Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5
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Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 5
Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
Volume V
Section: Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street
Introduction
Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street
.
67.1 Sector 3 is concerned with what happened in the area of Rossville Street, to the immediate west of the area covered by Sector 2. The area covered by Sector 3 is highlighted on the map below.
67.2 There is no doubt that in Sector 3 Michael Kelly, Hugh Gilmour,1John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash and Kevin McElhinney were killed by Army gunfire. Alexander Nash, the father of William Nash, was wounded by gunfire having probably previously been hit by a baton round, though whether his gunshot wound was the result of Army or civilian gunfire was a matter of dispute. All these casualties occurred in the area of the rubble barricade on Rossville Street, which we describe in detail below. It was submitted by the soldiers’ representatives that there was at least one additional casualty of Army gunfire in this area, who was engaged in paramilitary activity when he was shot, but whose existence has for this reason been kept secret.2We consider this submission later in this report.3
1 In many documents the surname of this casualty is given as “Gilmore” but we understand that “Gilmour” is correct.
67.3 It must be kept in mind that, to a significant degree, there is a chronological overlap between the events of Sector 2 and those of Sector 3.
Volume V
Section: Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street
Introduction
Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street
.
67.1 Sector 3 is concerned with what happened in the area of Rossville Street, to the immediate west of the area covered by Sector 2. The area covered by Sector 3 is highlighted on the map below.
67.2 There is no doubt that in Sector 3 Michael Kelly, Hugh Gilmour,1John Young, Michael McDaid, William Nash and Kevin McElhinney were killed by Army gunfire. Alexander Nash, the father of William Nash, was wounded by gunfire having probably previously been hit by a baton round, though whether his gunshot wound was the result of Army or civilian gunfire was a matter of dispute. All these casualties occurred in the area of the rubble barricade on Rossville Street, which we describe in detail below. It was submitted by the soldiers’ representatives that there was at least one additional casualty of Army gunfire in this area, who was engaged in paramilitary activity when he was shot, but whose existence has for this reason been kept secret.2We consider this submission later in this report.3
1 In many documents the surname of this casualty is given as “Gilmore” but we understand that “Gilmour” is correct.
67.3 It must be kept in mind that, to a significant degree, there is a chronological overlap between the events of Sector 2 and those of Sector 3.
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The layout of this part of the city
Chapter 68: The layout of this part of the city
68.1 The most important feature in Sector 3 was the rubble barricade on Rossville Street, the position of which is marked on the map shown above,1since it was at that barricade or in its immediate vicinity that the casualties of Sector 3 were shot. We describe this barricade later in this chapter.2
Rossville Street
68.2 As can be seen from the map reproduced below, Rossville Street ran from the junction of William Street and Little James Street in a south-westerly direction towards Free Derry Corner. For most of its length there was a relatively wide area of footpath or open ground on either side of the road. The distance between the junction of William Street and Little James Street and Free Derry Corner was approximately 370 yards. The distance from that junction to the north-eastern corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, which ran along the eastern side of Rossville Street, was approximately 140 yards. From Barrier 12 in Little James Street to the same corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats was approximately 240 yards.
68.3 The junction of Rossville Street, William Street and Little James Street, which was sometimes referred to, usually by the Army, as Aggro Corner, is shown near the centre of the following aerial photograph.
68.4 Rossville Street is the street leading from that junction towards the top of the photograph, in the direction of Free Derry Corner, which is out of view. This photograph, although approximately contemporaneous with Bloody Sunday, was taken on another occasion and does not show the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association march on that day.
The south-eastern side of Rossville Street
68.5 As can seen from the aerial photograph shown above, the route from the junction with William Street down the south-eastern side of Rossville Street passed initially along the side of Con Bradley’s public house, which fronted onto William Street, and adjacent buildings. These buildings extended from William Street for about 25 yards along Rossville Street, before the area opened up into the Eden Place waste ground, at the point at which a soldier is shown kneeling in a photograph (shown below) taken on Bloody Sunday by Colman Doyle of the Irish Press.
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68.6 For approximately 100 yards beyond that point, the left side of Rossville Street passed along the north-western edge of the Eden Place waste ground, upon which the buildings of Eden Place and Pilot Row had formerly stood. Nothing remained of those buildings in January 1972, but the position previously occupied by the two streets was still discernible. They ran approximately parallel to one another from Rossville Street to the backs of the houses of Chamberlain Street on the opposite side of the waste ground. This area has been described in greater detail in our description of Sector 2.1 At the south-western end of the waste ground, an access road led off Rossville Street to the car park of the Rossville Flats.
68.7 Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, which was situated beyond this access road, was a ten-storey residential building containing both flats and maisonettes. It was a little over 60 yards long and ran parallel to Rossville Street. We have provided a fuller description of the Rossville Flats in the part of the report concerned with Sector 2.1
68.8 A partly paved footpath about 8 yards wide separated the front of Block 1 from Rossville Street. This can be seen in the following photograph, which shows the view towards William Street from a point near the south-western end of Block 1, and also shows part of the rubble barricade, which we describe below.
68.9 The main entrance to Block 1 was situated at the south-western end of the side overlooking Rossville Street. It consisted of a double door, outside which was a canopy supported by four posts. The entrance can be seen in a photograph (which we show below) taken by Eamon Melaugh, although not on Bloody Sunday, which also shows the telephone kiosk that was located around the corner from the main entrance, at the southern end of Block 1.
68.7 Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, which was situated beyond this access road, was a ten-storey residential building containing both flats and maisonettes. It was a little over 60 yards long and ran parallel to Rossville Street. We have provided a fuller description of the Rossville Flats in the part of the report concerned with Sector 2.1
68.8 A partly paved footpath about 8 yards wide separated the front of Block 1 from Rossville Street. This can be seen in the following photograph, which shows the view towards William Street from a point near the south-western end of Block 1, and also shows part of the rubble barricade, which we describe below.
68.9 The main entrance to Block 1 was situated at the south-western end of the side overlooking Rossville Street. It consisted of a double door, outside which was a canopy supported by four posts. The entrance can be seen in a photograph (which we show below) taken by Eamon Melaugh, although not on Bloody Sunday, which also shows the telephone kiosk that was located around the corner from the main entrance, at the southern end of Block 1.
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68.10 On the right side of the photograph above can be seen the lowest of three walkways that connected Block 1 to Block 2. In the foreground is visible one of six low hexagonal brick structures known to many witnesses as the Threepenny Bits. These can be seen more clearly in a photograph taken from Block 2 on Bloody Sunday by Derrik Tucker Senior.
68.11 Between the Threepenny Bits and Block 2 of the Rossville Flats there was access to a pedestrianised area leading off Rossville Street towards the City Walls. A line of trees occupied the centre of this area. The trees can be seen in the following photograph which also shows the south-western (front) side of Block 2 and Rossville Street in the background.
68.12 The distance from the main entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to Free Derry Corner was approximately 175 yards. In this area Rossville Street became broader and the road divided into two carriageways, separated by two islands of empty ground. On the south-eastern side of the road, extending along most of this distance, lay the two three-storey residential blocks of Joseph Place. The first of these blocks, that is, the block closer to the Rossville Flats, was set back some 40 yards from the road at its north-eastern end but ran towards the road in a south-westerly direction. The second block of Joseph Place ran parallel to the road and closer to it. A second-floor walkway connected the two blocks. All these features can be seen in the following aerial photograph.
68.13 The next photograph shows the south-western end of Rossville Street, with the two blocks of Joseph Place on the left of the picture.
68.14 As the photograph shows, the carriageway that ran in front of Joseph Place ended at a T-junction. At this junction it met Fahan Street, on which were situated a small terrace of houses and, further to the west, the gable wall of Free Derry Corner painted with the inscription “YOU ARE NOW ENTERING FREE DERRY ”. The other carriageway of Rossville Street ran past Free Derry Corner on the western side, beyond which point the street became Lecky Road. The following photograph shows Free Derry Corner. This photograph was not taken on Bloody Sunday.
68.11 Between the Threepenny Bits and Block 2 of the Rossville Flats there was access to a pedestrianised area leading off Rossville Street towards the City Walls. A line of trees occupied the centre of this area. The trees can be seen in the following photograph which also shows the south-western (front) side of Block 2 and Rossville Street in the background.
68.12 The distance from the main entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats to Free Derry Corner was approximately 175 yards. In this area Rossville Street became broader and the road divided into two carriageways, separated by two islands of empty ground. On the south-eastern side of the road, extending along most of this distance, lay the two three-storey residential blocks of Joseph Place. The first of these blocks, that is, the block closer to the Rossville Flats, was set back some 40 yards from the road at its north-eastern end but ran towards the road in a south-westerly direction. The second block of Joseph Place ran parallel to the road and closer to it. A second-floor walkway connected the two blocks. All these features can be seen in the following aerial photograph.
68.13 The next photograph shows the south-western end of Rossville Street, with the two blocks of Joseph Place on the left of the picture.
68.14 As the photograph shows, the carriageway that ran in front of Joseph Place ended at a T-junction. At this junction it met Fahan Street, on which were situated a small terrace of houses and, further to the west, the gable wall of Free Derry Corner painted with the inscription “YOU ARE NOW ENTERING FREE DERRY ”. The other carriageway of Rossville Street ran past Free Derry Corner on the western side, beyond which point the street became Lecky Road. The following photograph shows Free Derry Corner. This photograph was not taken on Bloody Sunday.
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68.15 Closest to the junction with William Street on the north-western side of Rossville Street were the gable wall of a building on William Street and an adjacent lower wall. The next building to the south had a large garage door on the ground floor. The inside of the latter building was in a derelict state on Bloody Sunday. The following photograph, taken on Bloody Sunday, shows this part of Rossville Street.
68.16 The residential block known as Kells Walk was the next building on Rossville Street after the building with the garage door. Between Kells Walk and the latter building was an alley, occasionally also referred to as Kells Walk, which gave pedestrian access to a road that ran along the northern side of Columbcille Court, which was the larger complex of flats that lay behind Kells Walk, and led to Abbey Street. These features are illustrated in the following aerial photograph.
68.17 Kells Walk was a rectangular three-storey block, about 40 yards long, positioned alongside Rossville Street, opposite the Eden Place waste ground. At first floor level each maisonette had access to a small balcony overlooking Rossville Street. In front of the block, and beneath these balconies, lay a small garden area enclosed by a low, and in places dilapidated, brick wall. At the southern end of the block a ramp passed between two slightly higher brick walls, giving pedestrian access to a parking area on the eastern side of Columbcille Court. The more northerly of the walls that enclosed this ramp projected from the southern end wall of Kells Walk. At the northern end of Kells Walk was an external staircase leading to a walkway (sometimes referred to as a verandah), which ran the length of the western side of the building at first floor level. Most of these features (although not the first floor walkway) can be seen in the following aerial photograph.
68.16 The residential block known as Kells Walk was the next building on Rossville Street after the building with the garage door. Between Kells Walk and the latter building was an alley, occasionally also referred to as Kells Walk, which gave pedestrian access to a road that ran along the northern side of Columbcille Court, which was the larger complex of flats that lay behind Kells Walk, and led to Abbey Street. These features are illustrated in the following aerial photograph.
68.17 Kells Walk was a rectangular three-storey block, about 40 yards long, positioned alongside Rossville Street, opposite the Eden Place waste ground. At first floor level each maisonette had access to a small balcony overlooking Rossville Street. In front of the block, and beneath these balconies, lay a small garden area enclosed by a low, and in places dilapidated, brick wall. At the southern end of the block a ramp passed between two slightly higher brick walls, giving pedestrian access to a parking area on the eastern side of Columbcille Court. The more northerly of the walls that enclosed this ramp projected from the southern end wall of Kells Walk. At the northern end of Kells Walk was an external staircase leading to a walkway (sometimes referred to as a verandah), which ran the length of the western side of the building at first floor level. Most of these features (although not the first floor walkway) can be seen in the following aerial photograph.
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68.18 The staircase at the northern end of the Kells Walk building is shown clearly in the photograph below, which was taken on Bloody Sunday by Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail.
68.19 A clearer view of the walls between which the ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk passed is given in two further photographs taken on Bloody Sunday, the first by Jeffrey Morris, from the north looking south, and the second by a freelance photographer, Liam Mailey, from the south looking north.
68.20 As the second of these photographs shows, the ramp described above passed beneath the upper flight of another ramp, sometimes referred to as a pram-ramp, which led down from the walkway, or verandah, at first floor level on the west side of Kells Walk. The upper flight of that ramp descended from north to south. The lower flight returned from south to north on the Columbcille Court side to complete the descent, and at ground level met the ramp that gave access from Rossville Street. The descent of the ramp from the first floor walkway of Kells Walk can be seen in a photograph taken by Larry Doherty of the Derry Journal from halfway up the ramp, looking towards Kells Walk.
68.21 The next feature to the south on this side of Rossville Street was a brick wall, about 4ft high, which started from the southern end of the ramp that led down from the first floor walkway of Kells Walk. This wall projected a short distance towards Columbcille Court before turning to the left and running south for about 15 yards, approximately parallel to Rossville Street. Most of this wall can be seen on the left side of another of Liam Mailey’s photographs.
68.19 A clearer view of the walls between which the ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk passed is given in two further photographs taken on Bloody Sunday, the first by Jeffrey Morris, from the north looking south, and the second by a freelance photographer, Liam Mailey, from the south looking north.
