park who had been shot with a rubber bullet.3




77.8 On the basis of this evidence we are sure that Seamus Liddy was hit by a baton round when he was behind the rubble barricade and near the entrance to Glenfada Park North. This incident seems to have occurred just before Michael Kelly was shot and mortally injured near the rubble barricade.

77.9 Seamus Liddy himself, in his interview with Peter Pringle, attributed the baton round to a soldier “standing at the bottom of the Rossville flats ”. Paddy Doherty, in his evidence to us, described the soldier stepping out and firing from the northern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. In our view the account given by Seamus Liddy in 1972 is the more likely to be correct. It will have been seen from our discussion of the movements of Corporal P and Private 0171that although the latter fired his baton gun towards the rubble barricade, he may have been too far from the barricade for his baton round to be travelling with sufficient force to cause Seamus Liddy to fall. As to Lance Corporal 018, it is difficult to tell from his accounts, to which we have referred in the previous chapter,2 where he was when he fired his baton gun.



77.10 In these circumstances we have concluded that it is likely, though far from certain, that the baton round that hit Seamus Liddy was fired by Private 112 from the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. He was the closest baton gunner in Sector 3 to the rioting near the rubble barricade. The distance between the northern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats and the area where Seamus Liddy was hit was within, though at about the limit, of the effective range for a baton gun. There is nothing to suggest that Private 112 deliberately targeted Seamus Liddy; and we consider that this soldier may well (as he said) have been attempting to deter the advance of rioters beyond the rubble barricade. In our view the use of a baton gun for this purpose cannot fairly be criticised
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 22:00


Chapter 78: The injury to Mary Smith

78.1 Mary Smith, who was 17 years old at the time of Bloody Sunday, was watching events outside from the larger of the two windows of the sitting room of her mother’s flat at 2 Kells Walk.1 This was the southernmost window on the first floor on the eastern side of the block, facing Rossville Street and the Eden Place waste ground. The window can be seen in the following photograph.






78.2 In her written statement to this Inquiry, Mary Smith (now Mary Breslin) said that after the soldiers entered Rossville Street, a foreign photographer arrived in the flat and went to the smaller, more northerly window of the sitting room. Someone in the flat warned that a soldier was pointing a gun up at the flat. Mary Smith heard a bang and was hit on the left side of her face and in her left eye by flying glass. She did not think that anyone had been doing anything at either window to attract attention. Mary Smith was admitted to hospital and underwent an operation. She lost the sight in her left eye for a week or so.1



78.3 Mary Smith’s aunt, the late Kathleen Kelly, confirmed the substance of this account in her written evidence to this Inquiry, although she did not make a distinction between the two windows of the sitting room. Kathleen Kelly was in the room with her niece. She recalled that her sister had shouted out of the window to some soldiers “‘Leave them wee ’uns alone’ ” and that a journalist had been trying to take photographs from the window. She then saw a soldier fire his gun from the western side of Rossville Street beneath the window of the flat. She believed that he had fired a baton round because the whole window was smashed.1



78.4 Brian Power, a self-confessed “well known rioter ”,1 was also in the sitting room at 2 Kells Walk. In his written evidence to this Inquiry, he said that an officer was talking to a Corporal “in the area of the wall where there was a ramp up from Rossville Street ”. The officer pointed to the window of the flat, obviously saying something to the soldier, who then swivelled around, aimed at the window and fired a baton round, which shattered the glass.2 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Brian Power said that no-one had been throwing anything out of the windows of the room and that he was not sure whether the photographer had been using his camera at the time when the baton round was fired.3




78.5 Maura Power, Brian Power’s girlfriend at the time and later his wife, was in the room as well. She told us that as the photographer went to the window to take photographs, a rubber bullet was fired and the glass broken. She did not see the soldier who fired the baton round.1



78.6 Damien Friel recorded in his NICRA statement1 that he entered 2 Kells Walk as the soldiers were advancing down Rossville Street. From the flat he also saw soldiers in Rossville Street apprehend a young man. In our view this was William John Dillon. Damien Friel stated that a “French cameraman ” stepped out onto the balcony overlooking Rossville Street. A soldier holding a baton gun was standing beside a Sergeant at the back of an Army vehicle along with three other soldiers. The Sergeant grabbed the soldier with the baton gun by the left arm, turned him towards the balcony and pointed at the cameraman. The soldier fired one baton round, which missed the cameraman by about a foot, smashed the window, hit the window frame and bounced back into the street. The broken glass severely cut the face of a girl in the room.



