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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:02

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III -



Section: Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area of the Rossville Flats
General introduction
Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area of the Rossville Flats

(Chapters 22–54; Chapters 55–66 of Sector 2 can be found in Volume IV)

22.1 Sector 2 is concerned with what happened in the area of the Rossville Flats car park and in the adjoining waste ground to the north. There is no doubt that in this sector Jackie Duddy was killed by gunfire, while Margaret Deery, Michael Bridge and Michael Bradley were wounded by the same means. Patrick McDaid, Patrick Brolly and Pius McCarron were injured, though whether by gunfire or otherwise was a matter of controversy.

22.2 The casualties occurred after soldiers of Mortar Platoon had arrived in Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) in this area.

22.3 We describe first the layout of this part of the city, and then the movement of Mortar Platoon into this area from Barrier 12. There were a number of incidents both as Mortar Platoon arrived in Sector 2 and as and after they disembarked from the APCs, before anyone was hit by gunfire. These incidents are both important in themselves and help to set the scene for the Army gunfire that followed. Having considered those incidents we deal with the Army and civilian evidence relating to the casualties.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:11

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 23


The layout of this area of the city

23.1 The area covered by Sector 2 is highlighted on the map below.


23.2 The most conspicuous landmarks in this area were the three high-rise blocks that made up the Rossville Flats. These flats were demolished in the 1980s. They can be seen on the map above at the bottom of the shaded area. Block 1 of these flats was the one adjoining Rossville Street. Block 2 was the centre block and Block 3 was the most easterly block, as can also be seen from this map. The distance from the junction of William Street and Rossville Street to the southern end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats was approximately 215 yards. We set out further details of the Rossville Flats later in this chapter.

23.3 Two areas of Sector 2 are of particular importance. These are the Rossville Flats car park and the Eden Place waste ground.

23.4 The car park was the name given to the area enclosed on three sides by the three blocks of the Rossville Flats. Part of this area was marked out as a car park. A portion on the eastern side was fenced off as a recreation ground. The northern part of the recreation ground was described by some witnesses as being netball courts. The term “car park” was used to apply to the whole area. The approximate boundary of the car park is shown by a dotted line on the map above. The car park was partially separated from the Eden Place waste ground by a wire fence. We describe the car park in greater detail below.

23.5 The Eden Place waste ground incorporated the remnants of two disused roads, Eden Place and Pilot Row. It was often described in this Inquiry simply as “the waste ground”. The road known as Eden Place at one time ran from Chamberlain Street to Rossville Street. In January 1972, the gap in the buildings in Chamberlain Street through which the road used to run still survived. The road through that gap, about 15 yards long, linked the waste ground to Chamberlain Street and was still in use in 1972. In this report we refer to that road as the Eden Place alleyway, though many witnesses described it as Eden Place or Eden Terrace. There was also a small alleyway parallel to Chamberlain Street and running from William Street to the Eden Place waste ground, which was known as Macari’s Lane. Again we describe this part of Sector 2 in more detail below.

23.6 The photograph below was taken from the north and shows the central area of Sector 2. On it we have marked the features described above.

23.7 As can be seen, Macari’s Lane ran from William Street into the north-east corner of the Eden Place waste ground. It was sometimes called Quinn’s Lane, as it ran down the side of Quinn’s fish shop.1

1 Day 176/151

Chamberlain Street

23.8 Chamberlain Street ran roughly north-east to south-west from William Street to the car park of the Rossville Flats. The distance between its junction with William Street and the entrance to the car park was about 140 yards. High Street and Harvey Street ran in a south-easterly direction uphill from Chamberlain Street to join Waterloo Street, which ran parallel to, and below, the City Walls.

23.9 The following photograph was taken from the roof of the Embassy Ballroom. The photographer was looking south-west down Chamberlain Street. Block 2 of the Rossville Flats can be seen in the background. The junctions with High Street and Harvey Street can just be seen. The white gable end on the right-hand side is on the south side of the gap that led into the Eden Place alleyway.



23.10 The photograph below shows Chamberlain Street from the south. The photographer was looking north-east towards the junction with William Street. Devine’s florist’s shop, which can be seen in the picture, was on the north side of William Street. The photograph was taken on Bloody Sunday.

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:16

23.11 The photograph below shows Harvey Street. The picture was taken on Bloody Sunday from Harvey Street’s junction with Chamberlain Street. Waterloo Street can be seen at the top of the photograph.



The Eden Place waste ground

23.12 The Eden Place waste ground stretched in a south-westerly direction from the backs of buildings in William Street to the fence of the Rossville Flats car park. It was bordered to the west by Rossville Street and to the east by the walls of the yards of the houses on the western side of Chamberlain Street. The waste ground was about 90 yards long (north-east to south-west) and 60 yards wide (south-east to north-west).

23.13 The aerial photograph below shows the Eden Place waste ground from the south. The photograph was not taken on Bloody Sunday but shows the waste ground much as it was on that day. At the top (the north side) of the waste ground are the backs of the buildings on the south side of William Street. The buildings running down the right (east) side of the waste ground are the backs of the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street. The disused roads, Eden Place and Pilot Row, can be seen. Below (to the south of) Pilot Row another road can be seen, running into the waste ground at right angles to Rossville Street. This road gave access to the Rossville Flats car park.



23.14 The photograph below was taken on Bloody Sunday and shows most of the Eden Place waste ground. The photographer was standing on the west side of Rossville Street, looking east. The gap giving access to Chamberlain Street (the Eden Place alleyway) can just be seen. The backs of the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street are shown, running down the side of the waste ground. The Guildhall clock tower is in the background.

23.15 The backs of buildings on William Street, forming the northern boundary of the waste ground, can be seen in the photographs below, the second of which was taken on Bloody Sunday. The second photograph was taken looking in a north-easterly direction up Rossville Street. Many of the buildings were derelict.





23.16 The following photograph was taken on the Eden Place waste ground on Bloody Sunday. The photograph shows the Eden Place alleyway leading from Eden Place into Chamberlain Street. Harvey Street can be seen in the background, running uphill to Waterloo Street in a south-easterly direction away from Chamberlain Street.



23.17 The following photograph, again taken on Bloody Sunday, shows the same alleyway but from the opposite end. The photographer was standing on the corner of Chamberlain Street, looking into the Eden Place waste ground. The modern building in the background is Kells Walk, which was a block of maisonettes on the west side of Rossville Street. St Eugene’s Cathedral can be seen in the distance.

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:23

23.18 An L-shaped fence ran across the southern part of the Eden Place waste ground. Part of the fence can be seen in the photograph below. For a short distance the fence ran southwards, parallel to and about 10ft out from the backs of the Chamberlain Street houses. It then ran west at a right angle to the houses across the waste ground.



23.19 The fence did not extend across the entire width of the waste ground; it came to a halt about two-thirds of the way across, stopping level with the end of the road that gave access to the Rossville Flats car park. The fence and access road can be seen more clearly in the photograph below, which was not taken on Bloody Sunday

23.20 In the photograph below, which was taken by Derrik Tucker Senior on Bloody Sunday from Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, the fence can be seen in the middle distance. On the left is the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. On the right are the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street.

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:26

The Rossville Flats car park

23.21 The car park was bordered on three sides by the Rossville Flats. At its widest the car park was about 70 yards wide. The distance from the southern end of Chamberlain Street to Block 2 of the Rossville Flats (the central block) was about 45 yards. The car park was sometimes referred to as the market, since there had formerly been a market in this area.

23.22 The photograph below, also taken by Derrik Tucker Senior, shows the entrance to the car park from Chamberlain Street and, on the right, part of the fencing around the recreation ground.


23.23 A low wall ran along the south-western side of the Rossville Flats car park, parallel to Block 2. The wall fell in height as it went north-westwards, disappearing entirely before reaching Block 1. The photograph below, which was taken on Bloody Sunday, gives an impression of the differing heights of the wall. Block 2 is on the left of the picture and Block 1 is seen in the background.



23.24 The wall can be seen in the photograph below.



The Rossville Flats

23.25 The Rossville Flats consisted of three separate blocks joined by walkways. As described above, the block that ran parallel to Rossville Street (shown on the right of the photograph above) was known as Block 1. The central block was Block 2 and the easternmost block was Block 3.

23.26 The Rossville Flats were built on sloping ground. Blocks 1 and 2 both had ten storeys. Block 3 was built on higher ground and so, although it had the same roof height as the other two blocks, it had only seven storeys. As the previous photograph above shows, Blocks 1 and 2 were joined by three walkways. Blocks 2 and 3 were joined by two walkways. The photograph below, taken long after Bloody Sunday, shows the difference in ground level between Blocks 2 and 3. As the photograph shows, the lowest storey of Block 3 did not run the full length of the building, but tapered out as the ground rose. A retaining wall ran the length of the car park beneath Block 3.



23.27 The ground floor of Block 1 consisted of a row of garages. The ground floor of Block 2 was a row of shops. The shops faced southwards into Joseph Place, not into the car park. The ground floor of this block on the car park side was used as storage space. The lowest floor of Block 3, as noted above, did not run the whole length of the building. It consisted of one property, known as 37 Garvan Place. The floor above this, which did run the length of Block 3, consisted partly of flats and partly of storage space.

23.28 The flats were divided into three horizontal sections, excluding the ground floors. The first three floors of Blocks 1 and 2, together with the lowest floor of Block 3, were known as Garvan Place. The next three floors of Blocks 1, 2 and 3 formed Mura Place. The top three floors of Blocks 1, 2 and 3 formed Donagh Place.

23.29 The following diagrams1 identify Garvan Place, Mura Place and Donagh Place and show the location of each dwelling within the Rossville Flats. There is an error in the first diagram: the reference to Joseph Street on the left side of the diagram should be a reference to Joseph Place. The left side of this diagram represents the southern end of Block 1, which faced towards Joseph Place.







23.30 On the Block 3 diagram (above), the words “Joseph Place” should appear. What has been cut off the right side is probably “Joseph Street”. The right of the diagram shows the northern end of Block 3.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:34

23.31 As the diagrams show, most of the dwellings were single-storey flats. However, there were rows of two-storey maisonettes on the second and third floors of Blocks 1 and 2 (which formed part of Garvan Place) and on the fifth and sixth floors of Block 3 (part of Mura Place).