68.20 As the second of these photographs shows, the ramp described above passed beneath the upper flight of another ramp, sometimes referred to as a pram-ramp, which led down from the walkway, or verandah, at first floor level on the west side of Kells Walk. The upper flight of that ramp descended from north to south. The lower flight returned from south to north on the Columbcille Court side to complete the descent, and at ground level met the ramp that gave access from Rossville Street. The descent of the ramp from the first floor walkway of Kells Walk can be seen in a photograph taken by Larry Doherty of the Derry Journal from halfway up the ramp, looking towards Kells Walk.
68.21 The next feature to the south on this side of Rossville Street was a brick wall, about 4ft high, which started from the southern end of the ramp that led down from the first floor walkway of Kells Walk. This wall projected a short distance towards Columbcille Court before turning to the left and running south for about 15 yards, approximately parallel to Rossville Street. Most of this wall can be seen on the left side of another of Liam Mailey’s photographs.
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68.22 Beyond the southern end of this wall, an alley led off Rossville Street, passing between Columbcille Court to the north, and Glenfada Park North to the south. The entrance to the alley can be seen in a photograph taken on Bloody Sunday by Private 017.
68.23 As the photograph above shows, on the southern side of the alley, and lying parallel to it, was situated a ramp, again sometimes referred to as a pram-ramp, which rose in two flights, leading to a walkway. This walkway gave access at first-floor level to the Glenfada Park complex of buildings. To the south of the ramp, and overlooking Rossville Street opposite Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, lay the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. This three-storey block was similar in size and design to Kells Walk. As at Kells Walk, there were balconies on the eastern side of the block at first floor level, and beneath the balconies a low brick wall enclosed a garden area. The walkway reached from the ramp ran along the other side of the block, facing the interior of Glenfada Park North. The following aerial photograph shows these features.
68.24 Another photograph taken by Jeffrey Morris on Bloody Sunday provides a closer view of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.
68.23 As the photograph above shows, on the southern side of the alley, and lying parallel to it, was situated a ramp, again sometimes referred to as a pram-ramp, which rose in two flights, leading to a walkway. This walkway gave access at first-floor level to the Glenfada Park complex of buildings. To the south of the ramp, and overlooking Rossville Street opposite Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, lay the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. This three-storey block was similar in size and design to Kells Walk. As at Kells Walk, there were balconies on the eastern side of the block at first floor level, and beneath the balconies a low brick wall enclosed a garden area. The walkway reached from the ramp ran along the other side of the block, facing the interior of Glenfada Park North. The following aerial photograph shows these features.
68.24 Another photograph taken by Jeffrey Morris on Bloody Sunday provides a closer view of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North.
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68.25 It was possible to reach the interior of Glenfada Park North either through a passage leading to the left from the foot of the ramp, or by an entry between the ramp and the northern wall of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North. The second of these routes is illustrated in a photograph taken by Larry Doherty from Block 1 of the Rossville Flats.
68.26 A turning off Rossville Street at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North provided access for vehicles to a parking area, sometimes described as a courtyard, inside Glenfada Park North. This entrance can be seen in the following photograph.
68.27 On the southern side of this entrance lay another ramp, beyond which was the south-eastern block of Glenfada Park South. The ramp started at the north-eastern end of that block, rose in a north-easterly direction parallel to Rossville Street, and returned to the south-west, leading to a walkway at first floor level that ran around the interior of Glenfada Park South. It was possible to enter Glenfada Park South at its eastern corner either from the base of the ramp, by passing under its upper flight, or from Glenfada Park North, by passing down the north-western side of the ramp and beneath the walkway. The south-eastern block of Glenfada Park South was similar in design to its counterpart in Glenfada Park North, although not so long. There were balconies overlooking Rossville Street at first floor level, and once again beneath the balconies there was a garden area enclosed by a low brick wall. The block faced south-east across Rossville Street towards the northern block of Joseph Place. At its south-western end was a staircase leading to another part of the walkway. The following aerial photograph shows these features.
68.28 The photograph above also shows the street that led off Rossville Street in a north-westerly direction immediately south-west of Glenfada Park South. This street was Fahan Street West, often called the Old Bog Road. Further south, buildings that formed part of Lisfannon Park occupied the area on the north-western side of Rossville Street between the Old Bog Road and Free Derry Corner. Those buildings, and many of the others we describe, can be seen in the following aerial photograph, which shows the whole of Rossville Street, viewed from south-west to north-east.
68.26 A turning off Rossville Street at the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North provided access for vehicles to a parking area, sometimes described as a courtyard, inside Glenfada Park North. This entrance can be seen in the following photograph.
68.27 On the southern side of this entrance lay another ramp, beyond which was the south-eastern block of Glenfada Park South. The ramp started at the north-eastern end of that block, rose in a north-easterly direction parallel to Rossville Street, and returned to the south-west, leading to a walkway at first floor level that ran around the interior of Glenfada Park South. It was possible to enter Glenfada Park South at its eastern corner either from the base of the ramp, by passing under its upper flight, or from Glenfada Park North, by passing down the north-western side of the ramp and beneath the walkway. The south-eastern block of Glenfada Park South was similar in design to its counterpart in Glenfada Park North, although not so long. There were balconies overlooking Rossville Street at first floor level, and once again beneath the balconies there was a garden area enclosed by a low brick wall. The block faced south-east across Rossville Street towards the northern block of Joseph Place. At its south-western end was a staircase leading to another part of the walkway. The following aerial photograph shows these features.
68.28 The photograph above also shows the street that led off Rossville Street in a north-westerly direction immediately south-west of Glenfada Park South. This street was Fahan Street West, often called the Old Bog Road. Further south, buildings that formed part of Lisfannon Park occupied the area on the north-western side of Rossville Street between the Old Bog Road and Free Derry Corner. Those buildings, and many of the others we describe, can be seen in the following aerial photograph, which shows the whole of Rossville Street, viewed from south-west to north-east.
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68.29 At the beginning of this Inquiry the buildings of Joseph Place, Kells Walk, Columbcille Court and Glenfada Park remained largely unaltered, although substantial modifications were made to Kells Walk and Glenfada Park during the course of the Inquiry. We were therefore able to walk around these buildings and see their layout. This was not possible in the case of the Rossville Flats, which were demolished in the 1980s. There are now new buildings where the Rossville Flats used to be and on what was formerly the Eden Place waste ground.
The rubble barricade
68.30 The rubble barricade ran across Rossville Street, from a point close to the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, to about the midpoint of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, approximately 30 yards from the north-western corner of the block and 25 yards from the doors at the south-western corner. To show where the barricade was in relation to the other features of Sector 3, we reproduce below an aerial photograph. This photograph was not taken on Bloody Sunday and it should be borne in mind that since the barricade was in existence for some time before and after Bloody Sunday, photographs taken on other dates may not show its exact configuration on the day. A barricade across Rossville Street had probably been in existence since August 1971, although it may have been cleared by the Army on one or more occasions and then rebuilt.
68.31 There was a gap near the middle of the barricade, on the western side of the road. A still from the Army helicopter footage filmed on Bloody Sunday, reproduced below, shows the eastern part of the barricade, the gap and some of the western part. Another photograph, taken by the Derry Journal photographer Larry Doherty and also reproduced below, shows the barricade as it appeared from the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, ie looking towards the north, but as this photograph was taken on 12th March 1972 it is possible that it does not show the barricade in the same state as it was in on Bloody Sunday.
The rubble barricade
68.30 The rubble barricade ran across Rossville Street, from a point close to the southern end of the eastern block of Glenfada Park North, to about the midpoint of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, approximately 30 yards from the north-western corner of the block and 25 yards from the doors at the south-western corner. To show where the barricade was in relation to the other features of Sector 3, we reproduce below an aerial photograph. This photograph was not taken on Bloody Sunday and it should be borne in mind that since the barricade was in existence for some time before and after Bloody Sunday, photographs taken on other dates may not show its exact configuration on the day. A barricade across Rossville Street had probably been in existence since August 1971, although it may have been cleared by the Army on one or more occasions and then rebuilt.
68.31 There was a gap near the middle of the barricade, on the western side of the road. A still from the Army helicopter footage filmed on Bloody Sunday, reproduced below, shows the eastern part of the barricade, the gap and some of the western part. Another photograph, taken by the Derry Journal photographer Larry Doherty and also reproduced below, shows the barricade as it appeared from the entrance to Block 1 of the Rossville Flats, ie looking towards the north, but as this photograph was taken on 12th March 1972 it is possible that it does not show the barricade in the same state as it was in on Bloody Sunday.
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68.32 It can be seen from the first of these photographs that there was an oil drum on top of the eastern part of the barricade. In front, that is to the north, of the drum there was a wooden trestle. Behind it there were further trestles, including one that barred the gap in the barricade, which could be moved to allow vehicles to pass. These trestles and other features of the barricade can be seen in three photographs (shown below) taken on Bloody Sunday by Ciaran Donnelly of the Irish Times.
68.33 Robert White took the following photograph on Bloody Sunday. It shows the eastern part of the barricade.
68.34 Other photographs of the rubble barricade taken on Bloody Sunday include two taken from the north by Colman Doyle, the Irish Press photographer. We show these photographs below.
68.33 Robert White took the following photograph on Bloody Sunday. It shows the eastern part of the barricade.
68.34 Other photographs of the rubble barricade taken on Bloody Sunday include two taken from the north by Colman Doyle, the Irish Press photographer. We show these photographs below.
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The movement of the soldiers
Chapter 69: The movement of the soldiers
Other evidence relating to the movements of Corporal P and Private 017 69.49
69.1 In our consideration of the events of Sector 2,1we described the movement of the first two vehicles to come into the Bogside, namely the two Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) of Mortar Platoon. With the exception of Corporal P and Private 017, who had travelled in the second APC commanded by Sergeant O, the other soldiers in those APCs deployed on the Eden Place waste ground and in the Rossville Flats car park and were involved in the events of Sector 2, though Private U and the baton gunner Private 112, who also disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street, were also involved in the events of Sector 3, in the course of which the former fired a shot.
69.2 These two APCs were followed into the Bogside by Major Loden’s command vehicle, behind which was a Ferret scout car with a mounted Browning machine gun. In turn came two APCs of Machine Gun Platoon, which were empty but for the drivers and (possibly) vehicle guards, the other members of Machine Gun Platoon still being in the Abbey Taxis building, as described in our discussion of the events of Sector 1.1Two soft-skinned lorries containing Composite Platoon (Guinness Force) followed these APCs. At the rear were the two APCs of Anti-Tank Platoon.
69.3 The vehicles that followed the two APCs of Mortar Platoon all initially stopped in Rossville Street. The first of these (Major Loden’s command vehicle) stopped some yards short of Pilot Row; the Ferret car stopped to its side and a little behind; and the other vehicles lined up in turn behind these two, as can be seen from an enlargement of a photograph taken by Ciaran Donnelly, which we have reproduced in full above,1and from a photograph taken by Liam Mailey, both of which are shown below.
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69.4 Private 037 drove Major Loden in the command vehicle.1Warrant Officer Class II Lewis, the Company Sergeant Major (CSM), was also in this vehicle,2as were two radio operators, Lance Corporal 0333and Lance Corporal INQ 627.4
1 B1635-B1636; Day 357/122-126
2 B2111.012-013
3 B1617; B1621.001; B1621.003-4
4 C627.2-4; Day 324/35
69.5 Corporal INQ 993 drove the Ferret scout car.1Corporal INQ 1826 also travelled in this vehicle.2Private INQ 665 was another Ferret car driver. Although this soldier told us he was sure that he was not with C Company,3we are of the view that he was mistaken about this, as he also told us that he drove through a barrier which most of the company crossed on foot; and that he then drove to the corner of Little James Street and William Street where he went “static ”.4Sergeant INQ 1822 initially thought that he was in a Ferret car attached to Support Company, perhaps with Corporal INQ 993, but later in his oral evidence said that he now thought that he was mistaken about this and that he had in fact accompanied Private INQ 665 and C Company.5
1 C993.1-3; Day 340/2-4
2 C1826.1-3; Day 341/126
3 Day 356/162
4 C665.1-4
5 Day 340/71-73; Day 340/93-94
69.6 Behind these vehicles were the two APCs of Machine Gun Platoon. As noted, these were empty save for their drivers and (possibly) guards. Private 005 drove one of these vehicles1and it seems likely that Private INQ 439 drove the other.2Whether vehicle guards accompanied them is not clear. Private 005 recollected that he was on his own, but Private INQ 1544 (a member of Machine Gun Platoon) told us that he recalled guarding an APC close to the Rossville Flats.3
1 B1373
2 C439.2
3 C1544.2
Composite Platoon
69.7 The next two vehicles, the two soft-skinned lorries, contained Composite Platoon (Guinness Force). As we have explained earlier in this report,1this platoon was a rifle platoon made up of soldiers who had other regular duties, such as administrative, band and catering tasks. Captain 200, the officer commanding Composite Platoon, described it as follows:2
“When the whole battalion is employed in an operation the Administrative Company provides an operational force in the form of a composite platoon usually known as guiness force. This operates under the command of the officer commanding Administrative Company and for the operations of 30 January was commanded by me. In those operations guiness force was used to strengthen Support Company. ”
1 Paragraph 12.53 2B2022.024
69.8 Another, and less formal, description of Guinness Force was contained in the January 1972 edition of Pegasus, the magazine of the Parachute Regiment:
“Guinness Force is the nickname given to Admin Company when it turns out as a Rifle Company. This stalwart body, consisting of Quartermaster’s staff, Orderly Room Clerks, Pay Clerks, Bandsmen, off duty Dog Handlers, spare Drummers and not infrequently volunteer drivers and signallers from Command Company, was first formed during the severe rioting in Bligh’s Lane, Londonderry, in July this year. ”
69.9 On 29th January 1972 Captain 200 made a manuscript list1 of the 36 members of his platoon who were to be in service the following day. The list was typed “prior to our movement ”2 with notations in manuscript added to the typescript following the engagement.3 The call sign for the first lorry, with Captain 200 in command, was 71, while that for the second lorry, commanded by Colour Sergeant 002, was 71A. Captain 200’s list makes the following division of the soldiers between the two call signs:
71
71A
Captain 200
Colour Sergeant 002
Warrant Officer Class II INQ 1710
Sergeant 014
Colour Sergeant INQ 147
Sergeant 035
Sergeant 106
Sergeant K
Sergeant INQ 1318
Corporal 039
Corporal INQ 468
Corporal INQ 25
Corporal INQ 739
Corporal INQ 812
Corporal INQ 993
Lance Corporal D
Lance Corporal 229
Lance Corporal 010
Lance Corporal INQ 391
Lance Corporal INQ 816
Lance Corporal INQ 704
Private L
Lance Corporal INQ 1077
Private M
Lance Corporal INQ 11754
Private 032
Lance Corporal INQ 2047
Private INQ 127
Bandsman INQ 1854
Private INQ 405
Private C
Private INQ 449
Private 024
Private INQ 748
Private 203
Private INQ 24
1 B2022.063
2 Day 367/50
3 B2022.064
4 When the Inquiry approached Lance Corporal INQ 1175, he told us that he was not present on Bloody Sunday and was attending a course in England on that day. It is possible therefore that the soldier named in the unredacted version of Captain 200’s list was another soldier with the same surname, who has not been traced. The surname is a common one, so this is a real possibility.