78.7 Damien Friel also described this incident in his written evidence to this Inquiry, in which he said that the cameraman “kept trying to look out of the window ”. He said that before the baton round was fired people in the flat had implored the cameraman to come away from the window in case he drew fire. Damien Friel said that the soldier who fired the baton round had been standing near an Army vehicle just short of the entrance to the car park of the Rossville Flats.1 In his oral evidence, he said that he was “not too sure ” whether the cameraman was at the window or outside, but that his NICRA statement, in which he had stated that the cameraman was on the balcony, was more likely to be correct.2




78.8 The only soldier who has given evidence that he fired a baton round at a window in Kells Walk is Corporal 039 of Composite Platoon. In his RMP statement, he recorded that:1

“… a first floor window opened in ... about the centre of the block and two women appeared and started to throw missiles at us. There was also one man in the window who had a camera and was trying to take photographs of us… ”



78.9 He stated that he fired a baton round in the direction of the window in order to clear the people away from it. When the smoke from the discharge cleared, he saw a hole in the main pane of the window, to the left centre. The three people had disappeared. Within a few seconds a figure appeared to move across in front of the window and pick someone up from the floor. Corporal 039 could then see a female figure being supported by another person, holding her hands to her face, having apparently been struck by the baton round.1



78.10 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1 Corporal 039 recorded that “on a balcony I saw two women who were shouting at us and throwing missiles ”, whereas in his RMP statement he had said that a window opened and “two women appeared and started to throw missiles at us ”. He recorded in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry that a man was “taking photographs from the balcony ”, whereas in his RMP statement he had said that the man “in the window … was trying to take photographs ”. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry he continued, “She and the others were in the room rather than out on the edge of the balcony ”. He stated that he fired the baton round after having moved forward to an APC parked in Rossville Street “by the building fronting Columbcille Court ”, that is Kells Walk. He also stated that when he raised his baton gun and took aim, one of the women began to close the window.



78.11 Corporal 039’s recollection of the incident was less clear in his written evidence to this Inquiry. He stated:1

“Something about the window caught my attention although it is difficult now to say what it was. Whatever it was I saw, I must have considered it to be a threat. Someone may have been throwing something out of this window. ”



78.12 He told us that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the statements that he had made at the time.1 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Corporal 039 said that he now had no recollection of seeing women throwing missiles or of anyone attempting to take photographs, but that he would stand by the statements that he made in 1972.2




78.13 Private M, who was providing cover for Corporal 039, did not mention this incident in either of his two RMP statements or in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry.1 He was not asked about it in the course of his oral evidence to Lord Widgery, nor was any other military witness. In his written evidence to this Inquiry, he told us only that he recalled that a woman at one of the windows in Kells Walk screamed abuse at them.2 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private M said that he could not remember whether anything had been thrown or pointed out of the window, nor could he recall Corporal 039 firing his baton gun. He resisted the suggestion that he could not have failed to be aware of the incident at the time,3 and denied that he would have attempted to protect Corporal 039 by failing to mention the matter to the RMP or to the solicitor who took his statement on behalf of the Widgery Inquiry.4 We are not persuaded that Private M’s failure to mention the incident in 1972 or his present apparently meagre memory about it was motivated by an effort to protect Corporal 039. It appears not to have been treated as a major issue in 1972 and, although Mary Smith’s injuries were not minor, the incident was overshadowed by what happened when soldiers opened fire with live rounds.




78.14 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Colour Sergeant 002 of Composite Platoon told us that people “on the balconies of Kells Walk ” were shouting abuse at the soldiers.1 He did not mention that missiles had been thrown.