23.32 Balconies ran along the entire length of each block. Blocks 1 and 2 had three balconies, while Block 3 had two. There were balconies on the sides of the blocks that faced into the car park; the outward-facing sides had windows only.

23.33 There was a stairwell at each end of each block. Access to the balconies could be obtained from the stairs at either end. It was possible to walk from the northern end of Block 1 all the way round to the northern end of Block 3, using the balconies and the connecting walkways.

23.34 There was a gap at ground level underneath the walkways that joined Blocks 1 and 2 and those that joined Blocks 2 and 3. It was possible to walk through these gaps and reach Joseph Place.

23.35 The photograph below, which was taken on Bloody Sunday, shows part of the retaining wall on the east side of the car park beneath Block 3. It is the part leading to the gap between Blocks 2 and 3. The wall on the far left of the photograph is the low wall that ran parallel to Block 2.


23.36 The photograph below, which was not taken on Bloody Sunday, shows the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats.


23.37 The photograph below shows the gap between Blocks 1 and 2. Close to the gap, a doorway can be seen at ground level in Block 1. This doorway led to a staircase giving access to all floors. There were also lifts next to the stairwell. It was possible to walk straight through the block at ground level; a doorway opposite this one led onto Rossville Street.


23.38 Another doorway can be seen in the foreground, at the northern end of Block 1. This doorway also led to a stairwell that can be seen in the picture, clad in vertical wooden slats. There was no doorway on the other side of this stairwell, facing into Rossville Street.

23.39 A rubble barricade, constructed by civilians, lay across Rossville Street at the time of Bloody Sunday. It ran from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, a block of maisonettes on the opposite side of Rossville Street. The photograph below, which is a still taken from film footage shot from a helicopter on Bloody Sunday, shows the barricade.


23.40 The barricade was made from a variety of materials, including an oil drum, rubble and wooden trestles. The photograph shows that there was a gap in the barricade, towards the western side of the road. One of the trestles barred the gap in the barricade and could be moved to allow vehicles to pass.

23.41 This barricade is described in more detail in our consideration of the events of Sector 3,1but a description of it is included here because some of the witnesses concerned with Sector 2 refer to it.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:42

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 24





The movement of Mortar Platoon Armoured Personnel Carriers into the Bogside
Chapter 24: The movement of Mortar Platoon Armoured Personnel Carriers into the Bogside

24.1 As we have already described in our discussion of Sector 1,1 shortly before 1610 hours Support Company went in vehicles through Barrier 12 in Little James Street, while a little later C Company went on foot over or through Barrier 14 in William Street. As to the latter company, 7 Platoon of C Company continued along William Street to the junction with Rossville Street, followed by 9 Platoon. 8 Platoon turned left off William Street and subsequently went down Chamberlain Street. We describe in more detail later in this report2 what the soldiers of C Company did.

1 Paragraphs 20.207–257 2Chapter 65

24.2 So far as Support Company is concerned, the two leading vehicles were Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). These were often called “Pigs ” and, by many of the civilians, albeit inaccurately, “Saracens ”.

24.3 The two leading APCs contained Mortar Platoon. These were followed by Major Loden’s command vehicle, described as “Company Headquarters one ACV (1 ton Armoured modified) ”,1and a Ferret scout car with a mounted Browning machine gun.2Next came the two empty APCs of Machine Gun Platoon, and then two soft-sided, four-ton lorries containing the Composite Platoon (Guinness Force). The two APCs of Anti-Tank Platoon brought up the rear. Major Loden had designated this order when the company formed up in Clarence Avenue before moving to Queen’s Street.3

1 B2220 3 WT12.36; B2220

2 WT11.76

24.4 As we have already noted,1it seems probable that the Support Company vehicles went across the junction of William Street and Rossville Street before soldiers from C Company went over or through Barrier 14 in William Street, because a number of civilians who had been close to Barrier 14 described moving from there into Chamberlain Street on seeing these vehicles, rather than fleeing from the soldiers at Barrier 14.

1 Paragraphs 20.257–261

24.5 In the leading APC was Lieutenant N, the Commander of Mortar Platoon. In the following APC was Sergeant O, the Platoon Sergeant.1

1 B398; B466

24.6 The nominal roll of Mortar Platoon shows that 18 members of that platoon were deployed on Bloody Sunday.1 Lieutenant N confirmed this deployment in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.2 We are satisfied that, of these 18, the following 13 were divided between the two APCs as follows:

1 GEN8.4 2WT12.62

First APC

•Lieutenant N1
1 B398

•Corporal 1621
1 B1962.002

•Lance Corporal V1
1 B821.018; WT13.23

•Private Q,1 Private S (driver),2 Private 019,3 Private INQ 1918 (radio operator).4
1 B641

2 B706
3 B1494.002

4 C1918.1


Second APC

•Sergeant O1
1 B466

•Corporal P1
1 B591

•Private R,1 Private T,2 Private U,3 Private INQ 1579 (driver).4
1 B669

2 B735
3 B771

4 C1579.3


24.7 There remain five soldiers who were deployed on Bloody Sunday but in respect of whom it is less clear in which APC they travelled. They are Lance Corporal INQ 768, Private 006, Private 013, Private 017 and Private 112.

24.8 Lance Corporal INQ 768 made no statement in 1972. In his evidence to this Inquiry he said that he believed that he was in the second vehicle (Sergeant O’s APC) and that since he was the driver he also acted as a vehicle guard when the soldiers disembarked.1 In our view he was not the driver of either of the APCs, since we are satisfied from the evidence of Private S and Private INQ 1579 (supported by the evidence of Lieutenant N and Sergeant O respectively) that the former drove Lieutenant N and the latter Sergeant O.2 Lance Corporal INQ 768 may have acted as vehicle guard, but if so this cannot have been of Sergeant O’s APC, since we are satisfied from the evidence of Private R that he was the guard of that vehicle.3

1 C768.1; C768.3; Day 323/128-129

2 B706; B724.002; C1579.2; Day 336/149-150; B438.006; B575.111
3 B676


24.9 However, Lance Corporal INQ 768 also said that the normal practice was to have one Lance Corporal in each vehicle. There is no doubt that of the two Lance Corporals in the platoon, Lance Corporal V was in Lieutenant N’s APC.1 This indicates that Lance Corporal INQ 768 may have been in Sergeant O’s vehicle, as indeed Sergeant O also believed was the case.2

1 B821.018 2B575.111

24.10 In his Royal Military Police (RMP) statement,1 Private 006 recorded that he was a member of a snatch squad commanded by Sergeant O. In his written statement to this Inquiry, while he said that he thought that he was with Sergeant O, he also said that he thought that Private S was in the same vehicle and that this vehicle led the convoy.2 In our view the statement he made at the time is likely to be more accurate, so we consider that he was in the second APC commanded by Sergeant O.

1 B1375 2 B1377.004

24.11 Private 013 recorded in his RMP statement that he moved into the forecourt of the Rossville Flats.1 In his statement to this Inquiry he recalled that he was in the second vehicle.2 As will be seen, Sergeant O’s vehicle drove to what could be described as a forecourt and accordingly this may indicate that Private 013 was in this vehicle. However, in his first RMP statement Lieutenant N recorded that Private 013 accompanied him as he ran from his APC after it had stopped.3

1 B1406 3 B373

2 B1408.003

24.12 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 stated that he was pretty sure that he had travelled in the leading APC.1 However in his oral evidence he said that he thought that he was in Sergeant O’s vehicle.2 According to his first RMP statement,3 the APC he was in halted to the north-east of the northernmost block of the Rossville Flats. This is closer to a description of Sergeant O’s APC than that of Lieutenant N. Furthermore, Private 017 worked with Corporal P as his pair,4 and Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry that he and his pair disembarked from the same vehicle, Sergeant O’s APC.5 On this basis it seems that Private 017 was in that vehicle.

1 B1484.002

2 Day 358/39

3 B1472
4 B1482

5 B596


24.13 In his RMP statement,1 Private 112 recorded that he was deployed “on the waste ground off Rossville St ”. In his evidence to this Inquiry he said that he believed that he was in Sergeant O’s APC,2 but of the soldiers he said were with him, some were clearly in that vehicle while others were with Lieutenant N. He remembered an altercation between someone in the APC ahead of him and someone at Barrier 12 when they were waiting to go through, which also points to him being in the second APC. However, Private Q, in his written evidence to this Inquiry,3 recalled Private 112 being with him in the first APC.

1 B1730

2 B1732.1; Day 320/96; Day 320/123
3 B657.3


24.14 If Lance Corporal INQ 768, Private 006, Private 013, Private 017 and Private 112 were all in Sergeant O’s APC, then there would have been 11 soldiers in that APC and only seven with Lieutenant N. However, both Lieutenant N and Sergeant O gave evidence in 1972 that there was an equal number of soldiers in each vehicle.1Furthermore, Lieutenant N’s evidence was that four men in his platoon were armed with baton guns,2and that (as Sergeant O also said at the time)3there were two of these in each APC.4

1 B373; B466

2 B397
3 B439

4 B373


24.15 As appears from their RMP accounts, Private 013, Private 017 and Private 112 were armed with baton guns, though they also had self-loading rifles either with them or in the APCs.1It appears from his evidence to this Inquiry that Private 019 (in Lieutenant N’s APC) was the fourth soldier with a baton gun; he recognised himself near to Lieutenant N in one of the photographs to which we refer hereafter.2On one view of the evidence, therefore, there were three soldiers armed with baton guns in Sergeant O’s APC, and only one with Lieutenant N. In our view this cannot be right, as apart from the evidence given by Lieutenant N in 1972, the cine film from the helicopter,3to which we refer below, shows two separate puffs of smoke appearing in different places in quick succession close to Lieutenant N’s vehicle soon after the soldiers had disembarked. We have no doubt that this smoke came from two baton guns.