69.10 In the event, we are satisfied that the allocations for call sign 71A reflect what occurred on the day. The driver of this vehicle was Private INQ 405.1 Colour Sergeant 002’s radio operator was Private INQ 127.2
1 C405.001
2 B2022.064; Day 360/130
69.11 The allocations for call sign 71, however, have discrepancies. Corporal INQ 993 was driving the Ferret scout car on the day.1 Bandsman INQ 18542 told us that he stayed in the area in front of the Presbyterian church off Great James Street and never went into the Bogside, though he may be mistaken about this, since he also told us that he had no recollection of his colleagues in Composite Platoon going in either. In addition, Private 2033 and Lance Corporal INQ 20474 recalled, in our view mistakenly, that they, and in the case of Lance Corporal INQ 2047, all the soldiers of this call sign, went in on foot.
1 Day 340/2
2 C1854.3
3 Day 306/84
4 C2047.2
69.12 Six soldiers from Composite Platoon claimed to have fired (in total) 15 live rounds in Sector 3.
Anti-Tank Platoon
69.13 Anti-Tank Platoon were in the ninth and tenth (the last two) of the vehicles that entered the Bogside. Both these vehicles were APCs.
69.14 Lieutenant 119 commanded the first of these two vehicles.1His radio operator was Private 0272and his driver Private INQ 1581.3Corporal E4and Private H5also travelled in this vehicle. For the reason given below,6we think it likely that Private INQ 635 and Private INQ 1558 were also in this vehicle.
1 B1752.043
2 Day 364/2-5
3 B1752.012
4 B106
5 B233
6 Paragraph 69.16
69.15 Sergeant INQ 1694 commanded the second of these APCs.1Private 147 was his radio operator and Lance Corporal 036 the driver.2Lance Corporal F,3Lance Corporal J4and Private G also travelled in this vehicle. In addition it is likely that Lance Corporal 0185and Private Longstaff6were in this vehicle. Private INQ 1237 told us that he was in the same vehicle as Lance Corporal F and Private 027 and possibly Private Longstaff.7In our view he was mistaken about this, as Lance Corporal F and Private 027 travelled in different vehicles. However, Private INQ 1237 also told us that at the end of the operation he was in the same vehicle as Lance Corporal F and Lance Corporal J. In our view he too probably travelled in the second APC.
1 B1752.012
2 B1886
3 B145
4 B276-7
5 B1491
6 Day 374/65
7 C1237.4
69.16 According to the nominal roll of Anti-Tank Platoon, 17 soldiers of this platoon were deployed on Bloody Sunday. In the case of two soldiers (Private INQ 635 and Private INQ 1558) it is not apparent from the evidence in which APC they travelled. Private INQ 635 told us he had no recollection,1while Private INQ 1558 gave no evidence of any kind. However, to put these in the second APC would mean a significant imbalance in the numbers in each APC, and so on the whole we consider that, as noted above,2they probably travelled in Lieutenant 119’s APC.
1 Day 352/4 2Paragraph 69.14
69.17 Private INQ 1940 told us that he did not travel in either of the APCs, but went in on foot after receiving an order from Warrant Officer Class II Lewis to act as an escort for persons under arrest.1We do not know whether or not he was correct in this recollection.
1 C1940.2; Day 315/102-110
69.18 Five soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon claimed to have fired (in total) 14 live rounds in Sector 3.
Summary of the disposition of the soldiers in Sector 3
69.19 The tables below show the weapon carried by each soldier and, in some cases, his position of command or other specific role. The evidence on these issues is not wholly consistent; for example, Private G told the Royal Military Police (RMP) that two members of Anti-Tank Platoon carried baton guns and 16 carried self-loading rifles (SLRs),1but the other evidence indicates that there were only 17 members of Anti-Tank Platoon present on the day, of whom only one is known to have carried a baton gun. Confusion may have been caused by the fact that some soldiers initially carried baton guns and then exchanged these guns for SLRs. Captain 200’s annotated list of members of Composite Platoon2indicates that at least three soldiers with baton guns had sub-machine guns, as did the signallers. According to Captain 200’s oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry,3five soldiers had baton guns. Major Loden, in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, said that three members of Composite Platoon who carried baton guns also carried sub-machine guns.4The tables below show what weapons the soldiers were in our view probably carrying. For the sake of completeness, we include in these tables the soldiers of Mortar Platoon who were involved in the events of Sector 3.
1 B168
2 B2022.064
3 WT15.40
4 B2217; WT12.5
Sergeant O’s Armoured Personnel Carrier
Corporal P
SLR1
Section Commander2
Private 017
Baton gun and SLR3
Private U
SLR4
Private 112
Baton gun5 and SLR6
1 B576
2 B623.011
3 Private 017 told this Inquiry that he deployed initially with a baton gun alone, having left his SLR in the APC (B1484.001). He told this Inquiry that, after seeing a gunman, he returned to the APC and exchanged the baton gun for his SLR (B1484.005).
4 B748
5 B1730
6 Private 112 told this Inquiry that at some stage he put away his baton gun and took out his SLR (B1732.006).
Major Loden’s command vehicle
Major Loden
Officer Commanding Support Company
Warrant Officer Class II Lewis
Pistol1
Company Sergeant Major, Support Company2
Lance Corporal 033
SLR3
Radio operator for Major Loden
Lance Corporal INQ 627
SLR4
Radio operator for Major Loden
Private 037
SLR5
Driver6
1 B2111.012
2 B2111.006
3 B1617
4 C627.2
5 B1636.014
6 B1635
Ferret scout car
Corporal INQ 993
Sterling sub-machine gun (SMG)1
Driver2
Corporal INQ 1826
Sterling sub-machine gun3
In charge of Ferret cars4
1 C993.4; C1826.2
2 C993.2
3 C993.4; C1826.2
4 C1826.1
Machine Gun Platoon Armoured Personnel Carriers
Private 005
SLR1
Driver2
Private INQ 439
SLR3
Driver4
Private INQ 1544 (?)
SLR5
Vehicle guard (?)
1 B1374.003
2 B1373-4
3 C439.2
4 C439.1-2
5 C1544.3
First Composite Platoon lorry
Captain 200
Platoon Commander
Warrant Officer Class II INQ 1710
Baton gun and SMG1
Captain 200’s bodyguard2
Colour Sergeant INQ 147
Probably SLR3,4
Sergeant 106
SLR5
Section Commander6
Sergeant INQ 1318
SLR7
Corporal INQ 468
Baton gun and SLR8
Corporal INQ 739
SLR9
Lance Corporal 229
SLR10
Lance Corporal INQ 391
SLR11
Driver12
Lance Corporal INQ 704
Baton gun and SLR13,14
Lance Corporal INQ 1077
SMG15
Radio operator16
Lance Corporal INQ 1175
Probably SLR (whether he or another soldier with the same name was present on Bloody Sunday)17
Lance Corporal INQ 2047
Probably SLR18,19
Bandsman INQ 1854
SLR20
Private C
SLR21
Private 024
SLR22
Private 203
Baton gun23and SLR24
Private INQ 24
SMG25
Radio operator26
1 B2022.064
2 B2001; Day 367/28
3 C147.2
4 Colour Sergeant INQ 147 could not recall the type of weapon that he carried. The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Colour Sergeant INQ 147 was issued with an SMG.
5 B1713.001-002
6 B1713.001
7 C1318.1; Day 354/160
8 C468.1
9 C739.2
10 B2208; B2211.002
11 C391.3
12 C391.2
13 B2022.064
14 Lance Corporal INQ 704 did not give evidence to this Inquiry.
15 C1077.2
16 C1077.2
17 The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Lance Corporal INQ 1175 (or a soldier with the same name) was issued with an SMG.
18 C2047.2
19 Lance Corporal INQ 2047 could not recall the type of weapon that he carried. The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Lance Corporal INQ 2047 was issued with an SMG.
20 C1854.1
21 B44
22 B1527
23 B2022.064
24 B2022.064; B2114.006
25 C24.1
26 C24.1
Second Composite Platoon lorry
Colour Sergeant 002
SLR1
Commander, 71A2
Sergeant 014
SLR3
Section Commander4,5
Sergeant 035
SLR6
Section Commander7,8
Sergeant K
SLR or sniper rifle9
Corporal 039
Baton gun and SMG10
Corporal INQ 25
No firearm11,12
Corporal INQ 812
SLR13
Lance Corporal D
SLR14
Lance Corporal 010
Baton gun15,16
Lance Corporal INQ 816
SLR17
Private L
SLR18
Private M
SLR19
Private 032
SLR20,21
Private INQ 127
SMG22
Radio operator23
Private INQ 405
SLR or SMG24,25
Driver26
Private INQ 449
SLR27
Private INQ 748
SLR or SMG28
1 B1349
2 B1348; B1351.001; B2022.64
3 B1412.002
4 B1409; B1412.001
5 Sergeant 014 was in command of eight members of Composite Platoon, including Private L and Private 032 (B1412.004; Day 372/4; B1613).
6 B1625
7 B1625
8 Sergeant 035 was in command of a section of four men.
9 Captain 200’s evidence was that all members of Composite Platoon who did not carry an SMG carried an SLR. However, a note made by him after the event suggests that Composite Platoon had been issued with a sniper rifle (B2022.061). The note does not identify the soldier to whom the rifle was issued. However, there is some evidence (considered elsewhere) which shows that Sergeant K was armed with a sniper rifle.
10 B1649; B364
11 C25.1-2
12 Corporal INQ 25 is shown in a photograph taken by Constable Robert S Simpson of the Royal Ulster Constabulary carrying only a baton.
13 C812.1
14 B70
15 B1395.002; B1395.006-7; Day 355/83-4
16 Lance Corporal 010 told this Inquiry that he was not carrying an SLR or pistol.
17 C816.2
18 B312
19 B347
20 Day 362/1
21 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private 032 said that he thought that he was carrying an SMG (B1616.001-2). When he gave oral evidence, he said that he had been carrying an SLR. In our view his oral evidence is likely to be correct.
22 C127.2
23 Day 360/129-130
24 C391.3; C405.1
25 The evidence of Lance Corporal INQ 391 was that Private INQ 405 was issued with an SLR. This evidence is consistent with Captain 200’s list (B2022.064). However, Private INQ 405’s own evidence was that he was carrying an SMG (C405.1). In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 405 told us: “I was carrying an SMG. The majority of Guinness Force would have had SLRs … 9mm were sometimes used, but not for a job like this. I had a magazine on the SMG and two spare magazines, 60 rounds in total. ” It remains unclear whether Private INQ 405 was carrying an SLR or an SMG.
26 C391.2
27 C449.4
28 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 748 told us that he had an SLR (C748.2-3). Captain 200’s list (B2022.064) suggests that Private INQ 748 was issued with an SMG. It remains unclear whether Private INQ 748 was carrying an SLR or SMG.
First Anti-Tank Platoon Armoured Personnel Carrier
Lieutenant 119
SLR1
Platoon Commander2
Corporal E
SLR3
Section Commander4,5
Private H
SLR6
Private 027
SLR7
Radio operator8
Private INQ 635
SLR9
Private INQ 155810
Private INQ 1581
SLR11
Driver12
1 B1752.014
2 B1752.009
3 B86
4 B86; B264
5 Corporal E’s section consisted of Lance Corporal F, Private G and Private H.
6 B219
7 B1548
8 B1546
9 C635.2
10 This soldier did not give evidence to this Inquiry.
11 C1581.2
12 C1581.2
Second Anti-Tank Platoon Armoured Personnel Carrier
Sergeant INQ 16941
Section Commander
Lance Corporal F
SLR2
Lance Corporal J
SLR3
Lance Corporal 018
Baton gun4
Lance Corporal 036
SLR5
Driver6
Private G
SLR7
Private Longstaff
SLR8
Private 147
SLR9
Radio operator10
Private INQ 1237
SLR11
1 Sergeant INQ 1694 died before this Inquiry was established.
2 B121
3 B265
4 B1485
5 B1631.12
6 In his RMP statement Lance Corporal 036 recorded that he drove an APC along Rossville Street (B1629). Although he told this Inquiry that he did not drive a vehicle on Bloody Sunday, on being shown his RMP statement he accepted that it was possible that he had done so, though he could not remember doing so (B1631.11).