78.15 Despite some inconsistencies in the evidence, we are sure that Corporal 039 fired the baton round that caused Mary Smith to be injured by flying glass. A photographer, who has not been identified, was either taking photographs or trying to do so before the baton round was fired. There is no suggestion that his camera was mistaken for a weapon. Kathleen Kelly acknowledged that her sister shouted at the soldiers, although the reported remark was hardly abusive. The evidence of Kathleen Kelly, Brian Power and Corporal 039 himself indicates that the baton round was fired from somewhere on the western side of Rossville Street, not far from the window and thus at relatively close range. Damien Friel’s evidence that it was fired from the waste ground is in our view mistaken. Brian Power and Damien Friel appear independently to have recalled that a more senior soldier had pointed out the window of the flat to the soldier who fired the baton round. Corporal 039 has, however, never suggested that he fired other than on his own initiative. If someone pointed out the window to him, his identity remains unknown.

78.16 Corporal 039’s assertion in his RMP statement that two women had been throwing missiles from the window before he fired and that he fired towards the window to clear the people away from it is diminished by his later statement for the Widgery Inquiry, in which he said that before he fired one of them began to close the window. Additionally, in the latter statement he recorded both that they and the photographer were on the balcony and that they were in the room. It is also difficult to accept that two middle-aged mothers, one with her children present, the other being concerned about her marching son,1 would take the lead in throwing missiles at soldiers when there were youths, one being a well-known rioter, in the room. At most, it seems to us that one of the women was shouting at the soldiers. General Ford’s Internal Security Instruction 1/712 dated 15th October 1971 sanctioned the use of baton rounds, subject to the proviso that the minimum force must be used at all times to achieve the immediate aim. The annex to the 8th Infantry Brigade Operational Directive No 4/71 dated 10th November 1971 governing the use of internal security weapons3 indicates that baton rounds were primarily used for crowd control, that they were best fired in salvos, and that they were normally to be fired towards the ground since they could cause severe injury if fired directly at the crowd.




78.17 In our view Corporal 039 was not justified in firing this baton round nor could he have believed that he was. According to the account that he gave to the Widgery Inquiry, the act of raising his baton gun had had the desired effect, even if, which we are not persuaded was the case, the women had been throwing things. The fact that one of the women was shouting at the soldiers, even to the extent of screaming abuse, could not have justified firing a baton round at them.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 22:04


Chapter 79: Joseph Lynn and the incident in the derelict building

79.1 Just after members of Composite Platoon debussed in Rossville Street, Lance Corporal 229 and Private L became involved in an incident in a derelict building on Rossville Street, where Joseph Lynn had sought refuge.

79.2 Joseph Lynn, who was then 18 years old and lived in Strabane, told us that he entered a building on the western side of Rossville Street immediately to the north of Kells Walk to take cover.1 He identified it on the following photograph by the letter A, with an arrow pointing to the building.


79.3 According to Joseph Lynn, after going into the derelict building, he climbed to the top of an interior wall, where a soldier later found him. According to his account, one soldier with black camouflage on his face came into the building, saw Joseph Lynn and told him to get down. Hoping to be left alone, Joseph Lynn said that he could not get down. The soldier said something to the effect of “‘Get down or I’ll effing shoot you down’” and then fired a shot with his rifle. Joseph Lynn felt something pass through his hair. Although not certain, he told us that he now believes that this can only have been a bullet. The soldier shouted at him again and fired another shot, and again Joseph Lynn felt something pass through his hair. Joseph Lynn then jumped down and the soldier pulled him outside and stood him against a wall to the north of the building.1 Joseph Lynn insisted that two shots were fired at him and that there was only one soldier in the building.



79.4 Joseph Lynn was arrested and taken to Fort George. He told us that there he and other prisoners were mistreated. We deal with allegations of mistreatment at Fort George later in this report.1



79.5 Joseph Lynn stated that Lance Corporal 229 identified him at Fort George as a man whom he had arrested.1 He told us that he learned the name of Lance Corporal 229 when they were photographed together. Joseph Lynn, however, thought that Lance Corporal 229 was not the arresting soldier, as that soldier had been the same height as he was, whereas Lance Corporal 229 only came up to his shoulder.2The photograph taken at Fort George shows that although Lance Corporal 229 was substantially shorter than Joseph Lynn, it was not accurate to say that he only came up to Joseph Lynn’s shoulder.