1 B1406; B1472; B1730; Day 322/27-28

2 B1494.003
3 Vid 2 02.10


24.16 Weighing the evidence discussed above, it seems to us from their accounts that Private 017 and Private 112 were with Sergeant O and that Private Q was mistaken in his recollection that he was with Private 112. It follows in our view that Private 013 was, contrary to his recollection but consistent with the account given by Lieutenant N at the time,1 with Lieutenant N in the first APC. Private 013’s description in his RMP statement of moving into the forecourt of the Rossville Flats probably relates to what he did after he disembarked, though the expression “forecourt ” could also perhaps be applied to the whole of the open ground to the north of the Rossville Flats.2

1 B373 2 Day 323/185

24.17 On this basis, there would have been two soldiers with baton guns in each vehicle. That leaves Lance Corporal INQ 768. It is not possible to be certain in which vehicle Lance Corporal INQ 768 travelled. His own recollections are, for reasons given above, clearly erroneous at least in part. On the basis that there would be equal numbers in each APC, this would put him in Lieutenant N’s APC, while on the basis that there would be one Lance Corporal in each APC, this would put him in Sergeant O’s vehicle. On the whole it seems to us that the former is more likely to be the case, on the basis that both Lieutenant N and Sergeant O said that there was an equal number of soldiers in each vehicle.

24.18 For these reasons it seems to us that the 18 soldiers of Mortar Platoon were probably deployed between the two APCs as follows:

First APC

•Lieutenant N
•Corporal 162
•Lance Corporal V, Lance Corporal INQ 768
•Private Q, Private S (driver), Private 013 (armed with baton gun), Private 019 (armed with baton gun), Private INQ 1918 (radio operator).
Second APC

•Sergeant O
•Corporal P
•Private R, Private T, Private U, Private 006, Private 017 (armed with baton gun), Private 112 (armed with baton gun), Private INQ 1579 (driver).
24.19 Those with baton guns were accordingly Private 013 and Private 019 (who were with Lieutenant N) and Private 017 and Private 112 (who were with Sergeant O).

24.20 After passing through Barrier 12, the two APCs travelled south along Little James Street, over the junction between Rossville Street and William Street and on along Rossville Street. Lieutenant N’s vehicle turned left off Rossville Street and stopped between Eden Place and Pilot Row, a few yards from the Eden Place alleyway. Sergeant O’s APC continued along Rossville Street and then turned left, finally stopping well into the entrance to the car park of the Rossville Flats. The map set out below depicts the approximate route that the APCs took and where they stopped.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Wed 16 Jun - 22:51

24.21 Just before Sergeant O’s vehicle turned off Rossville Street into the car park entrance, it stopped briefly near Pilot Row and some soldiers disembarked.


24.22 The entry of the APCs into the Bogside was recorded on film both by an ABC News cameraman from the ground and by an Army cameraman in a helicopter.1

1 Vid 48 12.26; Vid 2 01.50

24.23 The photographs below are stills taken from the film footage obtained from the helicopter. The first photograph shows the junction of Rossville Street, William Street and Little James Street. On the right of the photograph is Lieutenant N’s APC, heading south along Rossville Street. Sergeant O’s APC is seen crossing the junction. The second image shows Lieutenant N’s APC as it turns into Pilot Row. On the right of this photograph, Sergeant O’s APC can be seen coming to a halt in Rossville Street.





24.24 A photograph taken from the west side of Rossville Street by Robert White also shows Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street.




24.25 In the photograph above, three soldiers can be seen behind the APC; the direction in which they are moving indicates that the photograph was taken as the APC moved off, after having stopped and after a number of soldiers had debussed from it. At first glance, the photograph seems to suggest that the APC must have stopped further north in Rossville Street than the film footage shows; however, this is an illusion created by the angle from which the photograph was taken. Behind the APC one can just make out the curving kerbstones that led into Pilot Row, showing that the APC had passed Pilot Row at the time at which the picture was taken. The location of the APC in the photograph is consistent with the movement of the APC shown in the footage shot at ground level by an ABC News cameraman looking southwards down Rossville Street and the helicopter footage, which shows clearly that Sergeant O’s APC stopped approximately opposite the turning into Pilot Row.1

1 Vid 48 11.48; Vid 2 01.50

24.26 The photograph below is a still from the helicopter footage. At the bottom of the picture, Lieutenant N’s APC can be seen. It has come to a halt on the Eden Place waste ground. The two white smudges above and to the right of the APC are in our view puffs of smoke discharged by baton guns.



24.27 In the previous chapter we referred to two of a series of photographs taken by Derrik Tucker Senior from his home in Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, which showed the scene from his vantage point before the Army vehicles came into the Bogside. Set out below are two photographs that he took as the vehicles arrived. We have identified on the photographs the vehicles that can be seen.

24.28 The first photograph shows Lieutenant N’s APC as it moves south-east along Pilot Row before turning north-east towards Eden Place. In the background can be seen Major Loden’s command vehicle with the perspex turret. Sergeant O’s APC was out of sight behind Block 1 of the Rossville Flats when this photograph was taken.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:30

24.29 The second photograph shows a number of Army vehicles on Rossville Street. The leading vehicle is Major Loden’s command vehicle. It is followed by the Ferret scout car. Behind the scout car are two APCs belonging to Machine Gun Platoon (one APC being barely visible behind the other). The rear vehicle on the photograph is the first of the two four-ton lorries that carried members of Composite Platoon (Guinness Force). Lieutenant N’s APC can no longer be seen. By the time at which this photograph was taken, Lieutenant N’s APC had turned to the north-east and was on the Eden Place waste ground, to the right of the scene shown on the photograph. Sergeant O’s APC was no longer on Rossville Street but had turned into the access road leading to the car park, close to the north end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. The front offside part of Sergeant O’s APC may just be seen in the photograph, emerging from behind the north end of Block 1.


24.30 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant N stated that the Company Commander “told me to go through the barrier and arrest rioters ”:1

“8. I’ve never been in Londonderry on operations before and this area was unknown to me. I had the impression of large open spaces with the crowd standing round watching us. We kept going up what I now know to be Rossville Street. The crowd began to run away from us. We kept driving up the street to overtake some of them and caught up with the back people, and then I turned my pig left to somewhere between what I now know to be Eden Place and Pilot Row, cutting off about 100. My sergeant who had followed the normal drill of pulling past me up the right and had halted towards the car park of the Rossville Flats. ”


1 B398

24.31 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant N said that as he moved through the barrier he saw a crowd about 50 or 75m from him, running along Rossville Street and he followed this crowd in his vehicle. He caught them up and kept going with them. “The aim in my mind was to cut as many off as we could so that we could debus in the middle of them. ” He described the crowd as quite dense. He told the Widgery Inquiry that he did not know for some minutes where Sergeant O’s APC had gone, but that it had followed what he described as “our normal procedure ”.1

1 WT12.63-64

24.32 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Sergeant O stated that he was ordered “to go into the crowd and make arrests ”. He described how people scattered to either side of Rossville Street as they drove down and how, after his Platoon Commander had turned left at Pilot Row, he continued on and then swung left himself. “In this way we cut off between us a group of about 200 people. These were intended as the people the snatch squads would go into. ”1 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry he said2“… the Platoon Commander came up, gave me a briefing. It was a Snatch operation initially at Aggro Corner. ”

1 B466 2WT13.35

24.33 Sergeant O told the Widgery Inquiry that as his APC slowed down to turn left, he believed that four men at the back of his vehicle had jumped out.1

1 WT13.25

24.34 Corporal P was one of those who told the Widgery Inquiry that he had got out of Sergeant O’s APC at this point, together with a soldier he was guarding who had a baton gun.1 For the reasons given above, this was probably Private 017, who had a baton gun and who believed that he was one of this group.2 Private R also told the Widgery Inquiry that he had got out at this stage.3 Private U, from his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, also appears to have disembarked at this point, together with the soldier carrying a baton gun whom he was protecting.4 On the basis of our identification of the two soldiers carrying baton guns in Sergeant O’s APC, this would, if Private U were right (as we consider he probably was), have been Private 112.

1 WT13.45 3WT13.72

2 Day 358/45 4B767

24.35 In his RMP statement, Private 006 recorded that he disembarked at the junction of Eden Place and Rossville Street.1 In our view he meant Pilot Row, as there is no doubt that this is where Sergeant O’s APC briefly stopped. On the basis that he was in Sergeant O’s APC, which in our view was probably the case, he too appears to have disembarked before this APC turned left into the car park.

1 B1375

24.36 For these reasons, we consider that Corporal P, Private 017, Private R, Private U, Private 006 and probably Private 112 got out of the APC before it turned off Rossville Street, leaving Sergeant O, the driver Private INQ 1579 and Private T to continue to the Rossville Flats car park. Although Sergeant O believed that only four soldiers had disembarked at the earlier stage, it must be remembered that he was sitting in the front of the vehicle with the driver1 and so might well not have been able to see exactly how many had got out. The ABC News film shows men disembarking from Sergeant O’s APC as it turned left, and though it seems to show only four soldiers disembarking, there is a break in the film at this stage so that two more may well have disembarked afterwards.2The film also shows a puff of smoke, which in our view was from the firing of a baton round.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:30

The question of firing at the moving Armoured Personnel Carriers

24.37 According to the driver of Sergeant O’s APC (Private INQ 1579), these vehicles had a top speed of 30mph and took time to reach this speed, as they were very heavy. His evidence was that there was not sufficient time for the APCs to reach top speed as they drove into the Bogside;1 though as can be seen from the film footage,2 they seem to have moved reasonably quickly.3 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Private S (the driver of Lieutenant N’s APC) estimated the speed of the APC that he was driving as about 20mph.4

1 Day 336/153-154

2 Vid 2 01.50; Vid 48 12.26
3 The distance from the north end of Rossville Street to a point level with the entrance to Eden Place is about 55 yards. The film footage (Vid 2 01.59) shows that Sergeant O’s APC covered this distance in about 4.5 seconds, suggesting a speed of about 25mph.