7 B168-9
8 C23.4
9 B1891.002
10 B1889
11 C1237.4
Unknown
Private INQ 19401
SLR2
1 This soldier’s evidence was that he went in on foot after receiving an order from Warrant Officer Class II Lewis to act as an escort for persons under arrest (C1940.2;
Mortar Platoon soldiers in Sector 3
69.20 In the course of our consideration of the events of Sector 2,1we explained that Corporal P and Private 017 disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC when it briefly stopped in Rossville Street, before it continued and turned into the car park of the Rossville Flats. Unlike the other soldiers who disembarked in Rossville Street from this APC, Corporal P and Private 017 (a baton gunner) crossed to the western side of Rossville Street. At this stage they were in front (ie to the south) of the other soldiers coming into Sector 3, and so it is convenient to start with their movements. We have referred to their accounts of hearing incoming fire in the context of Sector 2,2but for the sake of clarity we shall refer again to their evidence on this topic in discussing the events of Sector 3.
69.21 Private U of Mortar Platoon was also involved in the events of Sector 3. We return to consider this soldier later in this report.1
Corporal P
69.22 According to his first RMP statement timed at 2230 hours on 30th January 1972,1Corporal P had cocked his rifle no later than when he was in the APC. When he disembarked he “and two others ” deployed to the right of the APC (ie to the west) and “immediately came under heavy stoning and bottling from the rioters ”. His statement continued:
“About 20 of the rioters were advancing towards us and were throwing stones and other missiles at us continually. One of the two chaps with me and armed with a anti riot gun fired a number of rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse the 20 who were attacking us. They were about 50 metres away at this time. The rioters on being hit by these rubber bullets split up. ”
69.23 According to this statement it was at this stage that Corporal P saw a nail bomber at the back of the crowd and fired two shots; and a little later that he fired at a man holding a pistol. We return later in this report1to this part of Corporal P’s account and to his firing of further shots.
69.24 In this statement Corporal P recorded that he went to the right of the APC with two others. One of these, as already noted, was the baton gunner Private 017, but whether there was a third soldier remains unclear. Corporal P did not mention a third soldier in his later evidence; and none of the other soldiers who disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street claimed to have moved to the western side of that street. In our view Corporal P was probably mistaken in referring to a third soldier, though it is possible that one of the others may temporarily have gone in that direction before moving back to the eastern side of the street.
69.25 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Corporal P gave the following description:
“When the vehicle stopped the section got out and split into twos and threes in order to make arrests. I was with another soldier. It was at this time that I cocked my rifle. As we got out of the vehicle I noticed a small crowd in the area in front of a wall on the left-hand side (from the direction I was looking) of the low rise flats in front of Columbcille Court. The crowd were throwing missiles in the general direction of the troops on the ground in front of the Rossville Flats. I was wearing a gas mask and I signalled to the soldier I was with to advance in the direction of the crowd in order to make arrests. As we moved across Rossville Street they dispersed up the alley way into Columbcille Court and the alleyway to the left of Columbcille Court (from the direction I was looking). By the time we reached the wall the crowd had dispersed. Upon reaching the wall we came under fire from roughly the direction of the barricade. At that time I could not see anyone firing at us. There were two shots which I thought to be high velocity shots. They appeared to go over our heads as I heard the crack of the round going overhead. We then took cover along-side the wall. Shortly after this we noticed a group of people coming along the alleyway who started stoning and bottling us. The soldier I was with then fired a number of baton rounds into the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. The crowd on being hit split up… ”
69.26 It will be noted that in this account Corporal P described hearing two shots that he stated he believed to be high velocity and coming from “roughly ” the direction of the rubble barricade. Corporal P continued with a description of then seeing and firing at a nail bomber at the back of the crowd and at a man with a pistol, and of later shots, to which we return below.1
69.27 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Corporal P said that when he disembarked there was a crowd of people on the waste ground and another crowd “across the road from us ”. Both crowds were rioting, “throwing stones, bottles, all sorts of missiles ”.1
69.28 Corporal P then gave a description of moving to a wall on the Kells Walk side of the street, and of hearing two shots that had come from the direction of the barricade. He told the Widgery Inquiry that there were quite a few people behind the barricade, throwing stones or moving back to Free Derry Corner. He said that there were only one or two people on his side of the barricade, trying to cross to the other side of the barricade, but that he then noticed “a group of people coming out from the Columbcille Court alleyway and they started stoning us and bottling us ”. The other soldier he was with fired some baton rounds to disperse them.1He then again described his firing, to which we return below.2
69.29 Corporal P gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. In his written account1he told us that he had very little recollection of the day, but that he relied on what he had said in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.2
69.30 In his oral evidence to the present Inquiry, Corporal P said that Bloody Sunday was the only time he had fired live rounds, apart from on the rifle ranges, but despite this he said that he had practically no memory of the day.1He could give no explanation for why he had told the RMP that his rifle had been cocked while he was in the APC, whereas he had told the Widgery Inquiry that he had cocked it on disembarking,2nor for the fact that there was no mention in his RMP statement of the two shots he told the Widgery Inquiry that he had heard.
69.31 We return to Corporal P’s evidence later in this report,1when we consider the firing by soldiers in Sector 3.
69.32 In his first RMP statement timed at 0130 hours on 31st January 1972, Private 017 described how, armed only with a baton gun, he disembarked and moved to a position near a low wall to the north-west of the northernmost block of the Rossville Flats:1
“A barricade had been erected by the crowd in Rossville St some 60 metres to my front. This barricade was made up of bricks and rubble. There was a rioting crowd at the barricade and they were stoning troops who deployed around the flats. I fired a number of baton rounds at the crowd. They stoned me. A group of about 4 to 5 male youths came close to me around the corner of a wall to my right. They stoned me heavily. I realised that I could make an arrest from this small group and prepared to rush forward. As I ran towards the corner I saw a man walk around the corner towards me. ”
69.33 Private 017 then explained that this man was carrying a handgun, and gave an account of firing a baton round at him. We consider this evidence later in this report.1
69.34 Private 017 made a second RMP statement timed at 2030 hours on 4th February 1972,1in which he described being behind a brick wall about 10m from No 2 Columbcille Court. He stated that there was a crowd of about 50 people milling around in front of the barricade. “They rushed towards me so I fired one round from my rubber bullet gun, which split them up. ” Private 017 then gave a description of seeing a man come from behind the crowd with what he took to be a nail bomb, at whom Corporal P, “who was located just behind me ”, fired one shot. The man fell, the bomb did not go off, and the crowd carried the man away. We return to this part of Private 017’s evidence when considering below2the firing by Corporal P.
69.35 The brick wall about 10m from 2 Columbcille Court is the wall near which Private 017 can be seen in photographs that we consider below.1
69.36 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Private 017 gave this account:1,2
“2. About 4.10 that afternoon my platoon debussed at the north end of Block 1 of Rossville Flats. Whilst we had been moving to this position in our vehicles we could hear stones continuously hitting our armoured vehicle and on leaving the vehicle we were surrounded by a large crowd who were milling about the area of the front of the flats and in Rossville Street and the other side of the road and a lot of stones and debris was thrown in my direction.
3. Immediately after leaving the vehicle and together with soldier ‘P’ who was armed with an SLR as a protection for myself I went across Rossville Street to the side of a wall in front of Columbcille Court. Soon after we took up this position I heard two single high velocity shots which I believe may have come from around the area of Rossville Flats but I am not sure what the direction of the fire was. There was a crowd of about 50 people in front of the barricade in Rossville Street, they rushed towards me so I fired one round from my rubber bullet gun which split the crowd up. ”
69.37 This statement continued with Private 017’s account of seeing a nail bomber who had come from behind this crowd and who was shot by Corporal P; of the crowd then retreating behind the rubble barricade; of people running in and out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court and throwing stones and bottles in the direction of the two soldiers; and of then firing his baton gun at a man with a handgun who came round the corner of that alleyway. We deal with the man with the handgun below.1
69.38 Private 017 gave written1and oral evidence2to this Inquiry. As already noted,3though in his written statement he told us that he was pretty sure that he had been in the leading APC, in his oral evidence he said that this was wrong and that he had been in Sergeant O’s vehicle. For reasons already given,4we take the view that he had indeed travelled with Sergeant O.
69.39 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private 017 described firing a rubber bullet and chasing the crowd after he disembarked from the APC. The crowd generally moved south and “A lot of them joined the main crowd at a barricade across Rossville Street ”. He stated that he initially made his way to a point that he described as the north-east corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats (although on a map1he marked it as the entrance to the access road leading from Rossville Street to the car park of the Rossville Flats), and that he then crossed to the west side of Rossville Street. He told us that at this stage he heard some shots but did not know where they were coming from and did not think that they were aimed at him. He also told us that he was being stoned. His statement continued:2
“23. A group mainly of youths aged 20 to 25, broke away from the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade and made four or five half hearted approaches towards me. They were trying to urge the rest of the crowd to join them. They were shouting ‘Get him ’. They would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me. Crowds had killed soldiers before. I felt very vulnerable there on my own.
24. I fired two or three rubber bullets into the riot. Shortly afterwards P joined me. He cannot have been far behind me because I think I was only there for seconds before he joined me.
25. The next thing I remember is that a large group of people (40 to 50) ran out of an alleyway that was on our right, leading from Rossville Street to Columbcille Court (grid reference J13). The crowd turned and ran south to join the main group of rioters at the Rubble Barricade. I didn’t fire any rubber bullets as the group ran past but once they joined the rest of the crowd I fired a steady trickle of rubber bullets to contain them. In all, I think I fired 12–15 rubber bullets that day. ”
69.40 After giving a description of Corporal P shouting a warning about a nail bomber, and of hearing him fire, Private 017 stated:1
“29. Not long after that, I looked west down the alleyway immediately to my right (the one leading to Columbcille Court). I could see rubble and old prams lying around, across the alleyway. Four or five youths had formed a line and were throwing bottles or bricks towards me. In particular, I saw a guy with long hair and I decided to arrest him. As I ran forward, the youths doubled back and ran away and I saw a man with a pistol come around the corner, from the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, into the alleyway towards me. The gunman was about 20 to 30 yards from me. I don’t remember which hand his gun was in, but I could see that it was a pistol. He was pointing it in my direction. I fired a rubber bullet at him and he shied away. I then ran round the corner, back into Rossville Street and called P. I can’t be certain, as I did so, whether or not the man with the pistol fired at me, but I think that he did. The gunman was a young man, not fat but of normal build. If I had seen him again that day I would have recognised him. ”
69.41 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 said that he had fired his baton gun at the crowd, rather than bouncing the rounds off the ground. He agreed that he had probably fired his baton gun soon after disembarking from the APC, although the crowd was running away, to “Keep ’em moving ”.1He also corrected his written statement, in which he had recorded that he had initially made his way to a point on the eastern side of Rossville Street, agreeing that he had only later gone to that position, having first gone to the western side of Rossville Street.2
69.42 Private 017 said that at this stage he had heard what he thought was high velocity fire, but could not say how many shots he had heard. Asked how big the crowd was at the barricade, he estimated the number at “around 100 ”. Asked what they were doing, he said:1
“They were mainly behind the barricade. On occasions they charged forward and stopped in front of the barricade and then went back; they were making half-hearted attempts to charge. ”
69.44 During his oral evidence Private 017 was asked to look at a photograph, which was taken by the Irish Press photographer Colman Doyle, and to which we have already referred1when considering, in our discussion of the events of Sector 2, the arrest of William John Dillon:
1 B1635-B1636; Day 357/122-126
2 B2111.012-013
3 B1617; B1621.001; B1621.003-4
4 C627.2-4; Day 324/35
69.5 Corporal INQ 993 drove the Ferret scout car.1Corporal INQ 1826 also travelled in this vehicle.2Private INQ 665 was another Ferret car driver. Although this soldier told us he was sure that he was not with C Company,3we are of the view that he was mistaken about this, as he also told us that he drove through a barrier which most of the company crossed on foot; and that he then drove to the corner of Little James Street and William Street where he went “static ”.4Sergeant INQ 1822 initially thought that he was in a Ferret car attached to Support Company, perhaps with Corporal INQ 993, but later in his oral evidence said that he now thought that he was mistaken about this and that he had in fact accompanied Private INQ 665 and C Company.5
1 C993.1-3; Day 340/2-4
2 C1826.1-3; Day 341/126
3 Day 356/162
4 C665.1-4
5 Day 340/71-73; Day 340/93-94
69.6 Behind these vehicles were the two APCs of Machine Gun Platoon. As noted, these were empty save for their drivers and (possibly) guards. Private 005 drove one of these vehicles1and it seems likely that Private INQ 439 drove the other.2Whether vehicle guards accompanied them is not clear. Private 005 recollected that he was on his own, but Private INQ 1544 (a member of Machine Gun Platoon) told us that he recalled guarding an APC close to the Rossville Flats.3
1 B1373
2 C439.2
3 C1544.2
Composite Platoon
69.7 The next two vehicles, the two soft-skinned lorries, contained Composite Platoon (Guinness Force). As we have explained earlier in this report,1this platoon was a rifle platoon made up of soldiers who had other regular duties, such as administrative, band and catering tasks. Captain 200, the officer commanding Composite Platoon, described it as follows:2
“When the whole battalion is employed in an operation the Administrative Company provides an operational force in the form of a composite platoon usually known as guiness force. This operates under the command of the officer commanding Administrative Company and for the operations of 30 January was commanded by me. In those operations guiness force was used to strengthen Support Company. ”
1 Paragraph 12.53 2B2022.024
69.8 Another, and less formal, description of Guinness Force was contained in the January 1972 edition of Pegasus, the magazine of the Parachute Regiment:
“Guinness Force is the nickname given to Admin Company when it turns out as a Rifle Company. This stalwart body, consisting of Quartermaster’s staff, Orderly Room Clerks, Pay Clerks, Bandsmen, off duty Dog Handlers, spare Drummers and not infrequently volunteer drivers and signallers from Command Company, was first formed during the severe rioting in Bligh’s Lane, Londonderry, in July this year. ”
69.9 On 29th January 1972 Captain 200 made a manuscript list1 of the 36 members of his platoon who were to be in service the following day. The list was typed “prior to our movement ”2 with notations in manuscript added to the typescript following the engagement.3 The call sign for the first lorry, with Captain 200 in command, was 71, while that for the second lorry, commanded by Colour Sergeant 002, was 71A. Captain 200’s list makes the following division of the soldiers between the two call signs:
71
71A
Captain 200
Colour Sergeant 002
Warrant Officer Class II INQ 1710
Sergeant 014
Colour Sergeant INQ 147
Sergeant 035
Sergeant 106
Sergeant K
Sergeant INQ 1318
Corporal 039
Corporal INQ 468
Corporal INQ 25
Corporal INQ 739
Corporal INQ 812
Corporal INQ 993
Lance Corporal D
Lance Corporal 229
Lance Corporal 010
Lance Corporal INQ 391
Lance Corporal INQ 816
Lance Corporal INQ 704
Private L
Lance Corporal INQ 1077
Private M
Lance Corporal INQ 11754
Private 032
Lance Corporal INQ 2047
Private INQ 127
Bandsman INQ 1854
Private INQ 405
Private C
Private INQ 449
Private 024
Private INQ 748
Private 203
Private INQ 24
1 B2022.063
2 Day 367/50
3 B2022.064
4 When the Inquiry approached Lance Corporal INQ 1175, he told us that he was not present on Bloody Sunday and was attending a course in England on that day. It is possible therefore that the soldier named in the unredacted version of Captain 200’s list was another soldier with the same surname, who has not been traced. The surname is a common one, so this is a real possibility.