79.6 In his RMP statement of 15th February 1972,1 Lance Corporal 229 recorded that Composite Platoon (Guinness Force), of which he was a member, disembarked from its vehicles “near Barrier 14, in Little James Street ”. He was in the first of the two lorries of this platoon. He stated that shortly before he disembarked, he saw a youth, who he later learned was Joseph Lynn, run “from one side of the road to the other, to the other side of the barricade ”. In his written statement to this Inquiry,2 Lance Corporal 229 told us that he believed that the references to “Barrier 14 ” and “the barricade ” in his RMP statement should both have been references to Barrier 12. In our view he was right about this.




79.7 According to his RMP statement, Lance Corporal 229 chased Joseph Lynn and found him in a deserted building with a burned-out car inside. Joseph Lynn had climbed into the rafters. Lance Corporal 229 ordered him to come down three times, by which time Private L had arrived in the building. Joseph Lynn jumped down and was arrested. Lance Corporal 229 took him from the building and he “was almost immediately handed over to members of Guinness Force ”.1



79.8 Lance Corporal 229 recorded in his RMP statement that he identified Joseph Lynn at Fort George and was photographed with him.1


79.9 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal 229 told us that after debussing “We were all very disorientated ” and he was “frightened ”. He told us that he followed Joseph Lynn into an old building that might have been a burned-out garage. He ordered Joseph Lynn to get down from the rafters at least twice and then noticed that Private L had come into the building. Private L shouted to Joseph Lynn to come down and at the same time fired an unaimed shot into the roof above Joseph Lynn; a shot that Lance Corporal 229 stated that he thought was intended as a warning. When it was fired Joseph Lynn immediately started to come down from the rafters.1



79.10 Lance Corporal 229 told us that his only explanation for his omission to refer to Private L’s warning shot in his RMP statement was that the investigator did not ask him about it.1 He said that he would not have withheld the information in order to protect Private L. In his oral evidence2 he denied that he and Private L had made an agreement that neither would refer to the shot.



79.11 In his RMP statement,1 Private L, a member of Composite Platoon who had travelled in the second of the two lorries of that platoon, recorded that he was in a derelict building at the side of Rossville Street and saw “a man climbing along the rooftops ”. He arrested the man at gunpoint and took him back to the battalion arrest team. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,2 Private L stated that after he debussed he saw two men on the roof of the Rossville Flats and that the crowd in Rossville Street was throwing stones and bottles sporadically. He and another soldier took cover in a derelict building, where they heard a noise in the rafters and some rubble fell from the apex of the roof. They shouted to a man in the rafters to come down. The man stood up and said that he could not come down. Private L cocked his weapon, which he stated he had not done until that stage, and the man jumped down. Private L’s oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry3 was to the same effect. He said that he and the other soldier took the man away.



79.12 In his written statement to this Inquiry,1 Private L told us that he saw a number of rioters run into a derelict building, which, in his oral evidence,2 he identified as being the same building that Joseph Lynn had indicated. He recalled that some of the rioters ran out of the back of the building but that one man stayed up in the rafters. When that man dropped to the ground, Private L grabbed him, took him from the building and handed him over to soldiers at an APC. In this statement, he told us that he had cocked his weapon before he reached Rossville Street, but that he did not take the safety catch off when he was with the man in the derelict building. Private L told us that he had only “the vaguest recollection ” of another soldier being present, and could not remember who this might have been. Private L stated that there was “no way ” that he fired a shot at the man when he pointed his gun at him, a position he reiterated in his oral evidence to us.3 In that evidence, he said that he, and not Lance Corporal 229, took the man from the building. When shown Joseph Lynn’s arrest photograph, Private L said he could not recognise Joseph Lynn as the man in the building, or Lance Corporal 229 as the soldier in the building with him.4




79.13 We are sure that Joseph Lynn was the man in the derelict building and was arrested there. The first question is whether a soldier fired at Joseph Lynn, as both he and (when he gave evidence to us but not in 1972) Lance Corporal 229 have said.