4 B706


24.38 None of the soldiers in Lieutenant N’s APC suggested that this vehicle, which led the others, came under fire as it drove into the Bogside. The same applies to the soldiers in the second APC, though Private U in his first RMP statement recorded that “As we were advancing the rioters threw stones and bottles at the vehicle, I also heard the sound of automatic gunfire ”, but added that as far as he knew, “no rounds hit the vehicle ”.1 In his written statement for and oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, he stated that as the vehicle came into Rossville Street, he heard a long burst of automatic gunfire that he was sure was coming from “the other side of Glenfada Park ”.1

1 B748 2B767; WT13.94

24.39 We have difficulty in accepting this account of Private U. He was the only soldier in the second APC to say that he heard automatic gunfire at this stage. We do not understand how, from inside this vehicle, he could have been able to tell from where the fire was coming, and it is noteworthy that this detail is absent from his RMP statement. In his evidence to this Inquiry, Private U told us that the shots he had heard sounded like slow sub-machine gun fire or Thompson sub-machine gun bursts. “I could not tell where the gunfire was coming from. ”1 He also said that his recollection was that it was a short burst of gunfire, though he had told the Widgery Inquiry that it was a long burst that he had heard.2

1 B787.004; Day 369/16-17 2 Day 369/18

24.40 As will be seen from other parts of this report,1we have been unable to accept much of what Private U said he did and saw after disembarking from the APC. In our view his evidence is unreliable in so many respects that in the absence of any supporting evidence from those in the APC with him, we can place no reliance on his account of hearing automatic gunfire while in the APC. Had he heard such gunfire, we are sure that other soldiers in the vehicle would also have heard and commented on it. Indeed, Private U agreed in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry that he could see no reason why the soldiers in the leading APC would not have been able to hear automatic fire.2

1 Paragraphs 85.29–82 and 86.564–606 2WT14.2

24.41 There was no evidence of any bullet marks or damage on either APC.

24.42 Lieutenant 119, the Commander of Anti-Tank Platoon, was travelling in the second-to-last vehicle coming into the Bogside.1

1 B1752.043

24.43 In his first RMP statement, which was timed at 1320 hours on 31st January 1972,1 Lieutenant 119 recorded that as they travelled down Rossville Street, “the vehicles came under fire from the Rossville Flats and Glenfadda [sic] Flats ”. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant 119 recorded that as they passed the William Street/Rossville Street junction, “I saw that the leading Platoon had come under fire ”.2

1 B1752.041 2B1752.043

24.44 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant 119 said this:1

“Q. As you were passing over the junction, or round about there, did you observe any firing taking place, apart from baton rounds and CS gas?

A. When the leading platoon got up into Rossville Street I observed them come under fire from gunmen.

LORD WIDGERY: That is the Mortar Platoon.

Mr. GIBBENS: Would you give my Lord more detail about that. How did you observe them?

A. I was able to hear the fire and to see fire and when they got out of their vehicles they fired a large number of baton rounds in the direction of the crowd in the attempt to make the arrests.

Q. A little more detail than that. Which part of your vehicle were you sitting in?

A. In the front seat of my vehicle.

Q. The passenger seat?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And you could see fire coming, you say?

A. Yes sir, I could.

Q. What could you see of it? Could you see its source, or merely where it landed?

A. I could see the strike on the ground, sir.

Q. About how many strikes on the ground could you see?

A. It would be difficult to say, but three or four at first anyway.

Q. Whereabouts did it strike?

A. Very close, on the right-hand side of the Mortar Platoon’s vehicles.

Q. Could you indicate on the model roughly?

A. Yes sir. They would be up to about here and the fire, I think, had come from somewhere in the direction of the flats and landed on that sort of side of the road.

Q. You said from the direction of the flats, but you were pointing, in fact, parallel down towards Lecky Street [sic]. Was it from the building, or from behind the flats?

A. I think it may well have been behind. It appeared, because I was here, to come from the direction of the flats. ”


1 WT14.10

24.45 A little later in his evidence, Lieutenant 119 said that he did not feel it necessary to report this gunfire, as he thought Mortar Platoon and the Company Commander would have been aware of it.1

1 B1752.063

24.46 In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Lieutenant 119 stated that he was aware that Mortar Platoon was coming under fire and recalled seeing “the splash of a round that was fired, it hit the road near the lead Mortar Platoon Pig ”.1

1 B1752.015

24.47 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Lieutenant 119 said that he was unable to remember how, from his position in the ninth of the ten vehicles going into the Bogside, he was able to see, with all the vehicles in between, shots hitting the ground on the right-hand side of the leading vehicle.1 He was then shown the film of the vehicles entering the Bogside.2 As Counsel to the Inquiry correctly pointed out:

“... What we can see from that photograph is that the command vehicle is some way behind the second Mortar Platoon Pig and the Ferret is some way behind the command vehicle, apparently at a time when the first Pig of the Mortar Platoon has turned off and then behind the Ferret car are two Pigs of the Machine-Gun Platoon and then there are two lorries and then there is the two Pigs of your platoon.

Looking at that material it seems prima facie to make it even more difficult to see how you would have seen shots landing on the right-hand side of the first Mortar Platoon Pig; do you follow the point that I am putting to you?

A. I follow the point, sir.

Q. How confident can you be that you did in fact see that?

A. I still have the snapshot of one round, sir. ”


1 Day 363/121 2 Vid 48 12.26

24.48 Counsel to the Inquiry also pointed out to Lieutenant 119 that his first RMP account1 suggested that the vehicles that came under fire were his own.2 Lieutenant 119 said that he did not believe that this is what he meant to say. Later in his oral evidence, Lieutenant 119 gave a similar explanation. When it was put to Lieutenant 119 again that he was not in a position to see the vehicles of Mortar Platoon as they came into the Bogside and therefore could not have known whether they came under fire, he replied: “I have a snapshot recollection of that shot being fired. ”3

1 B1752.041

2 Day 363/123-124
3 Day 364/19-20; Day 364/59-60


24.49 Major Loden was in the command vehicle, which was the third in the convoy after the two APCs of Mortar Platoon. His evidence to the Widgery Inquiry was that he observed no firing as the vehicles went in.1 In his Diary of Operations2 there is the following entry, timed at 1617 hours: “Three rounds struck the second pig of the Mor Pl. My veh stopped on Rossville St/Pilot Row junction in the close vicinity of two rioters. The crew of my veh debussed to arrest these men. ”

1 WT12.27-28 2B2213

24.50 Major Loden’s Diary of Operations was written up after the event and included matters that he had not observed himself. In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Major Loden said that he imagined that the information about the rounds striking the second APC had come from someone in his company, but that he had not observed this himself. He also said that he stood by what he had told the Widgery Inquiry and agreed that it looked from that evidence as though he had some scepticism about bullets hitting the second APC,1 though he was at pains to emphasise that although he was in the next vehicle behind Sergeant O’s APC and looking out, he would not necessarily have heard or observed these shots had they occurred.2
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:31

24.51 In our view, Lieutenant 119 did not observe gunfire directed at either of the APCs of Mortar Platoon. He was at the back of the convoy, sitting on the passenger (left-hand) side, a considerable distance from these vehicles. Had there been such fire, it seems to us that, despite what Major Loden said to us, at least some of those in the leading APCs or immediately following vehicles would have been bound to have noticed it, if not Major Loden himself. We return to Lieutenant 119’s accounts later in this report.1 As will be seen, there are other parts of his evidence that we have found ourselves unable to accept.

1 Paragraphs 93.16–55, 96.4–7, 98.4–10, 100.15–19 and 113.58–60

24.52 However, the representatives of the majority of represented soldiers submitted that as the two APCs drove south down Rossville Street and turned east across the Rossville Street waste ground, they were attacked by gunmen and rioters.1 It is noteworthy that in support of this submission these representatives did not rely on the evidence of soldiers, but on the evidence of a number of civilians, namely George Nelis, Gerard Grieve, Eunan O’Donnell, Edward Dillon, Thomas Daly, Noel Moore, Ann Harkin, Harry McBride and Bernard Gilmour.2,3

1 FS7.1329

2 FS7.1329-1339
3 We have also looked at the evidence of the following three witnesses, but have not found it of any assistance on the matter under discussion: Donncha MacFicheallaigh (Day 409/96); Ciarán Mac Lochlainn (Day 415/126); Robert McLaughlin (Day 107/14; Day 107/35).


24.53 None of these witnesses suggested that they observed any gunfire directed at the two leading APCs, or indeed at any of the Army vehicles.

24.54 George Nelis gave us an account of being at his mother’s house at 33 Chamberlain Street (which was the southernmost house on the east side of Chamberlain Street), hearing a running crowd, and going outside to investigate:1

“It was as I stepped outside the house that I also became aware of gunfire. I did not hear the sound of guns being fired, but I distinctly remember hearing the sound of bullets striking. It seemed to me that I could hear bullets hitting the house somewhere high up, perhaps at the eaves. Bullets seemed to be hitting the house in short bursts, as if there had been regular bursts of fire from an automatic weapon. I remember thinking that the sounds had an echo to them, but my overall impression was of the sound of bullets hitting the house somewhere high up. ”


1 AN9.2

24.55 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, George Nelis told us that there were maybe two bursts of possibly three or four bullets each. Again he placed the bullet strikes that he heard (he repeated that he did not hear the weapon discharging) at the level of the eaves of his mother’s house and of the next two houses in the street. The bullets seemed to move along in a line above his head and were not focused on one spot.1

1 Day 103/149

24.56 George Nelis told us that after he had gone out of the house, he followed the crowd into the Rossville Flats car park and there saw a body lying on the ground. From his account this would appear to be Jackie Duddy.1 He also saw Margaret Deery.2 These were two of the casualties in Sector 2, who were hit by gunfire after the soldiers had arrived and disembarked in Sector 2.

1 AN9.2 2AN9.3

24.57 In our view, George Nelis’s account does not support the suggestion that he heard non-military fire as the Army vehicles came into the Bogside. On the contrary, it appears that what he recalled hearing was the strike of bullets at a later stage, after the soldiers had disembarked and perhaps even after two of the known casualties had been hit by gunfire. Furthermore, we find difficulty in accepting that bullets were in fact hitting the eaves of his mother’s house. It was submitted that these could not have been Army fire, as there is no evidence that any soldier was in a position to hit the eaves of a house on the east side of Chamberlain Street. Equally, however, it seems highly unlikely that any non-Army firer would have had any cause to fire in this direction. In the end we formed the view that it would be unwise to rely on this part of the account that George Nelis gave us so long after the event. There is no other evidence to suggest that shots hit 33 Chamberlain Street.