69.10 In the event, we are satisfied that the allocations for call sign 71A reflect what occurred on the day. The driver of this vehicle was Private INQ 405.1 Colour Sergeant 002’s radio operator was Private INQ 127.2
1 C405.001
2 B2022.064; Day 360/130
69.11 The allocations for call sign 71, however, have discrepancies. Corporal INQ 993 was driving the Ferret scout car on the day.1 Bandsman INQ 18542 told us that he stayed in the area in front of the Presbyterian church off Great James Street and never went into the Bogside, though he may be mistaken about this, since he also told us that he had no recollection of his colleagues in Composite Platoon going in either. In addition, Private 2033 and Lance Corporal INQ 20474 recalled, in our view mistakenly, that they, and in the case of Lance Corporal INQ 2047, all the soldiers of this call sign, went in on foot.
1 Day 340/2
2 C1854.3
3 Day 306/84
4 C2047.2
69.12 Six soldiers from Composite Platoon claimed to have fired (in total) 15 live rounds in Sector 3.
Anti-Tank Platoon
69.13 Anti-Tank Platoon were in the ninth and tenth (the last two) of the vehicles that entered the Bogside. Both these vehicles were APCs.
69.14 Lieutenant 119 commanded the first of these two vehicles.1His radio operator was Private 0272and his driver Private INQ 1581.3Corporal E4and Private H5also travelled in this vehicle. For the reason given below,6we think it likely that Private INQ 635 and Private INQ 1558 were also in this vehicle.
1 B1752.043
2 Day 364/2-5
3 B1752.012
4 B106
5 B233
6 Paragraph 69.16
69.15 Sergeant INQ 1694 commanded the second of these APCs.1Private 147 was his radio operator and Lance Corporal 036 the driver.2Lance Corporal F,3Lance Corporal J4and Private G also travelled in this vehicle. In addition it is likely that Lance Corporal 0185and Private Longstaff6were in this vehicle. Private INQ 1237 told us that he was in the same vehicle as Lance Corporal F and Private 027 and possibly Private Longstaff.7In our view he was mistaken about this, as Lance Corporal F and Private 027 travelled in different vehicles. However, Private INQ 1237 also told us that at the end of the operation he was in the same vehicle as Lance Corporal F and Lance Corporal J. In our view he too probably travelled in the second APC.
1 B1752.012
2 B1886
3 B145
4 B276-7
5 B1491
6 Day 374/65
7 C1237.4
69.16 According to the nominal roll of Anti-Tank Platoon, 17 soldiers of this platoon were deployed on Bloody Sunday. In the case of two soldiers (Private INQ 635 and Private INQ 1558) it is not apparent from the evidence in which APC they travelled. Private INQ 635 told us he had no recollection,1while Private INQ 1558 gave no evidence of any kind. However, to put these in the second APC would mean a significant imbalance in the numbers in each APC, and so on the whole we consider that, as noted above,2they probably travelled in Lieutenant 119’s APC.
1 Day 352/4 2Paragraph 69.14
69.17 Private INQ 1940 told us that he did not travel in either of the APCs, but went in on foot after receiving an order from Warrant Officer Class II Lewis to act as an escort for persons under arrest.1We do not know whether or not he was correct in this recollection.
1 C1940.2; Day 315/102-110
69.18 Five soldiers from Anti-Tank Platoon claimed to have fired (in total) 14 live rounds in Sector 3.
Summary of the disposition of the soldiers in Sector 3
69.19 The tables below show the weapon carried by each soldier and, in some cases, his position of command or other specific role. The evidence on these issues is not wholly consistent; for example, Private G told the Royal Military Police (RMP) that two members of Anti-Tank Platoon carried baton guns and 16 carried self-loading rifles (SLRs),1but the other evidence indicates that there were only 17 members of Anti-Tank Platoon present on the day, of whom only one is known to have carried a baton gun. Confusion may have been caused by the fact that some soldiers initially carried baton guns and then exchanged these guns for SLRs. Captain 200’s annotated list of members of Composite Platoon2indicates that at least three soldiers with baton guns had sub-machine guns, as did the signallers. According to Captain 200’s oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry,3five soldiers had baton guns. Major Loden, in his evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, said that three members of Composite Platoon who carried baton guns also carried sub-machine guns.4The tables below show what weapons the soldiers were in our view probably carrying. For the sake of completeness, we include in these tables the soldiers of Mortar Platoon who were involved in the events of Sector 3.
1 B168
2 B2022.064
3 WT15.40
4 B2217; WT12.5
Sergeant O’s Armoured Personnel Carrier
Corporal P
SLR1
Section Commander2
Private 017
Baton gun and SLR3
Private U
SLR4
Private 112
Baton gun5 and SLR6
1 B576
2 B623.011
3 Private 017 told this Inquiry that he deployed initially with a baton gun alone, having left his SLR in the APC (B1484.001). He told this Inquiry that, after seeing a gunman, he returned to the APC and exchanged the baton gun for his SLR (B1484.005).
4 B748
5 B1730
6 Private 112 told this Inquiry that at some stage he put away his baton gun and took out his SLR (B1732.006).
Major Loden’s command vehicle
Major Loden
Officer Commanding Support Company
Warrant Officer Class II Lewis
Pistol1
Company Sergeant Major, Support Company2
Lance Corporal 033
SLR3
Radio operator for Major Loden
Lance Corporal INQ 627
SLR4
Radio operator for Major Loden
Private 037
SLR5
Driver6
1 B2111.012
2 B2111.006
3 B1617
4 C627.2
5 B1636.014
6 B1635
Ferret scout car
Corporal INQ 993
Sterling sub-machine gun (SMG)1
Driver2
Corporal INQ 1826
Sterling sub-machine gun3
In charge of Ferret cars4
1 C993.4; C1826.2
2 C993.2
3 C993.4; C1826.2
4 C1826.1
Machine Gun Platoon Armoured Personnel Carriers
Private 005
SLR1
Driver2
Private INQ 439
SLR3
Driver4
Private INQ 1544 (?)
SLR5
Vehicle guard (?)
1 B1374.003
2 B1373-4
3 C439.2
4 C439.1-2
5 C1544.3
First Composite Platoon lorry
Captain 200
Platoon Commander
Warrant Officer Class II INQ 1710
Baton gun and SMG1
Captain 200’s bodyguard2
Colour Sergeant INQ 147
Probably SLR3,4
Sergeant 106
SLR5
Section Commander6
Sergeant INQ 1318
SLR7
Corporal INQ 468
Baton gun and SLR8
Corporal INQ 739
SLR9
Lance Corporal 229
SLR10
Lance Corporal INQ 391
SLR11
Driver12
Lance Corporal INQ 704
Baton gun and SLR13,14
Lance Corporal INQ 1077
SMG15
Radio operator16
Lance Corporal INQ 1175
Probably SLR (whether he or another soldier with the same name was present on Bloody Sunday)17
Lance Corporal INQ 2047
Probably SLR18,19
Bandsman INQ 1854
SLR20
Private C
SLR21
Private 024
SLR22
Private 203
Baton gun23and SLR24
Private INQ 24
SMG25
Radio operator26
1 B2022.064
2 B2001; Day 367/28
3 C147.2
4 Colour Sergeant INQ 147 could not recall the type of weapon that he carried. The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Colour Sergeant INQ 147 was issued with an SMG.
5 B1713.001-002
6 B1713.001
7 C1318.1; Day 354/160
8 C468.1
9 C739.2
10 B2208; B2211.002
11 C391.3
12 C391.2
13 B2022.064
14 Lance Corporal INQ 704 did not give evidence to this Inquiry.
15 C1077.2
16 C1077.2
17 The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Lance Corporal INQ 1175 (or a soldier with the same name) was issued with an SMG.
18 C2047.2
19 Lance Corporal INQ 2047 could not recall the type of weapon that he carried. The evidence of Captain 200 was that men who were not carrying SMGs were issued with SLRs (WT15.40). There is no evidence to suggest that Lance Corporal INQ 2047 was issued with an SMG.
20 C1854.1
21 B44
22 B1527
23 B2022.064
24 B2022.064; B2114.006
25 C24.1
26 C24.1
Second Composite Platoon lorry
Colour Sergeant 002
SLR1
Commander, 71A2
Sergeant 014
SLR3
Section Commander4,5
Sergeant 035
SLR6
Section Commander7,8
Sergeant K
SLR or sniper rifle9
Corporal 039
Baton gun and SMG10
Corporal INQ 25
No firearm11,12
Corporal INQ 812
SLR13
Lance Corporal D
SLR14
Lance Corporal 010
Baton gun15,16
Lance Corporal INQ 816
SLR17
Private L
SLR18
Private M
SLR19
Private 032
SLR20,21
Private INQ 127
SMG22
Radio operator23
Private INQ 405
SLR or SMG24,25
Driver26
Private INQ 449
SLR27
Private INQ 748
SLR or SMG28
1 B1349
2 B1348; B1351.001; B2022.64
3 B1412.002
4 B1409; B1412.001
5 Sergeant 014 was in command of eight members of Composite Platoon, including Private L and Private 032 (B1412.004; Day 372/4; B1613).
6 B1625
7 B1625
8 Sergeant 035 was in command of a section of four men.
9 Captain 200’s evidence was that all members of Composite Platoon who did not carry an SMG carried an SLR. However, a note made by him after the event suggests that Composite Platoon had been issued with a sniper rifle (B2022.061). The note does not identify the soldier to whom the rifle was issued. However, there is some evidence (considered elsewhere) which shows that Sergeant K was armed with a sniper rifle.
10 B1649; B364
11 C25.1-2
12 Corporal INQ 25 is shown in a photograph taken by Constable Robert S Simpson of the Royal Ulster Constabulary carrying only a baton.
13 C812.1
14 B70
15 B1395.002; B1395.006-7; Day 355/83-4
16 Lance Corporal 010 told this Inquiry that he was not carrying an SLR or pistol.
17 C816.2
18 B312
19 B347
20 Day 362/1
21 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private 032 said that he thought that he was carrying an SMG (B1616.001-2). When he gave oral evidence, he said that he had been carrying an SLR. In our view his oral evidence is likely to be correct.
22 C127.2
23 Day 360/129-130
24 C391.3; C405.1
25 The evidence of Lance Corporal INQ 391 was that Private INQ 405 was issued with an SLR. This evidence is consistent with Captain 200’s list (B2022.064). However, Private INQ 405’s own evidence was that he was carrying an SMG (C405.1). In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 405 told us: “I was carrying an SMG. The majority of Guinness Force would have had SLRs … 9mm were sometimes used, but not for a job like this. I had a magazine on the SMG and two spare magazines, 60 rounds in total. ” It remains unclear whether Private INQ 405 was carrying an SLR or an SMG.
26 C391.2
27 C449.4
28 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private INQ 748 told us that he had an SLR (C748.2-3). Captain 200’s list (B2022.064) suggests that Private INQ 748 was issued with an SMG. It remains unclear whether Private INQ 748 was carrying an SLR or SMG.