79.14 As will have been seen, Lance Corporal 229 identified that soldier as Private L.

79.15 In a statement made on 5th February 1972 in the form of an RMP statement,1 Captain 200 (the Platoon Commander) recorded that when Composite Platoon returned to Clarence Avenue at the end of the operation, he immediately ordered an ammunition check and conducted preliminary questioning of those who had fired their weapons. In relation to Private L, he recorded the following as one of four shots fired by this soldier:

“1 x 7.62 in rafters of ruin 43281696 at possible sniper in roof – deliberate miss after two warnings to come down. Man jumped down from roof (15 feet) and was arrested. Roof not searched for weapons. ”


1 B1982-1983. Captain 200 told us that he had not made or signed a formal RMP statement but had written up his own account (B2022.040) which he had given to the Adjutant; and that this was later typed up on an RMP statement form. For convenience, we refer hereafter to this statement as Captain 200’s RMP statement.

79.16 The grid reference corresponds to the derelict building on Rossville Street immediately north of Kells Walk. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1 Captain 200 confirmed that this information could only have come from Private L. Lance Corporal 229 said that he did not give this information to Captain 200.2


79.17 In our view the statement made by Captain 200 on 5th February 1972 supports the evidence of Lance Corporal 229 that Private L fired one shot in the derelict building before the arrest of Joseph Lynn. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1 Private L maintained that he did not fire a shot into the rafters of the derelict building, and was unable to explain how Captain 200 came to record that he had done so. He denied that he had decided to pretend that he did not fire the shot after having realised that it was unjustifiable. In our view Private L was not telling us the truth. We are sure that he did tell Captain 200 that he had fired a shot as recorded in the latter’s RMP statement. This and the evidence of Lance Corporal 229 and Joseph Lynn satisfy us that Private L fired in the derelict building.



79.18 The second question is whether Private L fired only one shot, or two as Joseph Lynn told us.

79.19 As we are of the view that Private L told Captain 200 that he had fired one shot in the derelict building, we think it unlikely that in fact he had fired two, as it would not have served Private L any useful purpose to conceal one shot while admitting the other. For that reason, we accept the evidence of Lance Corporal 229 that Private L fired one shot rather than the evidence of Joseph Lynn that the soldier who arrested him fired two shots.

79.20 In his written statement to this Inquiry,1 Lance Corporal 229 told us that Private L came into the building carrying his rifle pointing upwards, and that Private L “shouted to Lynn to come down and shot at the same time. The shot was not an aimed shot and it was not aimed at Lynn ... the shot was a warning to Lynn... ” That Lance Corporal 229 viewed it as a warning shot is consistent with the description of the shot in Captain 200’s RMP statement as a “deliberate miss ”. Although Joseph Lynn said that he felt something pass through his hair when the soldier fired, we are not persuaded of this. Joseph Lynn did not suggest that the soldier had attempted to kill him. In our view an aimed shot at that short range could not have missed the target. When Joseph Lynn was asked whether the soldier could have missed if he had been shooting to kill, he said “At that range he would have probably took me off at the waist ”.2




79.21 In these circumstances we are satisfied that Private L intended his shot as a warning to Joseph Lynn and to encourage him to climb down, and that he did not intend to hit Joseph Lynn. The Yellow Card (which we have discussed elsewhere in this report1 and which set out the circumstances in which soldiers were entitled to open fire) required that a soldier should not fire more rounds than absolutely necessary.2 Private L agreed that there had been no need to fire at the man in the rafters of the derelict building.3 Lance Corporal 229 said that he did not believe that Joseph Lynn presented any form of threat and that if Joseph Lynn had not come down from the rafters, he would have gone up himself and brought him down.4




79.22 Private L’s shot in the derelict building was in our view unjustified and contrary to the Yellow Card.

79.23 There is nothing in Major Loden’s List of Engagements1 that corresponds with the shot fired by Private L in the derelict building.



79.24 The third question relates to the identity of the soldier who arrested Joseph Lynn.

79.25 Lance Corporal 229 and Private L both claimed to have arrested him. Joseph Lynn’s evidence is that only one soldier was involved in his arrest and that this soldier was different from, and taller than, either Lance Corporal 229 or Private L. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Joseph Lynn said that he was as sure as he could be that this soldier was white, although his face was blackened. Joseph Lynn was about 5ft 11in tall and, on his evidence, the soldier who arrested him was about the same height.1 If this evidence is accurate, it would exclude both Lance Corporal 229, who was 5ft 8in tall,2 and Private L, who was not white, did not wear camouflage paint, and was only 5ft 7in tall.3 The implication of Joseph Lynn’s evidence, if accurate, is therefore that an unknown third soldier arrested him and that the incidents described by Lance Corporal 229 and Private L were either invented or related to the arrest of someone else.