24.58 As to Gerard Grieve’s account,1he told us that the fire that he heard was from the Army and before the APCs (he described them as “Saracens ”) had stopped. However, he also recalled that soldiers were coming in on foot with the Saracens following. We are sure that no soldiers preceded the two leading APCs, so we are doubtful about the accuracy of his recollections after so many years. In any event, he described the firing as being from the Army. In our view his account does not support the proposition that the leading APCs came under fire.

1 Day 147/9-10

24.59 We take the same view of the account that Eunan O’Donnell gave us. He described a volley of shots that appeared to him to come from the City Walls, but expressed himself as “no longer entirely clear ” as to the order in which he saw the Army coming in and heard these shots.1In his Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) statement2he described hearing shouts that the Army was coming in, running towards an entry in Columbcille Court and falling to the ground on hearing shots. In this statement he recorded that although he was not sure, he thought he had heard about 30 shots in all.

1 Day 54/114-115 2AO28.6

24.60 Edward Dillon gave a NICRA statement1in which he described coming up towards the meeting at Free Derry Corner. “At the High Flats the soldiers started firing. ” In his written account to us2he described hearing shooting, which he thought was from the direction of Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats and “possibly ” from the roof, more or less at the same time as he saw Army vehicles. From his accounts it appears that Edward Dillon was to the south of the Rossville Flats. He was sure that the fire was Army fire.3In our view his accounts do not demonstrate or suggest that what he heard was firing directed at the soldiers.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:31

24.61 Thomas Daly told us1that he recalled running down Rossville Street with a lot of people when they heard the sound of Army vehicles. He recalled being at about Pilot Row when he heard a number of cracks that he believed to be Army fire. He ran towards the car park of the Rossville Flats and the gap between Blocks 1 and 2, hearing more single shots behind him. At some point he looked behind him and saw Army vehicles in Rossville Street roughly opposite Kells Walk. In our view this evidence does not indicate that the fire he heard was fire directed at the Army vehicles, as it is not apparent from his account that he heard gunfire before the Army vehicles had arrived.

1 AD4.2

24.62 Noel Moore gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry.1Having considered the whole of this evidence, we concluded that we could not rely on the accounts of this witness, as his recollections differed in numerous and material respects from other convincing evidence of a number of events.

1 AM416.1; Day 63/101-128

24.63 Ann Harkin made a NICRA statement1in which she described standing opposite the Eden Place waste ground, hearing a roar and seeing the Saracens coming “ro[u]nd the corner ”, and running past the rubble barricade in Rossville Street. Ann Harkin made no mention of hearing gunfire at this stage, but later in this statement said that she was sure there was firing from the City Walls when she had reached the Old Bog Road (Fahan Street West). In her written account and in her oral evidence to us Ann Harkin recalled hearing live rounds at the same time as she heard the roar of the Army vehicles. However, this witness also told us that she saw Army vehicles in the Eden Place area2and also said that she was not sure whether she had heard the roar and the shots at the same time. Listening to her evidence, we formed the view that Ann Harkin did not really recall the order in which these events occurred.

1 AH10.8 2AH10.4; Day 59/115-116

24.64 Harry McBride told us that the first shots he had heard were when he was at Free Derry Corner. These were “single shots but … quicker than I normally heard ”. He told us that these were before he saw any Army vehicles:1

“Q. All you can tell the Tribunal is that the noise of where the guns appeared to be, they appeared to be to the north of you, somewhere near Rossville Street?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the fire that you described in paragraph 6 as being like automatic fire?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was before you saw any Saracens?

A. Yeah, when I was on the ground, I was not actually looking for Saracens or anything, I was then apprehensive that the Saracens or other vehicles could come through the barricade, but I was not particularly looking to see if they were there.

Q. And you had not seen any at that stage?

A. I really was not looking, I was trying to protect myself and then when I felt that, where I was lying, that I was still in danger, I ran underneath a lorry. I was not looking around, I was just trying to get out of the road as quickly as possible and into some safe place. ”


1 AM47.2; Day 105/108

24.65 In our view this evidence falls far short of even suggesting that Army vehicles were fired on as they came into the Bogside. Harry McBride, according to his account, was not looking for “Saracens ” but was concerned that they might come south through the barricade in Rossville Street.

24.66 Bernard Gilmour is the brother of Hugh Gilmour, who was shot and killed on Bloody Sunday. We consider the circumstances of that shooting in our consideration of the events of Sector 3.1

1 Paragraphs 85.29–82, 86.60–156 and 89.46–49

24.67 In his NICRA statement1Bernard Gilmour and two other witnesses described being in 23 Garvan Place (a flat in Block 2 of the Rossville Flats) and seeing two Saracens coming in from Rossville Street. These witnesses then described what they saw from that flat, to which we return later in this report.2There is nothing in that statement to suggest that they had previously heard gunfire. However, in Bernard Gilmour’s account to us he described hearing 30 to 40 shots when he was in Rossville Street and about five seconds later the revving up of the APCs, all before he had reached the flat.3In this respect we are of the view that Bernard Gilmour has confused the order of events. Had this amount of gunfire occurred before the Army vehicles had come into Rossville Street, we are sure that he would have described it in his NICRA statement; and that there would be other evidence of firing at this stage.

1 AG38.9

2 Paragraph 63.13
3 AG38.3; Day 87/201-202


24.68 There is another consideration. As can be seen from the film footage and stills referred to above, as the leading APCs drove into the Bogside, there were fleeing civilians in the area. Anyone considering firing at these vehicles would have been bound to realise that there would be a risk of hitting civilians if he opened fire. In our view this militates against the suggestion that the APCs were fired on at this stage, since it would be entirely against their interests for paramilitaries to risk being blamed for the shooting of civilians.

24.69 For these reasons, we take the view that no shots were fired towards or hit either APC of Mortar Platoon as these vehicles came into the Bogside.

24.70 Private U gave evidence in his first RMP statement1of rioters having thrown stones and bottles at his vehicle as it advanced. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Private S recorded that “Missiles had been thrown at the vehicle all the way from William Street ”.2In his RMP statement, Private 006 recorded that the vehicles were hit with missiles but the statement is not clear as to whether the vehicles were hit before or after the soldiers alighted.3Private 006 told us that rioters threw bricks and bottles at the vehicles until the vehicles stopped.4
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:32

24.71 Neil McLaughlin told us that he was in the Rossville Flats car park when “four or five army Pigs approached the north western entrance to the car park and stopped in a group at the north gable end of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats ”. He continued: “Together with about twenty other people … I ran at the Pigs, throwing stones at them. I am pretty sure that I hit one of them. Suddenly, soldiers jumped out of the back of the Pigs. ”1In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, he accepted that there was only one APC at the entrance to the car park and more in Rossville Street. He said that he was at the gable wall at the south end of Chamberlain Street when he saw the vehicles and threw the stones.2He said that it was the APC at the car park entrance towards which he and about 20 others charged.3

1 AM347.2 3Day 91/53-54

2 Day 91/5-6

24.72 We consider that, as the vehicles came into the Bogside, a few civilians did throw stones or similar missiles at them, as some soldiers have said.1 In our view the ABC News film2 shows one or two people whose posture and movements suggest that this was the case, though most people seem to be running away and the stoning does not seem to be as heavy or prolonged as some soldiers suggested.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:34

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 25





The arrival of Lieutenant N’s Armoured Personnel Carrier
Chapter 25: The arrival of Lieutenant N’s Armoured Personnel Carrier

25.1 There are photographs that show where Lieutenant N’s Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) stopped on the Eden Place waste ground. The first was taken looking south-west.1

1 This photograph was obtained from the Sunday Times archive and attributed to Fulvio Grimaldi. In his evidence to this Inquiry, Fulvio Grimaldi said that he thought that the photograph might well have been taken by him (Day 131/15).



25.2 The photograph below1was taken from the west side of Rossville Street. Lieutenant N’s APC is in the position at which it stopped on the Eden Place waste ground. The Eden Place alleyway can be seen on the left of the photograph.

1 Photograph taken by Robert White (AW11.3; AW11.26).




25.3 On the aerial photograph below, which was not taken on Bloody Sunday, the approximate place at which Lieutenant N’s APC came to a halt has been marked.1

1 Photograph supplied by the Imperial War Museum.




25.4 We now consider the evidence of the soldiers in this APC as to what then happened.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:37

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 26




The evidence of the soldiers in Lieutenant N’s Armoured Personnel Carrier


Lieutenant N

26.1 In his first Royal Military Police (RMP) statement, Lieutenant N recorded that as he got out of the vehicle several people ran past throwing stones and bottles. Some ran towards the flats, while others ran into Eden Place and continued towards Chamberlain Street. He recorded that he ran after the latter group accompanied by Private 019 and Private INQ 1918.1 He said nothing about coming under fire.