First Anti-Tank Platoon Armoured Personnel Carrier
Lieutenant 119
SLR1
Platoon Commander2
Corporal E
SLR3
Section Commander4,5
Private H
SLR6
Private 027
SLR7
Radio operator8
Private INQ 635
SLR9
Private INQ 155810
Private INQ 1581
SLR11
Driver12
1 B1752.014
2 B1752.009
3 B86
4 B86; B264
5 Corporal E’s section consisted of Lance Corporal F, Private G and Private H.
6 B219
7 B1548
8 B1546
9 C635.2
10 This soldier did not give evidence to this Inquiry.
11 C1581.2
12 C1581.2
Second Anti-Tank Platoon Armoured Personnel Carrier
Sergeant INQ 16941
Section Commander
Lance Corporal F
SLR2
Lance Corporal J
SLR3
Lance Corporal 018
Baton gun4
Lance Corporal 036
SLR5
Driver6
Private G
SLR7
Private Longstaff
SLR8
Private 147
SLR9
Radio operator10
Private INQ 1237
SLR11
1 Sergeant INQ 1694 died before this Inquiry was established.
2 B121
3 B265
4 B1485
5 B1631.12
6 In his RMP statement Lance Corporal 036 recorded that he drove an APC along Rossville Street (B1629). Although he told this Inquiry that he did not drive a vehicle on Bloody Sunday, on being shown his RMP statement he accepted that it was possible that he had done so, though he could not remember doing so (B1631.11).
7 B168-9
8 C23.4
9 B1891.002
10 B1889
11 C1237.4
Unknown
Private INQ 19401
SLR2
1 This soldier’s evidence was that he went in on foot after receiving an order from Warrant Officer Class II Lewis to act as an escort for persons under arrest (C1940.2;
Mortar Platoon soldiers in Sector 3
69.20 In the course of our consideration of the events of Sector 2,1we explained that Corporal P and Private 017 disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC when it briefly stopped in Rossville Street, before it continued and turned into the car park of the Rossville Flats. Unlike the other soldiers who disembarked in Rossville Street from this APC, Corporal P and Private 017 (a baton gunner) crossed to the western side of Rossville Street. At this stage they were in front (ie to the south) of the other soldiers coming into Sector 3, and so it is convenient to start with their movements. We have referred to their accounts of hearing incoming fire in the context of Sector 2,2but for the sake of clarity we shall refer again to their evidence on this topic in discussing the events of Sector 3.
69.21 Private U of Mortar Platoon was also involved in the events of Sector 3. We return to consider this soldier later in this report.1
Corporal P
69.22 According to his first RMP statement timed at 2230 hours on 30th January 1972,1Corporal P had cocked his rifle no later than when he was in the APC. When he disembarked he “and two others ” deployed to the right of the APC (ie to the west) and “immediately came under heavy stoning and bottling from the rioters ”. His statement continued:
“About 20 of the rioters were advancing towards us and were throwing stones and other missiles at us continually. One of the two chaps with me and armed with a anti riot gun fired a number of rubber bullets in an attempt to disperse the 20 who were attacking us. They were about 50 metres away at this time. The rioters on being hit by these rubber bullets split up. ”
69.23 According to this statement it was at this stage that Corporal P saw a nail bomber at the back of the crowd and fired two shots; and a little later that he fired at a man holding a pistol. We return later in this report1to this part of Corporal P’s account and to his firing of further shots.
69.24 In this statement Corporal P recorded that he went to the right of the APC with two others. One of these, as already noted, was the baton gunner Private 017, but whether there was a third soldier remains unclear. Corporal P did not mention a third soldier in his later evidence; and none of the other soldiers who disembarked from Sergeant O’s APC in Rossville Street claimed to have moved to the western side of that street. In our view Corporal P was probably mistaken in referring to a third soldier, though it is possible that one of the others may temporarily have gone in that direction before moving back to the eastern side of the street.
69.25 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,1Corporal P gave the following description:
“When the vehicle stopped the section got out and split into twos and threes in order to make arrests. I was with another soldier. It was at this time that I cocked my rifle. As we got out of the vehicle I noticed a small crowd in the area in front of a wall on the left-hand side (from the direction I was looking) of the low rise flats in front of Columbcille Court. The crowd were throwing missiles in the general direction of the troops on the ground in front of the Rossville Flats. I was wearing a gas mask and I signalled to the soldier I was with to advance in the direction of the crowd in order to make arrests. As we moved across Rossville Street they dispersed up the alley way into Columbcille Court and the alleyway to the left of Columbcille Court (from the direction I was looking). By the time we reached the wall the crowd had dispersed. Upon reaching the wall we came under fire from roughly the direction of the barricade. At that time I could not see anyone firing at us. There were two shots which I thought to be high velocity shots. They appeared to go over our heads as I heard the crack of the round going overhead. We then took cover along-side the wall. Shortly after this we noticed a group of people coming along the alleyway who started stoning and bottling us. The soldier I was with then fired a number of baton rounds into the crowd in an attempt to disperse them. The crowd on being hit split up… ”
69.26 It will be noted that in this account Corporal P described hearing two shots that he stated he believed to be high velocity and coming from “roughly ” the direction of the rubble barricade. Corporal P continued with a description of then seeing and firing at a nail bomber at the back of the crowd and at a man with a pistol, and of later shots, to which we return below.1
69.27 In his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, Corporal P said that when he disembarked there was a crowd of people on the waste ground and another crowd “across the road from us ”. Both crowds were rioting, “throwing stones, bottles, all sorts of missiles ”.1
69.28 Corporal P then gave a description of moving to a wall on the Kells Walk side of the street, and of hearing two shots that had come from the direction of the barricade. He told the Widgery Inquiry that there were quite a few people behind the barricade, throwing stones or moving back to Free Derry Corner. He said that there were only one or two people on his side of the barricade, trying to cross to the other side of the barricade, but that he then noticed “a group of people coming out from the Columbcille Court alleyway and they started stoning us and bottling us ”. The other soldier he was with fired some baton rounds to disperse them.1He then again described his firing, to which we return below.2
69.29 Corporal P gave written and oral evidence to this Inquiry. In his written account1he told us that he had very little recollection of the day, but that he relied on what he had said in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.2
69.30 In his oral evidence to the present Inquiry, Corporal P said that Bloody Sunday was the only time he had fired live rounds, apart from on the rifle ranges, but despite this he said that he had practically no memory of the day.1He could give no explanation for why he had told the RMP that his rifle had been cocked while he was in the APC, whereas he had told the Widgery Inquiry that he had cocked it on disembarking,2nor for the fact that there was no mention in his RMP statement of the two shots he told the Widgery Inquiry that he had heard.
69.31 We return to Corporal P’s evidence later in this report,1when we consider the firing by soldiers in Sector 3.
69.32 In his first RMP statement timed at 0130 hours on 31st January 1972, Private 017 described how, armed only with a baton gun, he disembarked and moved to a position near a low wall to the north-west of the northernmost block of the Rossville Flats:1
“A barricade had been erected by the crowd in Rossville St some 60 metres to my front. This barricade was made up of bricks and rubble. There was a rioting crowd at the barricade and they were stoning troops who deployed around the flats. I fired a number of baton rounds at the crowd. They stoned me. A group of about 4 to 5 male youths came close to me around the corner of a wall to my right. They stoned me heavily. I realised that I could make an arrest from this small group and prepared to rush forward. As I ran towards the corner I saw a man walk around the corner towards me. ”
69.33 Private 017 then explained that this man was carrying a handgun, and gave an account of firing a baton round at him. We consider this evidence later in this report.1
69.34 Private 017 made a second RMP statement timed at 2030 hours on 4th February 1972,1in which he described being behind a brick wall about 10m from No 2 Columbcille Court. He stated that there was a crowd of about 50 people milling around in front of the barricade. “They rushed towards me so I fired one round from my rubber bullet gun, which split them up. ” Private 017 then gave a description of seeing a man come from behind the crowd with what he took to be a nail bomb, at whom Corporal P, “who was located just behind me ”, fired one shot. The man fell, the bomb did not go off, and the crowd carried the man away. We return to this part of Private 017’s evidence when considering below2the firing by Corporal P.
69.35 The brick wall about 10m from 2 Columbcille Court is the wall near which Private 017 can be seen in photographs that we consider below.1
69.36 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Private 017 gave this account:1,2
“2. About 4.10 that afternoon my platoon debussed at the north end of Block 1 of Rossville Flats. Whilst we had been moving to this position in our vehicles we could hear stones continuously hitting our armoured vehicle and on leaving the vehicle we were surrounded by a large crowd who were milling about the area of the front of the flats and in Rossville Street and the other side of the road and a lot of stones and debris was thrown in my direction.
3. Immediately after leaving the vehicle and together with soldier ‘P’ who was armed with an SLR as a protection for myself I went across Rossville Street to the side of a wall in front of Columbcille Court. Soon after we took up this position I heard two single high velocity shots which I believe may have come from around the area of Rossville Flats but I am not sure what the direction of the fire was. There was a crowd of about 50 people in front of the barricade in Rossville Street, they rushed towards me so I fired one round from my rubber bullet gun which split the crowd up. ”
69.37 This statement continued with Private 017’s account of seeing a nail bomber who had come from behind this crowd and who was shot by Corporal P; of the crowd then retreating behind the rubble barricade; of people running in and out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court and throwing stones and bottles in the direction of the two soldiers; and of then firing his baton gun at a man with a handgun who came round the corner of that alleyway. We deal with the man with the handgun below.1
69.38 Private 017 gave written1and oral evidence2to this Inquiry. As already noted,3though in his written statement he told us that he was pretty sure that he had been in the leading APC, in his oral evidence he said that this was wrong and that he had been in Sergeant O’s vehicle. For reasons already given,4we take the view that he had indeed travelled with Sergeant O.
69.39 In his written statement to this Inquiry, Private 017 described firing a rubber bullet and chasing the crowd after he disembarked from the APC. The crowd generally moved south and “A lot of them joined the main crowd at a barricade across Rossville Street ”. He stated that he initially made his way to a point that he described as the north-east corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats (although on a map1he marked it as the entrance to the access road leading from Rossville Street to the car park of the Rossville Flats), and that he then crossed to the west side of Rossville Street. He told us that at this stage he heard some shots but did not know where they were coming from and did not think that they were aimed at him. He also told us that he was being stoned. His statement continued:2
“23. A group mainly of youths aged 20 to 25, broke away from the crowd behind the Rubble Barricade and made four or five half hearted approaches towards me. They were trying to urge the rest of the crowd to join them. They were shouting ‘Get him ’. They would have ripped me to pieces if they had got me. Crowds had killed soldiers before. I felt very vulnerable there on my own.
24. I fired two or three rubber bullets into the riot. Shortly afterwards P joined me. He cannot have been far behind me because I think I was only there for seconds before he joined me.
25. The next thing I remember is that a large group of people (40 to 50) ran out of an alleyway that was on our right, leading from Rossville Street to Columbcille Court (grid reference J13). The crowd turned and ran south to join the main group of rioters at the Rubble Barricade. I didn’t fire any rubber bullets as the group ran past but once they joined the rest of the crowd I fired a steady trickle of rubber bullets to contain them. In all, I think I fired 12–15 rubber bullets that day. ”
69.40 After giving a description of Corporal P shouting a warning about a nail bomber, and of hearing him fire, Private 017 stated:1
“29. Not long after that, I looked west down the alleyway immediately to my right (the one leading to Columbcille Court). I could see rubble and old prams lying around, across the alleyway. Four or five youths had formed a line and were throwing bottles or bricks towards me. In particular, I saw a guy with long hair and I decided to arrest him. As I ran forward, the youths doubled back and ran away and I saw a man with a pistol come around the corner, from the north east corner of Glenfada Park North, into the alleyway towards me. The gunman was about 20 to 30 yards from me. I don’t remember which hand his gun was in, but I could see that it was a pistol. He was pointing it in my direction. I fired a rubber bullet at him and he shied away. I then ran round the corner, back into Rossville Street and called P. I can’t be certain, as I did so, whether or not the man with the pistol fired at me, but I think that he did. The gunman was a young man, not fat but of normal build. If I had seen him again that day I would have recognised him. ”
69.41 In his oral evidence to this Inquiry, Private 017 said that he had fired his baton gun at the crowd, rather than bouncing the rounds off the ground. He agreed that he had probably fired his baton gun soon after disembarking from the APC, although the crowd was running away, to “Keep ’em moving ”.1He also corrected his written statement, in which he had recorded that he had initially made his way to a point on the eastern side of Rossville Street, agreeing that he had only later gone to that position, having first gone to the western side of Rossville Street.2
69.42 Private 017 said that at this stage he had heard what he thought was high velocity fire, but could not say how many shots he had heard. Asked how big the crowd was at the barricade, he estimated the number at “around 100 ”. Asked what they were doing, he said:1
“They were mainly behind the barricade. On occasions they charged forward and stopped in front of the barricade and then went back; they were making half-hearted attempts to charge. ”
69.44 During his oral evidence Private 017 was asked to look at a photograph, which was taken by the Irish Press photographer Colman Doyle, and to which we have already referred1when considering, in our discussion of the events of Sector 2, the arrest of William John Dillon:
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69.45 Private 017 agreed that the figure in the background on the left of the photograph was probably him. “It looks like I am firing a rubber bullet gun and that is the smoke from it. ” He also identified the soldier with him as Corporal P. He said he did not recall being any closer than this to the rubble barricade before the incident in which he fired a baton round at a gunman.1
69.46 Next, Private 017 was shown two photographs taken by the freelance photographer Liam Mailey in the order shown below.