79.26 It seems to us that Joseph Lynn may have become confused about the height of the soldier because of a newspaper photograph he had seen after Bloody Sunday,1 which showed him standing against a wall after being arrested, with a soldier of approximately the same height standing at his back. It is possible that the photograph in question was the first of the two shown below (taken by the Daily Mail photographer Jeffrey Morris) and that Joseph Lynn is the individual seen on the far left, who can also be seen beside a soldier in the second photograph (taken by Constable A Brown of the RUC).
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 22:05





79.27 If Joseph Lynn mistakenly believed that the soldier who stood behind him at the wall was the soldier who had arrested him, it is possible that the photograph that he saw caused him to reach an erroneous conclusion about the height of the soldier who arrested him. In any event, it is our view that Joseph Lynn was mistaken both in his belief that the soldier who arrested him was alone and about the height of that soldier. On the basis of the evidence we have considered above we are satisfied that Lance Corporal 229 and Private L arrested Joseph Lynn.

79.28 The last question is whether Joseph Lynn’s arrest was justified.

79.29 The justification for the arrest given by Lance Corporal 229 in a statement made at Fort George that evening was that he had seen Joseph Lynn throwing stones. This statement is the only evidence that Joseph Lynn was seen engaging in such activity. There is nothing about Joseph Lynn throwing stones in Lance Corporal 229’s RMP statement made on 15th February 1972.1 In his written statement to this Inquiry,2Lance Corporal 229 told us that he went after a man who he had seen run into a derelict building and no longer recalled whether he had seen that man throwing stones or whether someone told him that this is what he had been doing. Nor could he recall whether he was ordered to go after Joseph Lynn or whether he did so of his own accord. Lance Corporal 229 stated that people had been throwing stones when the soldiers arrived in the area and that Joseph Lynn “may have been ” one of them.



79.30 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1 Lance Corporal 229 said that he would not have been able to make out the features of individuals because he was wearing a respirator. He said that he was sure that he had not seen Joseph Lynn doing anything wrong. When asked why he chased after Joseph Lynn, Lance Corporal 229 said that he had “probably been told to go and get him ”, although he did not remember being told this. He also said that it was possible that he had simply gone after anyone whom he could catch. In his RMP statement,2 Lance Corporal 229 recorded that he chased Joseph Lynn and found him in the derelict building and that Private L joined him in the building at a later stage. In Lance Corporal 229’s written statement to this Inquiry3 he told us the same, although there and in his oral evidence,4 he acknowledged that it was possible that he only entered the derelict building for cover and caught sight of Joseph Lynn once he was inside it.




79.31 That possibility would be consistent with Private L’s written statement for the Widgery Inquiry1 and with his oral evidence to that Inquiry,2in which he said that he and another soldier entered the building to take cover, and then heard a noise and realised that there was someone in the rafters. This account by Private L, however, is inconsistent with his written statement to this Inquiry3 and with his oral evidence to this Inquiry,4 in which he said that he followed rioters into the building. Because of the time lapse and certain personal difficulties that Private L has undergone in the interim, we prefer the accounts that he gave in 1972 to his more recent ones, though even the former give rise to problems.




79.32 In his written statement to this Inquiry,1 Joseph Lynn told us that he thought that the soldier who arrested him had not followed him into the building, but was just checking the area. Joseph Lynn denied that he threw any stones.2




79.33 Lance Corporal D, a member of Composite Platoon, recorded in his RMP statement1 that after disembarking from his vehicle, he was given an arrested youth to look after, who told him that his name was Finn and that he had “become mixed in the riot accidentally ”. The description given by Lance Corporal D suggests that this was Joseph Lynn.