1 B373

26.2 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant N described how, as he got out of his APC:1

“... a man about 10 feet away began to throw lumps of concrete at me. I made straight for him. He turned and ran and then turned and threw another one. By which time I had closed with him. I started to try and grapple with him. My helmet strap broke and my helmet fell off over my eyes and during the confusion the man got away. As a result I was somewhat behind the rest of the platoon who had pursued the crowd towards the high flats. I moved out of the open towards the backs of the houses in Chamberlain Street taking up position roughly at Eden Place with my radio operator and one man with a riot gun. The situation here was not comfortable… ”


1 B398

26.3 Again, at this stage in his account Lieutenant N made no mention of coming under fire, though later in this account1he stated that:

“13. During the period I was occupied around Eden Place I was aware of firing but none of it affected me directly, I was considerably occupied, and I cannot say exactly when it began or ceased. Certainly when I reached the platoon sergeant’s pig firing had ceased from my men. ”


1 B399

26.4 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Lieutenant N described how shortly after the incident described above he fired three shots into Chamberlain Street and a little later fired at what he described as a nail bomber. We consider these incidents below, but for present purposes it is important to note that when asked whether at this stage he had heard any shots other than his own, he replied that he had not, apart from rubber bullets.1

1 WT12.67; WT12.69

26.5 On 2nd February 1972, Lieutenant N took part with other soldiers in an interview recorded for a Thames Television This Week programme. In a part of the interview which was not used in the programme, Lieutenant N said that there had been “a rifle-man who’d been firing from the – I can’t remember exactly – the bottom left hand corner of the flats ” and that he had seen this man firing.1 Lieutenant N acknowledged to the Widgery Inquiry that he had not seen a man firing from that position, but said that as part of an attempt to rebut criticism being made of the Army, he had claimed in the interview to have seen something that had in fact been reported to him by some of his soldiers. When it was suggested to him that what he had said in the interview was a lie he replied that “technically ” it was untrue.2

1 ED57.3-4 2WT12.73-74

Private INQ 1918

26.6 Private INQ 1918 was Lieutenant N’s radio operator.1In his RMP statement dated 30th January 19722he recorded nothing about his movements after he had disembarked from the APC, but this was probably because this statement was concerned with an arrest that he said he had made of Duncan Clark, a matter that we consider later in this report.3In his written evidence to this Inquiry, he again recorded nothing about what he did as he disembarked. He described being near Lieutenant N at the entrance to the Eden Place alleyway when he heard “the sound of incoming fire from my left rear quarter ”, he thought a couple of shots, which he was sure was high velocity fire but not from a self-loading rifle (SLR).4He marked on a drawing5his position as A, Lieutenant N’s position as B, the area from which the sound of the fire was coming as X, the position of the two APCs as P, the positions of other soldiers as C and D, and the direction from which the APCs had come with arrows.

1 C1918.1 4C1918.2

2 C1918.9 5C1918.5

3 Paragraphs 30.13–34



26.7 Private INQ 1918 can be seen in the first of the photographs displayed in the previous chapter.1He is the soldier carrying a radio on his back.2He is also seen in the two following photographs, the second of which marks him as A and Lieutenant N as B.3We consider below what was happening when these photographs were taken by the Daily Mail newspaper photographer Jeffrey Morris.4






26.8 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private INQ 1918 agreed that he could not be 100 per cent certain about the sound or direction of the incoming fire he said he recalled hearing.1During the questioning of Private INQ 1918 about this and his recollection2of hearing Thompson sub-machine gun fire at some stage, there was the following exchange:3

“The reason I asked these questions is because you have very honestly said your recollection is one of isolated snapshots and it raises the question of whether, in your attempt to set out your recollection to the best that you can, you may have imported into the recollection of that day an incident or a recollection from another day on your tour of Northern Ireland?

A. That is perfectly possible, yes.

Q. So this recollection of a Thompson sub-machine-gun may come from another occasion?

A. It could well do. ”

1 Day 342/98-99

2 C1918.3
3 Day 342/100-101


26.9 Private INQ 1918 also said that although as the radio operator he was wearing headphones, he was able to distinguish between SLR fire and other high velocity fire.1We remained unconvinced that he was able to do this.2
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:38

Corporal 162

26.10 Corporal 162 mentioned nothing in his RMP statement dated 4th February 19721about coming under fire or hearing fire as he debussed and ran towards the Eden Place alleyway. He described seeing a man running towards the alleyway from the direction of William Street, who was carrying a metal stake, about a foot long, which he threw at Corporal 162. He stated that Private 019 saw this and fired a baton round at this man, who “disappeared into Chamberlain St ”. In none of his accounts did Private 019 mention this incident, so although we are sure (from the helicopter footage) that Private 019 was one of the two who fired a baton round on disembarkation, whether he fired at a man who had thrown a metal stake remains uncertain.

1 B1962.007

26.11 Corporal 162’s RMP statement continued with an account of running along the Eden Place waste ground and getting as far as 30 Chamberlain Street where he met Sergeant O who had an arrested person (William John Doherty) with him. We consider later in this report1the circumstances of this arrest.

1 Chapter 40

26.12 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Corporal 162 stated that as he debussed “I heard what I believed to be automatic fire coming from my right in front of the Pig ... I just remember hearing a burst of automatic fire, the zip sound of about four or five rounds … I would say that it came from the Rossville Flats or Rossville Street area. ” He stated that though the firing was not an immediate threat to him it made him go close to the walls at the back of the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street.1

1 B1962.003

26.13 Corporal 162 maintained this account of firing when he gave oral evidence to this Inquiry. When reminded that his RMP account made no mention of any firing at the time, he said that he would have mentioned it to the military policeman but could not say why it had not been included.1We were not persuaded that Corporal 162 had heard incoming fire.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:38

Lance Corporal V

26.14 In his RMP statement timed at 0025 hours on 31st January 1972, Lance Corporal V recorded that “As I debussed I heard the sound of shots. I cocked my weapon. I heard two explosions. Rioters also threw petrol and acid bombs. ”1

1 B788

26.15 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Lance Corporal V stated that it was just before he debussed that he heard the two explosions “which were definitely not rubber bullets. I had cocked my rifle as soon as I debussed since I had heard these explosions and as I was running forward behind [Private] S I heard the firing of single shots. I also saw the spurt of bullets hitting the ground somewhere to my right. ”1

1 B801

26.16 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Lance Corporal V said that the sound of the explosions that he had heard had come from the Rossville Flats area and that so far as he could judge the single (high velocity) shots had come from the alleyway between Blocks 1 and 2 of the Rossville Flats.1

1 WT13.11

26.17 Lance Corporal V gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. In his written evidence he said nothing about the explosions or hearing single shots, though he emphasised that his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry had been given to the best of his ability.1In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, he said that he had no present recollection of hearing explosions before he debussed, or the single shots hitting the ground as he ran behind Private S.2He was unable to explain why in his RMP statement he appeared to record that he had heard shots as he debussed, then cocked his weapon and then heard two explosions, while in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry his account was that he heard explosions before he debussed, cocked his weapon after he had debussed and then heard shots.3
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:39

Lance Corporal INQ 768

26.18 As already noted, Lance Corporal INQ 768 gave no account in 1972. In his written evidence to this Inquiry1he stated that when the APC stopped he went to the rear, knelt down “and I believe shut the PIG doors ”. He believed that he was the only person who stayed with the vehicle. He continued:

“18. I remember being at the back of the PIG and hearing incoming automatic fire. I would estimate that I heard 5 or 6 rounds being fired and that they were fired from either a machine gun or a rifle adapted to fire automatically, but I could not identify the exact weapon. All I now recall is that it was incoming fire, I could not say from exactly where it was fired but I do remember scanning the flats and I believe I did that in an attempt to identify a gunman, I did not see one.

19. As soon as I heard the incoming automatic fire, single shot SLR fire was returned from the army. I could not say who fired and from where but I certainly had the impression at the time and do so now that the army fire was in response to the automatic fire and so I assume that soldiers were engaging the gunmen. My recollection is that I heard between 3 and 4 – 10 rounds being fired in reply. ”


1 C768.3

26.19 A little later in this statement, Lance Corporal INQ 768 told us that he did not see anyone being beaten up. “I would add that soon after we got out of the PIG we came under fire and then people would have reduced their target size and if available would have taken cover. To suggest that in such circumstances soldiers would seek to beat up somebody and thus expose themselves to the risk of being shot is a suggestion which lacks common sense. ”1

1 C768.5

26.20 In the course of his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Lance Corporal INQ 768 said that he did not actually see anybody being physically arrested, nor any soldiers taking cover. As to the firing that he said he had heard, he told us that this was high velocity fire that came from the direction of the flats and that he believed himself to be under fire. He said he had no recollection of hearing Lieutenant N firing three shots into Chamberlain Street, or of any firing of baton guns.1He was unable to explain how he had only heard a few shots fired by the Army in reply to what he had said was incoming fire.2

1 Day 323/142-150 2 Day 323/154

26.21 As we have already observed,1in our view Lance Corporal INQ 768 was wrong in his recollection that he was in Sergeant O’s APC. His evidence was to the effect that the incoming automatic fire he said he heard was soon after the soldiers had disembarked. Since on his own account he did not see what the other soldiers did, his comment about the other soldiers taking cover and thus not being in a position to beat anybody up is, therefore, conjecture. In fact, as will be seen, soldiers did not take cover but instead set about trying to arrest people on the waste ground, as well as (in some cases) advancing towards the Rossville Flats.

1 Paragraphs 24.8–18
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:39

Private Q

26.22 In his RMP statement timed at 0030 hours on 30th January 1972 (which must be a mistake for 31st January),1Private Q recorded that as he got out of the vehicle stones and bottles were being thrown at his position “from where Chamberlain St runs into the forecourt of the Flats. As we deployed to cover I heard shots fired. These were fired towards us but I did not see any strikes made of the rounds fired. I was not able to locate any of the gunmen. ”

1 B624

26.23 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Private Q gave the following account:

“We were told that we were moving in to make arrests. We moved off and arrived eventually on waste ground which I now know to be in front of the north corner of Rossville Flats. As I got out of the vehicle there were a lot of people running about mostly in the general direction of the forecourt of the flats and some down Rossville Street towards what I now know to be Free Derry Corner. Arrests were being made and I had been detailed to act as cover for an arrest group.