69.47 Private 017 identified himself as the soldier on the left standing at the corner of the wall. He did so because of the pouch that can be seen at the hip, in which he carried a camera. He agreed that it was from this position that he had fired his baton gun. He also identified the soldier behind him as Corporal P.1
1 Day 358/57-60
69.48 Private 017 said that the group that had run out of the alleyway leading from Columbcille Court was not the 40 to 50 he had described in his written statement, but “round about 15 ”.1He was sure that this group had turned south and run towards the rubble barricade; and he thought that the two incidents involving the nail bomber and the gunman were separate from this.2
1 Day 358/62
2 Day 358/61-62
Other evidence relating to the movements of Corporal P and Private 017
69.49 From the photograph taken by Colman Doyle, which we have reproduced above,1and Private 017’s identification of himself and Corporal P, it can be seen that when the photograph was taken Private 017 had just discharged his baton gun, with Corporal P close behind him. The following is the second photograph of the scene taken by Colman Doyle. This was taken immediately after the first photograph, as can be seen from the different positions of the soldier on the right running towards the group in the foreground.
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69.50 As will have been seen from our account of the arrest of William John Dillon in Sector 2,1Colman Doyle took these photographs after Lieutenant N had fired up the Eden Place alleyway, but before Lieutenant N had returned to his APC.
69.51 As to the photographs taken by Liam Mailey, those shown to Private 017 are part of a series taken of this scene. We set the complete series out below, in the order in which they were taken, which is established by the contact prints.
The first photograph
69.52 Of the six in this series, we have already shown the first1when describing the arrival of the vehicles in Rossville Street. By the time this photograph was taken, the two APCs of Mortar Platoon had moved from Rossville Street into the Eden Place waste ground and the Rossville Flats car park and so are out of sight. On the left of the photograph can be seen a group of soldiers.
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The second photograph
69.53 The group of soldiers is in much the same position in the second photograph, but in front of the sloping wall of the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk another soldier can be seen, apparently running west. Liam Mailey told the Widgery Inquiry that this soldier had a rubber bullet gun.1This photograph was referred to as photograph 6 in Liam Mailey’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.
The third and fourth photographs
69.54 The third and fourth photographs are those in which Private 017 identified himself and Corporal P. The latter also identified himself and Private 017 in the third photograph in his oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry.1 Liam Mailey told that Inquiry that the soldier with the rubber bullet gun shown in the second photograph could be seen in the third in the position from which he fired rubber bullets.2 In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry, Liam Mailey recorded that when he took the third photograph this soldier had just fired a few rubber bullets.3
The fifth and sixth photographs
69.55 The next two photographs show that by this stage other soldiers had arrived at the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk. Liam Mailey told the Widgery Inquiry that “the troops ran towards the ramp and towards the alleyway there. They should have obviously gone between the walls. They ran in front of them and turned back again and went up between the walls. ”1
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69.56 The last two of these six photographs show soldiers at the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk. In Colman Doyle’s two photographs of the scene (reproduced above1), no soldiers can be seen in this position, from which we conclude that he took these photographs before they arrived and probably just before Liam Mailey took his third and fourth photographs, the third of which, as noted above,2Liam Mailey told the Widgery Inquiry he had taken just after the soldier with the rubber bullet gun had fired.
1 Paragraphs 69.44 and 69.49 2Paragraph 69.54
69.57 Although Private 017 told us that he thought he was not one of the soldiers shown in the fifth of Liam Mailey’s photographs, because he did not recollect “that amount of people being there ”,1we consider, in the light of this series of photographs, that he was mistaken about this and that he was the soldier seen furthest to the left in the fifth and sixth photographs. Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry that he had fired two shots at a man he said was a nail bomber, before the group of soldiers had arrived at the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk.2
69.58 On the basis of this evidence, we are satisfied that Corporal P and Private 017 did initially go to the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street and that Private 017 fired some baton rounds when standing at the southern corner of the wall of the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk, with Corporal P close by. Private 017 appears to have fired at least one of these baton rounds after William John Dillon had been arrested. Later in this report1we consider Corporal P’s account of firing two shots at a man with a nail bomb and Private 017’s account of firing his baton gun at a man with a handgun.
1 Paragraphs 69.44 and 69.49 2Paragraph 69.54
69.57 Although Private 017 told us that he thought he was not one of the soldiers shown in the fifth of Liam Mailey’s photographs, because he did not recollect “that amount of people being there ”,1we consider, in the light of this series of photographs, that he was mistaken about this and that he was the soldier seen furthest to the left in the fifth and sixth photographs. Corporal P told the Widgery Inquiry that he had fired two shots at a man he said was a nail bomber, before the group of soldiers had arrived at the low ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk.2
69.58 On the basis of this evidence, we are satisfied that Corporal P and Private 017 did initially go to the Kells Walk side of Rossville Street and that Private 017 fired some baton rounds when standing at the southern corner of the wall of the high ramp at the southern end of Kells Walk, with Corporal P close by. Private 017 appears to have fired at least one of these baton rounds after William John Dillon had been arrested. Later in this report1we consider Corporal P’s account of firing two shots at a man with a nail bomb and Private 017’s account of firing his baton gun at a man with a handgun.
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Chapter 70: The actions of civilians in Rossville Street on and after the arrival of the Army vehicles
70.1 In our consideration of the events of Sector 2,1we concluded that while some civilians threw stones and bottles at the vehicles as they came into the Bogside, the general reaction of the crowd was to run away. So far as Sector 3 is concerned, there was initially the same general movement away, as can be seen from the film of the two leading vehicles driving in.2
70.2 We have referred earlier, in our consideration of the events of Sector 2,1to photographs taken by Derrik Tucker Senior from Block 2 of the Rossville Flats, before and as the Army vehicles came in. We set out below the photograph that he took after the Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) of Mortar Platoon had turned off Rossville Street.
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70.3 Ciaran Donnelly, the Irish Times photographer, took a number of photographs when the vehicles arrived. He told us that he took the first two of these from the ramp at the north-eastern corner of Glenfada Park South (ie from behind and slightly above the rubble barricade) and the second two at ground level and also from behind the barricade.1His contact prints show that the photographs were taken in the following order.
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70.4 At the stage when these photographs were taken, Lieutenant N’s APC had already turned into the Eden Place waste ground and Sergeant O’s APC into the Rossville Flats car park, and so they are out of view.
70.5 Before the sequence of six photographs taken by Liam Mailey that show the arrival of Corporal P and Private 017 at the pram-ramp wall south of Kells Walk, which we have set out above,1Liam Mailey had taken another photograph, which we show below.
70.6 Although each of the photographs that we have set out above shows only a moment in time and must be treated on that basis, together they give a view of people moving away from the Army vehicles, a number gathering at the rubble barricade, some to the north of that barricade and some apparently armed with stones and similar missiles. A number of civilians gave evidence that there was rioting at and north of the barricade, in the form of throwing bricks, stones and similar missiles.
70.7 Thomas Heaney,1 Vincent McCauley,2 Ciaran Donnelly3 and Peter Lancaster4 told us of rallying cries and calls for people at Free Derry Corner to return to the rubble barricade. Some witnesses, such as Don Mullan,5 told us of returning to the barricade with “maybe a dozen or two dozen people ” to throw stones.6 Paul McGeady put the number returning at “maybe several dozen ”.7 Gavan Duffy said “about … 80 people … surged forward towards the [Free Derry Corner side of the] barricade ” from Glenfada Park North on seeing a soldier hitting a youth with a rifle butt.
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70.8 Vincent McCauley told us of rioters “charging towards the soldiers ”1 and of “youths running towards the soldiers with the intent of tackling them with bricks ”,2 from about the south end of Glenfada Park South.3 Paul McGeady thought “maybe between 6 to 12 people ” went over the barricade,4 while George Downey thought “three or four guys ” went over the barricade “five or six foot ”.5 Hugh Patrick O’Donnell said that 30 to 50 people ran towards soldiers at the corner of the Rossville Flats, and that he thought that there had been “30/40 of us north of the barricade”.6 Frankie Mellon said that “20 or 30 people ”, including Hugh Gilmour (one of those shot and killed in Sector 3), would pick up fist-sized stones from behind the barricade and run forward “about 40 or 50 yards ” to hurl them at the soldiers.7 James Quinn said that, while he threw stones from behind the barricade, some were stoning from the north side of the barricade.8George Roberts said that he and between 15 and 20 others threw stones from the rubble barricade, but the soldiers were too far away for them to reach.
70.9 Many civilian witnesses described seeing or taking part in rioting at the barricade itself. Paul McGeady thought “Maybe a dozen ” youths were involved in the stoning.1 Brian Kelly described rioting by some of “between 12 and 15 ” youths behind the barricade, but thought that the youths would have realised that the stones “could not reach the soldiers and that there was no chance of causing injury ”.2 Gavan Duffy believed that only a minority in the crowd were rioting with stones and bottles while the remainder watched without participating.3 Ciaran Donnelly said that of the 20 or so youths lined up behind the barricade, only six to ten “were constantly throwing stones ”.4 Ronald Wood said that a crowd of ten to 15 people were throwing rubble and pieces of brick from the centre of the rubble barricade, among whom were two young men who fell, though he said that he had not actually seen the two men throwing stones.5 Professor Terence O’Keeffe (who in 1972 was Fr O’Keeffe) told us that he had the “impression ” that “a small group of youths, about 7 or 8, towards the middle of the barricade ” were throwing stones.6 George Roberts put the number at “15 to 20 maybe ”, but said that the soldiers were out of range.7 Jack Nash threw stones from behind the barricade and saw others do the same.8 Donal Deeney thought that “There might have been more ” than 10 to 20 rioters
70.10 Assistant Chief Constable Robert Campbell, of the Renfrew and Bute Constabulary, and Superintendent Samuel McGonigle, then the Planning Officer of that constabulary, were visiting Northern Ireland in order to study the methods employed there for dealing with major incidents; and were present on Bloody Sunday. They accepted an invitation from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to observe the civil rights march from near the Walker Monument on the City Walls. We indicate the position of the Walker Monument on the following map and photograph
70.9 Many civilian witnesses described seeing or taking part in rioting at the barricade itself. Paul McGeady thought “Maybe a dozen ” youths were involved in the stoning.1 Brian Kelly described rioting by some of “between 12 and 15 ” youths behind the barricade, but thought that the youths would have realised that the stones “could not reach the soldiers and that there was no chance of causing injury ”.2 Gavan Duffy believed that only a minority in the crowd were rioting with stones and bottles while the remainder watched without participating.3 Ciaran Donnelly said that of the 20 or so youths lined up behind the barricade, only six to ten “were constantly throwing stones ”.4 Ronald Wood said that a crowd of ten to 15 people were throwing rubble and pieces of brick from the centre of the rubble barricade, among whom were two young men who fell, though he said that he had not actually seen the two men throwing stones.5 Professor Terence O’Keeffe (who in 1972 was Fr O’Keeffe) told us that he had the “impression ” that “a small group of youths, about 7 or 8, towards the middle of the barricade ” were throwing stones.6 George Roberts put the number at “15 to 20 maybe ”, but said that the soldiers were out of range.7 Jack Nash threw stones from behind the barricade and saw others do the same.8 Donal Deeney thought that “There might have been more ” than 10 to 20 rioters
70.10 Assistant Chief Constable Robert Campbell, of the Renfrew and Bute Constabulary, and Superintendent Samuel McGonigle, then the Planning Officer of that constabulary, were visiting Northern Ireland in order to study the methods employed there for dealing with major incidents; and were present on Bloody Sunday. They accepted an invitation from the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to observe the civil rights march from near the Walker Monument on the City Walls. We indicate the position of the Walker Monument on the following map and photograph
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70.11 Both these police officers reported being able to observe, among other things, part of the rubble barricade, though their view of Rossville Street further north was obscured by the Rossville Flats; and that they saw people running north to the rubble barricade and hurling stones and similar missiles at what they assumed were soldiers out of their view.1 According to Superintendent McGonigle, a crowd formed up behind the rubble barricade and then ran forward throwing these missiles
70.12 There was some evidence to suggest that a number of people at the rubble barricade went forward and threw stones after seeing a person arrested by soldiers on the Eden Place waste ground.
70.13 George Downey,1 Gavan Duffy,2 Paul McGeady,3 Alphonsus Cunningham,4 Noel McCartney5 and Hugh Patrick O’Donnell6 all gave accounts of what some described as a “surge ” forward, with numbers varying from about three and four up to as many as several dozen crossing the barricade and going forward. However, none suggested that they came close to the arresting soldiers or near enough to do them harm. We accept that, as George Downey said, the surge was really more a gesture than a real attempt to engage the soldiers.
70.14 Although it is not certain, we consider it more likely than not that the arrest, or one of the arrests, to which these civilians were referring, was that of William John Dillon. We considered this arrest in our discussion of the events of Sector 2.1 Neither of the soldiers who arrested William John Dillon (Private 006 and Private 037) gave any evidence of being approached by civilians or being stoned as they did so.
70.15 As we noted while considering the arrest of William John Dillon,1 both Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail and Colman Doyle of the Irish Press photographed this event. The first photograph taken by Jeffrey Morris from the Eden Place waste ground gives a view across Rossville Street and of part of the rubble barricade.