79.34 At the time, Lance Corporal 229 justified the arrest of Joseph Lynn on the basis that he had seen Joseph Lynn throwing stones. There is a real doubt as to whether Lance Corporal 229 had seen Joseph Lynn at all before he entered the building, let alone seen him throwing stones. The evidence, particularly the evidence given in 1972, persuades us that Lance Corporal 229 could not have held a genuine belief that Joseph Lynn had been throwing stones. As will be seen in our consideration of events at Fort George, to which Joseph Lynn was taken, there are other instances in which arrest forms were completed with false details of activities justifying arrest. In our view Joseph Lynn, a stranger to the area, was probably caught by soldiers simply because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and not because he had been seen throwing stones; and there is no evidence to contradict his denial that he had engaged in this activity. For these reasons his arrest was in our view probably unjustified.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

Post  Guest on Thu 8 Jul - 22:08


Chapter 80: The initial movements of the soldiers in Sector 3



Mortar Platoon

80.1 Earlier in our consideration of the events of Sector 31 we examined the movement and initial action of three soldiers from Mortar Platoon, namely Corporal P and the baton gunners Private 017 and Private 112. Another soldier from Mortar Platoon, Private U, was also involved in the events of Sector 3.



80.2 As we described when considering the events of Sector 2,1 soon after disembarking from Sergeant O’s Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) in Rossville Street, Private U was involved in the arrest of Charles Canning, after which he made his way past Major Loden’s command vehicle to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. According to his accounts, he fired one shot from there at a man with a pistol who appeared some distance away to the south of the rubble barricade. We deal with the firing by Private U later in this report.2 He told the Widgery Inquiry that he was not wearing his respirator when he disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC.3




Composite Platoon (Guinness Force) and Anti-Tank Platoon

80.3 As we have described earlier in this report,1 the two lorries containing Composite Platoon (also known as Guinness Force) followed the two APCs of Machine Gun Platoon into the Bogside; and were followed by the two APCs of Anti-Tank Platoon. When the vehicles stopped in Rossville Street, the soldiers of Composite Platoon and Anti-Tank Platoon disembarked. There is film footage showing soldiers disembarking from the lorries in Rossville Street.2



Captain 200 – the Commander of Composite Platoon

80.4 In his Royal Military Police (RMP) statement dated 5th February 1972,1 Captain 200, the Commander of Composite Platoon, recorded that when his platoon disembarked there was CS gas in the air: “This delayed our deployment slightly as we had to put on gas masks. I decided to split my Force, with 71 [the call sign for the soldiers in the first lorry] moving to the left to give support to the Mor Pl [Mortar Platoon] and 71A [the call sign for the soldiers in the second lorry] to move right flanking along the eastern side of Columbcille Court. ” He stated that his orders to Colour Sergeant 002, in command of 71A, were to move up the right flank of Rossville Street and act on his own initiative if they got separated. “I went left with 71. ” He then stated that on moving off, he noticed Anti-Tank Platoon overtaking the 71A soldiers2 and moving quickly through Columbcille Court and the “long block east of the Court ”, by which he must have meant Kells Walk. “I stopped and shouted quick orders to ‘L.1’ [Colour Sergeant 002, who was his Platoon Sergeant] to move up in support of the Anti Tank Pl. ”


2 In his RMP statement, Captain 200 stated that Anti-Tank Platoon overtook 71A in their APCs, but in his oral evidence to this Inquiry he said that he clearly recalled, as we believe was the case, that the Anti-Tank Platoon soldiers overtook his men on foot (Day 367/85-89).


80.5 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Captain 200 recorded that his vehicles had stopped “under cover ” just past the junction with William Street. In this statement he recorded that it was his Company Commander (Major Loden) who told him to assist Mortar Platoon, but that he decided to split his force, “half to support the anti-tank platoon which were now in position near the long straight building between Rossville Street and Kells Walk and half to support the mortar platoon ”. He continued:

“It was at this stage that I saw at least three men from the anti-tank platoon kneeling behind the wall on the right hand side of Rossville Street by the building firing their SLR. I looked to see what they were firing at and saw a barrier in Rossville Street near the Rossville flats. I could see people behind the barrier. Immediately behind the barrier I could see perhaps two heads beyond that near Glenfada Park there were about 30 scattered people on the right hand side of the road near the Glenfada Park building. There were others further down the road – scattered not in a crowd. This was all taken in in a matter of seconds. My feeling was that the crowd had dispersed rapidly and that gunmen would be likely to appear. I told my men in the vicinity of the long building to spread out – they were too bunched, an obvious target. It was about this time that I removed my gas-mask. I then went over to the half of my platoon which was supporting the mortar platoon and on my way over I saw two women sheltering behind a car who were obviously frightened and I told them to move out through Eden Place into Chamberlain Street. ”




80.6 A little later in this statement, Captain 200 described moving between the two halves of his force “and in the end all those not employed in dealing with prisoners or guarding vehicles were in the vicinity of the long building and of Columbcille Court ”.1Again, it seems that by “the long building ” Captain 200 meant Kells Walk.



80.7 Captain 200 gave a similar account in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. He told that Inquiry that after Anti-Tank Platoon had moved forward “round the corner towards the Glenfada Park area ” he ordered Colour Sergeant 002 to move his soldiers up to the wall from where that platoon had been firing.1He also told the Widgery Inquiry that he did not see any of his soldiers firing.2



80.8 Captain 200 gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. In his written statement,1he gave much the same account of his movements and that of his soldiers as he had in the accounts that he gave in 1972. In this statement, Captain 200 told us that Major Loden had told him to support Anti-Tank Platoon, not Mortar Platoon, but he corrected this in his oral evidence.2




80.9 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1Captain 200 said that the initial deployment of his soldiers was to send half to move up the “right flank ”, ie the western side of Rossville Street, and that after the other half had stayed for a while at a wall at the north end of Rossville Street he sent them to the “left flank ”, behind Mortar Platoon.



80.10 Captain 200 also told us that he moved to the left, ie to the east, and shepherded people away from the Eden Place waste ground, not after receiving orders from Major Loden, as he had said in his written statement to this Inquiry,1but just before he went back to Major Loden, as he had recorded in his RMP statement and in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry.2This, therefore, would have been after he had seen soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon firing from a wall at Kells Walk.




Lieutenant 119 – the Commander of Anti-Tank Platoon

80.11 Lieutenant 119 was the Commander of Anti-Tank Platoon. Although in the accounts that he gave in 1972 he did not provide as much detail as Captain 200 of the movement of his soldiers, nothing he said on this subject was inconsistent with the accounts of Captain 200. In his second RMP statement,1Lieutenant 119 recorded:

“About 1615 hrs 30 Jan 72 I moved into the Rossville Street area of Londonderry with my Platoon. We moved along Rossville Street in a Southerly direction, towards Rossville Flats.

When we arrived at MR 43251688, we came under fire from at least two different directions. We were on foot and in open ground without adequate cover. Just prior to this we had been advancing rapidly towards the mob of rioters with the object of arresting as many as possible. As soon as we came under fire, I moved those soldiers with me to the cover of a wall just in front of us, at the Map Reference given. ”




80.12 We deal elsewhere in this report1with accounts of incoming fire given by the soldiers involved in the events of Sector 3.



Summary of the initial movements of the soldiers in Sector 3

80.13 On the basis of the foregoing evidence, we have concluded that the sequence of events, so far as the soldiers were concerned, was that Corporal P and Private 017 from Mortar Platoon disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street and went to the western side of that street, where Corporal P fired two shots and Private 017 encountered a man with a handgun. These matters we have already considered in detail.1Meanwhile Composite Platoon and Anti-Tank Platoon disembarked from their vehicles. Soldiers from the latter platoon moved ahead (ie south) of the soldiers from Composite Platoon and reached the low walls of the Kells Walk ramp after Corporal P had fired two shots. In our view the fifth and sixth of the six photographs taken by Liam Mailey, which we have set out earlier in this report,2but which for the sake of clarity we set out again below, show soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon reaching those low walls, with Corporal P and Private 017, who had reached that area earlier, in front of them.





80.14 Very shortly after soldiers of Anti-Tank Platoon arrived at the low walls of the Kells Walk ramp, there was firing from that position. As noted above,1Captain 200, the Commander of Composite Platoon, described seeing at least three soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon kneeling in that position and firing their rifles.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5

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