My rifle at this stage was not cocked. The soldier I was detailed to cover was armed with a baton gun and ran on towards the forecourt of Rossville Flats ahead of me and as he did so fired his baton gun several times in the direction of the crowd where there were a number of people who were turning and throwing stones in our direction as they retreated into the forecourt. The stone throwing was heavy so we took cover at the north end of the Rossville Flats. At this time I heard four or five single low velocity shots and I went to the western corner of the north end of the flats from where I could see soldiers moving up towards the barricade in Rossville Street from where stones were being thrown at soldiers. I then returned to the eastern corner of the north end of Rossville Flats. ”


26.24 As we describe below, the baton gunner to whom Private Q referred was Private 013.

26.25 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Private Q described himself as in an arrest group of three, two with an SLR and the other with a baton gun. He said that the people in the forecourt of the Rossville Flats were “stopping, throwing at us and moving again ... We took cover because the stoning became heavy. ” He then told the Widgery Inquiry that he and the soldier with the baton gun had run to the north end of the Rossville Flats and that it was at this stage that he heard four or five low velocity shots, but he did not know where they landed or where they had come from.1

1 WT12.86

26.26 Later in this evidence Private Q said that there was no firing as the soldiers got out of the APC, that the firing that he heard was about 45 seconds or a minute later and that he was not conscious of any firing being directed either at him or the other soldiers who had been in the APC.1

1 WT12.93-95

26.27 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private Q told us that as he ran from the APC towards the people, he could hear the crack and thump of incoming fire coming over his head.1

1 B657.3

26.28 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private Q said that he was sure that the shots he heard were incoming fire and could not have been the shots fired by Lieutenant N.1Reminded of what he had told the Widgery Inquiry, he first told us that what he meant was that shots were not fired at him personally but at other soldiers near him, and then that he could not give an explanation for this change in his evidence.2

1 Day 339/70-71 2 Day 339/73-77

26.29 If Private Q had heard incoming fire directed at him or his colleagues as or soon after they disembarked from the APC, we are sure that he would have said so to the Widgery Inquiry. For this reason we cannot accept the account of incoming fire at this stage that he gave to us.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:40

Private 013

26.30 We are sure that Private 013 was the baton gunner whom Private Q described following towards the Rossville Flats, since the other baton gunner (Private 019) went towards the Eden Place alleyway, as we describe below.

26.31 In his RMP statement dated 4th February 1972, Private 013 recorded that he moved into the forecourt of the Rossville Flats where on his arrival he used the baton gun to move back the crowd who were throwing various missiles. He continued: “At the same time I heard the sound of gunfire and saw two or three bullets strike the ground behind me on my right. I could not say from which block of flats the shots came from as I was observing people throwing bottles and acid bombs from the balcony of Block 1, Rossville Flats. ”1

1 B1406

26.32 It appears from this statement that Private 013 was describing firing after he had moved away from the APC. In his written evidence to this Inquiry, Private 013 stated that he could hear “bangs going off all around me although I didn’t know where they were coming from. It could have been from us. ”1He also said he could not remember saying to the RMP that he had seen bullets hitting the ground “and I cannot now recall seeing these ”.2We should note that, for medical reasons, Private 013, did not give oral evidence to this Inquiry.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:41

Private 019

26.33 Private 019 (the other soldier in Lieutenant N’s APC with a baton gun) described in his RMP statement dated 4th February 1972 being at “the corner of Eden Place/Harvey Street ” observing a group of rioters in that area, with Lieutenant N on the opposite side of Eden Place. “Suddenly I heard three to five shots being fired. These shots were of high velocity and were fired from the direction of Block 2 Rossville Flats. ” He then described how the rioters advanced and how Lieutenant N fired two shots into Chamberlain Street.1

1 B1492

26.34 In his written statement to this Inquiry,1Private 019 described disembarking and going with Lieutenant N. He said that he could not remember seeing many civilians as he debussed. “There were certainly some around but they were no cause for concern. ” He went with Lieutenant N and took cover at the southern end of the Eden Place alleyway:

“I could see a crowd of civilians at the junction between Chamberlain Street and Harvey Street (grid reference O13). I cannot remember what they were doing. I could hear the noise of the crowd at this stage and the bangs of baton rounds. I think I could hear rifle fire at this time too. I cannot remember hearing any pistol shots nor any automatic fire at this time or at any time. The rifle fire I could hear could have been hostile or it could have been ours. I simply did not know. I have no idea where the other occupants of my Pig had gone. I was standing with my back to the Rossville Flats and looking up Harvey Street, in a south easterly direction. I might have looked round for a split second to see what was going on behind me, but because no fire was directed at me and there was no immediate threat to me I was not concerned about it. ”


1 B1494.002-003

26.35 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 019 said that he was pretty sure that the rifle fire that he heard came before the firing by Lieutenant N, but that he did not know whether or not it was hostile fire, but only that it was behind him and not coming his way.1He agreed that the figure in the background of the following photograph must have been him.2

1 Day 343/115; Day 343/165 2Day 343/117

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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:42

Private S

26.36 In his first RMP statement timed at 2230 hours on 30th January 1972, Private S (the driver of Lieutenant N’s APC) described dismounting from the APC and deploying to defensive positions. “My position was against the garden wall of, I believe, number 34 Chamberlain St ” He described moving forward into the crowd, which was throwing bottles and stones, and stated that nail bombs and acid bombs were being thrown from the top of the flats.1

1 B692

26.37 34 Chamberlain Street was the next house but one to the end of that street nearest to the Rossville Flats and is marked on the following map.

26.38 In his second RMP statement, dated 4th February 1972,1Private S recorded that he saw gunfire directed from a ground floor window about three windows in from the south-east corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats at soldiers deployed around one of the APCs. It is clear from this account that he was referring to Sergeant O’s APC, so we return to this part of Private S’s evidence later in this report,2while noting here that in this statement he also described seeing about five nail bombs thrown from the balconies of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.

1 B703 2Paragraph 49.16

26.39 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Private S stated:1

“As soon as the vehicle stopped and we debussed we came under fire. I was vehicle guard and would normally stay by the vehicle. Shots came down near the pig and I assumed it was the target. I therefore immediately ran for cover to the back wall of the houses on Chamberlain Street. The arrest operation was then in progress and there were civilians milling around. I agree that any shots fired at us might have hit civilians instead. ”


1 B707

26.40 In this account, Private S stated that his previous accounts of nail bombs being thrown were “not really correct. I heard some distant bangs and I assumed that these were nail bombs. ”

26.41 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Private S said that all the men in his APC came under fire from what he described as medium velocity fast single repetition shots seconds after the soldiers had debussed more or less together. He said that he did not see any of these shots land.1

1 WT12.102; WT13.5-6

26.42 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private S stated that he had forgotten most of what happened on Bloody Sunday, but had a distinct recollection of getting out of the APC and hearing the sound of incoming rounds.1In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, he said that he would have believed that he was being shot at.2He was originally unable to explain how he had come to say in his first RMP statement that nail bombs had been thrown, in his second statement to say that he had seen people throwing nail bombs and that about five of them had been thrown, and then in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry to say in effect that he had seen no nail bombs at all and had merely heard some distant bangs.3However, later in his evidence4there was this exchange:

“Q. You mean you knew you had told a lie on two previous occasions about the nail bombs and you wanted to correct that?

A. I had allowed myself to be – to make an inaccurate statement.

Q. Do you have any difficulty accepting the way I am putting it to you?

A. No, I have conceded the fact that, and I think I said yesterday that I, I apologise to the Inquiry for doing that and signing a statement that was wrong. I say it again, I am sorry and, and I am – I apologise to the families and everything, that are concerned in this. I do not take this lightly at all. ”

1 B724.001

2 Day 331/44
3 Day 331/65-69

4 Day 332/41


26.43 It will be seen from the accounts given by Private S that in his first RMP statement there is nothing to suggest that he came under fire as he disembarked from the APC, while in his later accounts he said that all the men from that APC had come under fire seconds after they had disembarked.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:43

Consideration of the evidence of the soldiers in Lieutenant N’s Armoured Personnel Carrier

26.44 According to the evidence of the soldiers who disembarked from the first APC, it appears that Lieutenant N attempted to grapple with a man who ran away and that Lieutenant N then went to the entrance to the Eden Place alleyway. He was accompanied by his radio operator Private INQ 1918 and by one of the soldiers with a baton gun, Private 019. Corporal 162 appears to have gone towards the garden walls of the houses on the west side of Chamberlain Street that abutted on to the Eden Place waste ground. Lance Corporal INQ 768 stayed at the back of the APC. Private Q ran towards the Rossville Flats; ahead of him was the other soldier with a baton gun, Private 013. Lance Corporal V seems also to have run towards the Rossville Flats with Private S, though in the direction of the southern end of the garden walls of Chamberlain Street.

26.45 The evidence of these soldiers on the question as to whether or not they were fired on at this stage is confusing and contradictory.

26.46 Lieutenant N’s evidence was that he had heard only rubber bullets up to the time he fired into Chamberlain Street and then at what he described as a nail bomber in the Rossville Flats car park. We consider this firing in detail later in this report.1

1 Paragraphs 30.36–128, 51.1–39 and 52.2

26.47 Private 013 said nothing about hearing firing before he had got to the forecourt of the Rossville Flats.

26.48 Private INQ 1918 gave no account in 1972 of hearing incoming fire; his evidence to us indicated that he thought, though he was not certain, that fire was coming from, in effect, the opposite direction to the Rossville Flats. We formed the impression from his evidence to us that his memory of events was such that it would be unwise to rely on his account of firing. However, as appears later in this report,1he was engaged in detaining a civilian when Lieutenant N fired into Chamberlain Street, and while he told us that he had no recollection of Lieutenant N firing,2we consider that nevertheless what he recalled were probably the shots fired by that officer.

1 Paragraphs 30.5–34 2Day 342/114-116

26.49 Corporal 162 made no mention of firing in his RMP statement. In our view, had he told the RMP about firing, it is most unlikely that the statement taker would have omitted it from the statement; RMP statements of other soldiers in this group do contain accounts of firing. In his case, we conclude that he said nothing about firing to the RMP, from which we infer that he is unlikely to have heard or seen any.

26.50 Private Q told the Widgery Inquiry that there was no firing as they got out of the APC and that the firing he recalled was 45 seconds to a minute later when he had got up to the Rossville Flats.

26.51 Private 019 said that he heard three to five shots being fired from the direction of the Rossville Flats when he was at the entrance to the Eden Place alleyway. He did not suggest that he or others from Lieutenant N’s APC had been fired on and in his evidence to us said that he did not know whether the fire he heard was hostile or friendly fire but that it was not directed at him. He was, on his own account, close to Lieutenant N who said he heard no shots at this time. For reasons given later in this report1(when discussing the firing by Lieutenant N up the Eden Place alleyway), we have taken the view that we should not rely either on the account given by Private 019 in his RMP statement or on his evidence to us of hearing shots at this stage.