70.16 There is an enlargement of the left-hand side of this photograph shown below.
70.12 There was some evidence to suggest that a number of people at the rubble barricade went forward and threw stones after seeing a person arrested by soldiers on the Eden Place waste ground.
70.13 George Downey,1 Gavan Duffy,2 Paul McGeady,3 Alphonsus Cunningham,4 Noel McCartney5 and Hugh Patrick O’Donnell6 all gave accounts of what some described as a “surge ” forward, with numbers varying from about three and four up to as many as several dozen crossing the barricade and going forward. However, none suggested that they came close to the arresting soldiers or near enough to do them harm. We accept that, as George Downey said, the surge was really more a gesture than a real attempt to engage the soldiers.
70.14 Although it is not certain, we consider it more likely than not that the arrest, or one of the arrests, to which these civilians were referring, was that of William John Dillon. We considered this arrest in our discussion of the events of Sector 2.1 Neither of the soldiers who arrested William John Dillon (Private 006 and Private 037) gave any evidence of being approached by civilians or being stoned as they did so.
70.15 As we noted while considering the arrest of William John Dillon,1 both Jeffrey Morris of the Daily Mail and Colman Doyle of the Irish Press photographed this event. The first photograph taken by Jeffrey Morris from the Eden Place waste ground gives a view across Rossville Street and of part of the rubble barricade.
70.16 There is an enlargement of the left-hand side of this photograph shown below.
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70.17 This shows two figures north of the rubble barricade and perhaps moving northwards. However, the photograph as a whole shows no-one near the soldier arresting William John Dillon, and the part of Rossville Street in view (from the western part of the rubble barricade to a position a few yards from the corner where Corporal P and Private 017 can be seen in the photographs we have considered above1) is shown entirely clear of people.
70.18 As we have also already noted1when discussing the arrest of William John Dillon, Colman Doyle took a very similar photograph from a position that must have been close to Jeffrey Morris. Colman Doyle’s contact prints show that after that he took five further photographs of the arrest of William John Dillon. In the background of the last three of these can be seen Corporal P and Private 017. Two of these photographs we have reproduced above.2 The contact sheet we show below.
70.19 In our view there can be little doubt that this series of photographs, and those of Jeffrey Morris, were taken over a short period of time. With the exception of the figures just to the north of the rubble barricade shown in the enlargement of Jeffrey Morris’s photograph, none shows any civilians (apart from William John Dillon) in the area of Rossville Street or along its western side.
Conclusions on the rioting at and near the rubble barricade
70.20 From the evidence we have considered above we are sure that rioting broke out at the rubble barricade soon after the Army vehicles arrived in Rossville Street, in the form of some dozen or more men collecting and throwing stones, bricks, rubble, bottles and the like towards the soldiers. Some went forward of the rubble barricade to stone from nearer the soldiers, but in our view none came near enough to soldiers to pose a real danger to them. At this stage most of the soldiers in Sector 3 were some 70 yards away from the rubble barricade, in the Kells Walk area of Rossville Street.
70.18 As we have also already noted1when discussing the arrest of William John Dillon, Colman Doyle took a very similar photograph from a position that must have been close to Jeffrey Morris. Colman Doyle’s contact prints show that after that he took five further photographs of the arrest of William John Dillon. In the background of the last three of these can be seen Corporal P and Private 017. Two of these photographs we have reproduced above.2 The contact sheet we show below.
70.19 In our view there can be little doubt that this series of photographs, and those of Jeffrey Morris, were taken over a short period of time. With the exception of the figures just to the north of the rubble barricade shown in the enlargement of Jeffrey Morris’s photograph, none shows any civilians (apart from William John Dillon) in the area of Rossville Street or along its western side.
Conclusions on the rioting at and near the rubble barricade
70.20 From the evidence we have considered above we are sure that rioting broke out at the rubble barricade soon after the Army vehicles arrived in Rossville Street, in the form of some dozen or more men collecting and throwing stones, bricks, rubble, bottles and the like towards the soldiers. Some went forward of the rubble barricade to stone from nearer the soldiers, but in our view none came near enough to soldiers to pose a real danger to them. At this stage most of the soldiers in Sector 3 were some 70 yards away from the rubble barricade, in the Kells Walk area of Rossville Street.
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Rioters coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway
Chapter 71: Rioters coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway
71.1 In a part of his first RMP statement1 that we have quoted above,2 Corporal P described about 20 advancing rioters, who were about 50m away and at whom Private 017 fired a number of baton rounds, causing the rioters to split up. The rubble barricade would have been about 50m away from the corner where Corporal P and Private 017 can be seen in the photographs shown above.3 However, in a part of his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry that we have also quoted above,4 Corporal P described taking cover against a wall (which appears from the context to be the wall where he and Private 017 can be seen in the photographs), after which a group of people came along the alleyway and started stoning and bottling them. Again from the context, this would appear to be the alleyway that led off Rossville Street towards Columbcille Court. This alleyway is shown in the following photograph, on which we have also marked the position of Corporal P and Private 017 when they were photographed by Colman Doyle.
71.2 The distance between the position occupied by Corporal P and Private 017 at the wall and the alleyway into Columbcille Court is only some 20m. According to Corporal P’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, it was at a crowd that came along this alleyway that Private 017 fired his baton gun, splitting them up.
71.3 In his first RMP statement,1 Private 017 described going to a low wall and seeing about 60m in front of him the rubble barricade where there was a rioting crowd at which he fired a number of baton rounds. (In his second RMP statement,2 he recorded that he had fired one round at this crowd.) He then described a group of about four to five youths coming close to him round a corner to his right, and stated that he decided to go forward to try to make an arrest. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,3 he described firing one baton round at the crowd near the barricade, which in this statement he recorded was rushing towards him. He then gave an account of people coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway and throwing stones and bottles, and of then seeing a man with a handgun coming round the corner, and of firing a baton round at this man. We consider the incident involving the gunman later in this report.4
71.4 The evidence that Corporal P (in his first RMP statement) and Private 017 gave about the state of the crowd at or near the rubble barricade corresponds to a significant degree with the evidence given by civilians. We therefore conclude that there were a number of rioters at the rubble barricade, some of whom came forward to throw stones and similar missiles, but none of whom advanced more than a few yards from the barricade.
71.5 In his later evidence Corporal P referred to Private 017 firing baton rounds, not at the crowd near the rubble barricade, but at a group of people who had come out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. Private 017 had given an account of this group in his first RMP statement, but both in this statement and in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry he recorded that he had first fired at the crowd coming from the barricade, and then at a gunman who came round the corner of the alleyway.
71.6 There is only one other witness who gave an account of people coming out of the alleyway and stoning soldiers. This was Brendan Carlin, who gave written evidence to this Inquiry1 but did not give oral evidence.
71.7 Brendan Carlin was 13 at the time of Bloody Sunday. He stated that he had run down Chamberlain Street and through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats, and taken shelter at the Threepenny Bits (the hexagonal brick structures to the south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats). His account continued as follows:1
“12. I could see up Rossville Street but I have no recollection of what was happening around the Rubble Barricade. What grabbed my attention was two soldiers who were in the area I have marked D on the map in map reference K12. They were standing on an area that had cobbled stones pushed into cement. I do not recall seeing any other soldiers around these two, as my attention was focused entirely on them. The crowd had come out of the alleyway eastwards from the north of Glenfade Park North at point E on the map at reference J13 and had turned to confront the soldiers. They were taking on the two soldiers and were giving them a right stoning. One of the soldiers had a rubber bullet gun and the other had a rifle. The one with the rubber bullet gun was loading his gun as fast as he possibly could and was firing out at the youths who were coming back and forth from the alley but he was going to lose out and he knew it. These two were under pressure and the other soldier with a rifle shot a live round. He did this with his right elbow at the hip but with the gun pointing above the heads of the youths. Witnessing this scene convinced me that things were going to go wrong. ”
71.8 The area Brendan Carlin marked “D ” was by the corner of the wall where Private 017 and Corporal P can be seen in the photographs that we have set out above.1 The alleyway he marked “E ” was the alleyway leading from Rossville Street to Columbcille Court.2 Brendan Carlin told us that after witnessing this he crossed Rossville Street and went into Glenfada Park North, but did not remember seeing anyone injured at the rubble barricade at this time.
71.9 We draw no adverse inference from the fact that Brendan Carlin did not give oral evidence. His account of the two soldiers in the position he described who were being stoned by people coming out of the alleyway leading from Columbcille Court in our view supports the evidence of Corporal P and Private 017 that on their arrival at the wall there were people who came out of that alleyway and threw stones and bottles. We return later in this report1 to Brendan Carlin’s evidence of Corporal P firing a shot over their heads.
71.10 In summary, therefore, we conclude that in addition to the crowd at or near the rubble barricade, a few people (Private 017 told us it was about four or five1) were throwing objects from the Columbcille Court alleyway towards him.
Chapter 71: Rioters coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway
71.1 In a part of his first RMP statement1 that we have quoted above,2 Corporal P described about 20 advancing rioters, who were about 50m away and at whom Private 017 fired a number of baton rounds, causing the rioters to split up. The rubble barricade would have been about 50m away from the corner where Corporal P and Private 017 can be seen in the photographs shown above.3 However, in a part of his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry that we have also quoted above,4 Corporal P described taking cover against a wall (which appears from the context to be the wall where he and Private 017 can be seen in the photographs), after which a group of people came along the alleyway and started stoning and bottling them. Again from the context, this would appear to be the alleyway that led off Rossville Street towards Columbcille Court. This alleyway is shown in the following photograph, on which we have also marked the position of Corporal P and Private 017 when they were photographed by Colman Doyle.
71.2 The distance between the position occupied by Corporal P and Private 017 at the wall and the alleyway into Columbcille Court is only some 20m. According to Corporal P’s evidence to the Widgery Inquiry, it was at a crowd that came along this alleyway that Private 017 fired his baton gun, splitting them up.
71.3 In his first RMP statement,1 Private 017 described going to a low wall and seeing about 60m in front of him the rubble barricade where there was a rioting crowd at which he fired a number of baton rounds. (In his second RMP statement,2 he recorded that he had fired one round at this crowd.) He then described a group of about four to five youths coming close to him round a corner to his right, and stated that he decided to go forward to try to make an arrest. In his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry,3 he described firing one baton round at the crowd near the barricade, which in this statement he recorded was rushing towards him. He then gave an account of people coming from the Columbcille Court alleyway and throwing stones and bottles, and of then seeing a man with a handgun coming round the corner, and of firing a baton round at this man. We consider the incident involving the gunman later in this report.4
71.4 The evidence that Corporal P (in his first RMP statement) and Private 017 gave about the state of the crowd at or near the rubble barricade corresponds to a significant degree with the evidence given by civilians. We therefore conclude that there were a number of rioters at the rubble barricade, some of whom came forward to throw stones and similar missiles, but none of whom advanced more than a few yards from the barricade.
71.5 In his later evidence Corporal P referred to Private 017 firing baton rounds, not at the crowd near the rubble barricade, but at a group of people who had come out of the alleyway leading to Columbcille Court. Private 017 had given an account of this group in his first RMP statement, but both in this statement and in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry he recorded that he had first fired at the crowd coming from the barricade, and then at a gunman who came round the corner of the alleyway.
71.6 There is only one other witness who gave an account of people coming out of the alleyway and stoning soldiers. This was Brendan Carlin, who gave written evidence to this Inquiry1 but did not give oral evidence.
71.7 Brendan Carlin was 13 at the time of Bloody Sunday. He stated that he had run down Chamberlain Street and through the gap between Blocks 2 and 3 of the Rossville Flats, and taken shelter at the Threepenny Bits (the hexagonal brick structures to the south of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats). His account continued as follows:1
“12. I could see up Rossville Street but I have no recollection of what was happening around the Rubble Barricade. What grabbed my attention was two soldiers who were in the area I have marked D on the map in map reference K12. They were standing on an area that had cobbled stones pushed into cement. I do not recall seeing any other soldiers around these two, as my attention was focused entirely on them. The crowd had come out of the alleyway eastwards from the north of Glenfade Park North at point E on the map at reference J13 and had turned to confront the soldiers. They were taking on the two soldiers and were giving them a right stoning. One of the soldiers had a rubber bullet gun and the other had a rifle. The one with the rubber bullet gun was loading his gun as fast as he possibly could and was firing out at the youths who were coming back and forth from the alley but he was going to lose out and he knew it. These two were under pressure and the other soldier with a rifle shot a live round. He did this with his right elbow at the hip but with the gun pointing above the heads of the youths. Witnessing this scene convinced me that things were going to go wrong. ”
71.8 The area Brendan Carlin marked “D ” was by the corner of the wall where Private 017 and Corporal P can be seen in the photographs that we have set out above.1 The alleyway he marked “E ” was the alleyway leading from Rossville Street to Columbcille Court.2 Brendan Carlin told us that after witnessing this he crossed Rossville Street and went into Glenfada Park North, but did not remember seeing anyone injured at the rubble barricade at this time.
71.9 We draw no adverse inference from the fact that Brendan Carlin did not give oral evidence. His account of the two soldiers in the position he described who were being stoned by people coming out of the alleyway leading from Columbcille Court in our view supports the evidence of Corporal P and Private 017 that on their arrival at the wall there were people who came out of that alleyway and threw stones and bottles. We return later in this report1 to Brendan Carlin’s evidence of Corporal P firing a shot over their heads.
71.10 In summary, therefore, we conclude that in addition to the crowd at or near the rubble barricade, a few people (Private 017 told us it was about four or five1) were throwing objects from the Columbcille Court alleyway towards him.
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