1 Paragraphs 30.36–72

26.52 Private S said nothing in his RMP statements about being fired on as the soldiers disembarked from Lieutenant N’s APC. In our view had he in fact witnessed this he would have told the RMP; and as we have observed we consider that the RMP would have recorded this obviously important matter. In our view his changing accounts of nail bombs further devalue his testimony. We do not accept his evidence that he or his colleagues were fired on as they disembarked.

26.53 Lance Corporal V’s account of hearing two explosions is not supported by the evidence of any others in this group of soldiers. He could give no explanation for the change from his RMP account to what he said to the Widgery Inquiry. It is possible that the two explosions he said he heard were in fact the discharge of the baton guns close by, which can be seen in the film taken from the helicopter.1On the basis of his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, we consider that Lance Corporal V did not hear firing as he disembarked but only (according to his account) at a later stage when he was moving up towards the Rossville Flats.

1 Vid 2 02.10

26.54 Lance Corporal INQ 768 gave no evidence in 1972. To us he said that he heard five or six rounds of automatic fire and thought that he was under fire. It is not clear at what stage he meant he heard this fire. There is no evidence given in 1972 by any of the other soldiers who disembarked from Lieutenant N’s APC that they heard automatic fire as they disembarked.

26.55 In our view there is no acceptable evidence given at the time by the soldiers disembarking from Lieutenant N’s APC that they came under fire as or soon after they had done so. On the contrary, much of the evidence given in 1972 by these soldiers indicates to us that there was no such fire. We are not persuaded, for the reasons given, of the reliability of the accounts of firing at this stage that the soldiers from Lieutenant N’s APC have given in recent years.

26.56 In a later chapter1we consider the evidence of Jeffrey Morris, the Daily Mail photographer who came into the Eden Place waste ground soon after the soldiers had arrived there. As will be seen, his evidence was to the effect that the soldiers did not come under fire at this time.

1 Paragraphs 30.2–11

26.57 There is a further point. When Lieutenant N’s APC arrived in the Eden Place waste ground, and soldiers disembarked, there were many civilians around, as can be seen from the photographs shown below. It seems to us in the highest degree unlikely that any paramilitary would fire at or towards Lieutenant N’s APC in these circumstances, in view of the risk to those civilians.

26.58 We return later in this report1to the question as to whether or not the soldiers from Lieutenant N’s APC came under fire at a later stage.

1 Paragraphs 49.1–27 and 49.82–84

26.59 Before leaving the evidence of the soldiers as to what happened after they disembarked from the APC, we should draw attention to two photographs taken by Robert White from the west side of Rossville Street. In both photographs, Lieutenant N’s APC can be seen.




26.60 To our minds these photographs show people generally trying to get away. As we noted earlier in this chapter, Private 019 stated in his written evidence to this Inquiry that there were people around when he debussed but that they were no cause for concern. As also already noted, the helicopter footage shows the two baton gunners firing their weapons very soon after disembarking.1
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:44

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 27




The use of baton guns by Private 013 and Private 019

Chapter 27: The use of baton guns by Private 013 and Private 019

27.1 In his Royal Military Police statement,1Private 013 described using his baton gun to move back the crowd who were throwing various missiles at him. It seems from this statement that he was describing what he had done after moving from the Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC). In his written evidence to this Inquiry, he made no mention of firing his baton gun as soon as he had disembarked.2

1 B1406 2B1408.003

27.2 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry,1Private 019 was asked why, given that the civilians who were in the area when he disembarked had caused him no concern, he had fired his baton gun. His answer, that they might have given concern later, seems to mean either that he might have fired his baton gun at a later stage, or that he fired into a non-rioting crowd to discourage them from rioting later. The first of these possibilities does not address the fact that, as the film footage shows (and as Captain 200, Commander of Composite Platoon (Guinness Force), told the Widgery Inquiry2), soldiers of Mortar Platoon fired baton guns immediately after they had disembarked. The second possibility would indicate, if correct, the illegitimate firing of baton rounds against non-rioting people. Private 019 denied the suggestion that this “was a standard practice, that you would get out of your vehicle and start terrorising the population, just to make them know who was boss ”.3

1 Day 343/164 3Day 343/163-164

2 WT15.42

27.3 Whether or not it was standard practice to fire baton rounds at people who were not rioting, we are of the view that what the two baton gunners from Lieutenant N’s APC did, as soon as they had disembarked, was to use their baton guns in circumstances where the only object of doing so was to frighten or indeed hurt the civilians, rather than to seek to control rioting. In our view that was not an acceptable use of baton guns.

27.4 In relation to the use of baton guns, we now turn to consider the circumstances in which Rosemary Doyle, a volunteer member of the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps, and Patrick “Barman” Duffy, a 51-year-old man, came to be hit by baton rounds. We describe later in this report1the circumstances in which Pat Cashman, an Irish Press newspaper photographer, was also hit by a baton round while on the Eden Place waste ground.
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Re: Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 3

Post  Guest on Thu 17 Jun - 21:48

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume III - Chapter 28




The incident concerning Rosemary Doyle

Chapter 28: The incident concerning Rosemary Doyle

28.1 At the time of Bloody Sunday, Rosemary Doyle was a 19-year-old volunteer in the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps. She was on duty on that day, wearing her medical uniform, which consisted of a white coat and a white linen kit bag. In addition to carrying first aid equipment, she was carrying an army issue gas mask in her kit bag.1

1 AD140.1

28.2 In a report made soon after the event to the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps,1Rosemary Doyle described seeing someone “in the Rossville flats area ” who had been hit by a rubber bullet. She recorded that, after her colleague had instructed bystanders to carry the casualty to safety:

“We proceeded to walk across waste ground by the Rossville flats when two Saracen tanks raced up the roadway and another across the waste ground. The leading Saracen passed within about 1ft 6 inches of us and we stood our ground to avoid injury. A paratrooper then jumped out of the back of the Saracen and fired a rubber bullet at my face at a range of about 2ft 6ins to 3ft. As I was still wearing my gas mask I was protected a good deal from the force of the rubber bullet which slightly damaged three teeth and I sustained bruising of right jaw. We walked slowly away from the Saracen towards the Glenfada Park area and while doing so the paratroopers opened up with live machine gun fire after issuing no warning and with absolutely no provocation from the marchers … ”


1 AD140.5-7

28.3 While we have no doubt that Rosemary Doyle was hit by a rubber bullet, it is not clear from this report just where on the Eden Place waste ground this happened.

28.4 It appears from her report that Rosemary Doyle was with two other members of the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps, Robert Cadman and Maureen Gallagher. In his report to the Ambulance Corps,1Robert Cadman also described this incident as occurring “on the waste ground at Eden place ”.

1 AC1.23

28.5 In her written evidence to this Inquiry, Rosemary Doyle marked the position where she had been hit as being more or less in line with the entrance to the car park and the houses in Chamberlain Street, ie right to the south of the Eden Place waste ground.1However, in the course of her oral evidence, Counsel to the Inquiry showed her the following three photographs, which were taken by Robert White. The civilians seen in these photographs include a group of three people, one of whom is wearing a white uniform. This group can be seen more clearly in the third of these photographs, an enlargement of which follows on from it. While the image is not of the best quality, that enlargement shows that the person on the left of the group is a woman wearing what appears to be a grey uniform, including a skirt.









28.6 Counsel to the Inquiry directed Rosemary Doyle to the third of the photographs reproduced above and put to her that she was the person on the right of the group with Robert Cadman in the middle and Maureen Gallagher on the left. Rosemary Doyle said that she thought she was the person in the white uniform standing next to Robert Cadman.1Later, Rosemary Doyle identified Maureen Gallagher from a photograph taken at an early stage of the march.2The image confirms that Maureen Gallagher was wearing the grey uniform of the Order of Malta Ambulance Corps.

1 Day 101/9-12; Day 101/26 2Day 101/50

28.7 During her oral evidence to us, Maureen Gallagher was shown another copy of the third of the photographs taken by Robert White reproduced above. She identified Rosemary Doyle as the figure in the white uniform and said that she was the person on the left of the group with Robert Cadman in the middle.1 According to her written statement to this Inquiry,2 the incident happened after she and Rosemary Doyle had walked across the waste ground at Eden Place and just as they were beginning to cross Rossville Street towards Kells Walk.

1 Day 70/86-89
2 AG21.2


28.8 As noted above, in her report made at the time, Rosemary Doyle described a soldier who disembarked from a vehicle and fired at her at very short range. According to her written evidence to this Inquiry, she saw a soldier emerging from a Saracen (by which she meant an APC) who as he stepped out immediately fired a rubber bullet in her direction.1In her oral evidence to this Inquiry,2she recalled that she thought the Saracen was coming to a halt:

“A. … What happened was, it was coming quite fast and slowing and when the back of it opened, the soldier was actually half in and half out with his foot on a foot plate.

Q. When you describe a soldier coming out with a rubber bullet gun in his hand and being half in and half out of the vehicle when he fired, he was coming out the back with his foot on the foot plate?

A. I cannot remember if that was the actual soldier. It was – they were all coming out in succession and they were coming out running, you know, at speed coming out of it, but –

Q. Go on, I do not want to interrupt.

A. No, I just remember seeing the one with the rubber bullet gun who fired at myself.

Q. You saw him, did you?

A. Um, yes, I did. ”


1 AD140.2 2Day 101/4

28.9 When Rosemary Doyle was asked to give an estimate, based on the size of the hearing room, of how far away the soldier was from her when he fired she said:1

“A. 25 yards maybe, or something, I do not know.

LORD SAVILLE: 25 yards would be almost across to the far corner, perhaps a bit less; was it that sort of distance?

A. I think so, that – perhaps a bit less, yes.

LORD SAVILLE: There or thereabouts?

A. Yes, I think so.

LORD SAVILLE: If you really cannot remember at all, do tell us, but we are trying to get as clear a picture as we possibly can. Do not hesitate to say ‘I do not really remember’, if that is the case?

A. I do not really remember, but I think it was less than that, yeah. ”


1 Day 101/6

28.10 However, a little later in her oral evidence, when shown her report made at the time, in which she had recorded that she had been shot at a distance of 2ft 6in to 3ft, Rosemary Doyle said that she could not remember precisely, “but he was very close. I would say that this statement, which I had handwritten at the time, is accurate or very good to accurate ”.1
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