Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry Volume 1

1 Chapter 179

The draft chapter provided by Colin Wallace

9.726 Colin Wallace, the civilian Army public relations officer to whom we have referred above,1 provided the Inquiry with a draft chapter from a proposed book, apparently written in the early 1970s by an officer of 1 PARA. Colin Wallace did not know whether the book was ever finished (he saw no further draft chapters), but it does not appear to have been published, and no witness to this Inquiry has claimed responsibility for writing the piece in question. Although Colin Wallace retained the document, he could not assist further as to its origin or the identity of its author.2

1 Paragraph 9.214 2KW2.8; KW2.129; Day 238/35-41; Day 238/97-100

9.727 The author, dealing with the days leading up to Bloody Sunday, wrote:1

“The first one of our Company seconds-in-command heard of the impending operation was on the Friday before, when his Company Commander came rushing excitedly into his office after the Commanding Officer’s Orders Group. ‘We’re really going to have a go at them this time.’ He then went on to describe, with considerable relish, how the hooligan element on the march were going to be ‘dealt with’, the idea of ‘Scoop Force’, and our own role. The intelligence part of the operational order predicted gunmen in the area of the Rossville Flats.”


1 KW2.44

9.728 According to the draft chapter, later that day the Captain briefly explained to his wife what the weekend’s operations would be. He explained about Scoop Force, the Paras and the gunmen. “I can just see the headlines,” she said, “Londonderry’s Sharpeville”.1

1 The Sharpeville shootings occurred on 21st March 1960, when South African police opened fire on a crowd of black demonstrators in the township of Sharpeville. Reports indicate that 69 people, including women and children, were killed and over 180 injured.

9.729 According to the document, the author was present at the march from Dungannon to Coalisland that took place on 29th January 1972. The chapter contains many details that are consistent with what is known about this march and its policing, but there are considerable doubts as to its provenance. Despite some evidence to the contrary,1it appears unlikely that 1 PARA, or any part of this battalion, was involved in policing the march. The Fusilier magazine (volume 1 number 8, June 1972) recorded that the units employed in the operation came from 3 RRF, 1 KOB and 8 UDR. The first two of these were also deployed in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday. There is no evidence from any 1 PARA soldier that members of the battalion were present at this event, and several witnesses told this Inquiry that they did not recall the battalion being so deployed.2 In these circumstances, the authenticity and accuracy of the draft chapter cannot be verified, and we are unable to place any reliance on the information that is contained in this document.

1 AR38.2 2 Day 287/143-144; Day 279/58

Publicity for the march

9.730 On Saturday 29th January 1972 the Irish News carried an advertisement for the march.1

1 L19



9.731 Of particular note is the fact that this notice included the detail that the march would go to the Guildhall Square for a public meeting, something that had also been reported in the Derry Journal on the previous day. The advertisement also announced that one of the speakers would be John Hume. He told this Inquiry that he had initially agreed to address the march, but changed his mind after witnessing the violence displayed against the marchers at Magilligan. On that occasion, John Hume had insisted that the protest occur on a beach as this would minimise the risk of a violent confrontation, there being no stones for potential rioters to throw. When, in his view, this failed to stop an assault from the security forces, he feared for what might happen in an urban situation. He therefore withdrew from his previous agreement to speak, publicly announced that he would have nothing further to do with the march, and actively encouraged others to do the same.1

1 KH8.2; Day 180/4-5; Day 180/9-10; Day 180/39-40

9.732 In addition to the advertisement, NICRA issued another statement on 29th January 1972, which was widely reported in the media:1

“A call for a massive turnout at the Civil Rights Demonstration planned for Derry tomorrow has been made by the Executive of the Civil Rights Association. Making the call the Executive pointed out that the British Government are now full-tilt on repression and coercion and that a massive peaceful demonstration was vital if world opinion was to be impressed by the justice of the democratic cause in Northern Ireland.

The twin major aims for Derry is a demonstration that is both huge in numbers and perfectly peaceful and incident free. It is pointed out that any violence can only set back the civil rights cause and play straight into the hands of the Tory-Unionists by providing a justification not only for any violence they might contemplate against the demonstration itself but also for the daily violence of the security forces.”


1 G92.552

9.733 Despite these statements, the expectation of many must have been that it was likely if not inevitable that the Army would seek to stop or divert the march and that there would be a violent confrontation at some stage during or after the event.

Cancellation of the Democratic Unionist rally

9.734 On the afternoon of 29th January 1972, the City of Londonderry and Foyle DUA announced the cancellation of the rally that earlier in the week they had told the Chief Constable they intended to hold in the Guildhall Square. The Vice President of this Association, the Reverend James McClelland, was reported as saying:1

“We were approached by the Government and given assurances that the Civil Rights march will be halted – by force if necessary.

We believe wholesale riot and bloodshed could be the result of the Civil Rights activities tomorrow and we would be held responsible if our rally takes place. We have appealed to all loyalists to stay out of the city centre to-morrow.

We are prepared to give the Government a final opportunity to demonstrate its integrity and honour its promise to stop this march (Civil Rights). But if it fails in this undertaking, it need never again ask loyalist people to surrender their basic right of peaceful and legal assembly.”


1 L21; G92.553; Day 220/4-8; Day 220/11-14; KM9.8

9.735 Whether there was in fact ever any genuine intention to hold a rally is open to doubt. As Lord Cameron noted in his report,1 the tactic of announcing a march or demonstration that would clash with another already proposed by those of a different political colour, in order to force the prohibition or re-routing of the latter, and then (if this purpose was achieved) allowing the counter-demonstration to lapse, had, as he put it, “long been a recognised tactic of obstruction in Northern Ireland”.

1 Cameron Report, para 41.

9.736 The DUA’s announcement that their rally had been cancelled contained the claim that the organisation had been approached by the (presumably Northern Ireland) Government and given assurances that the NICRA march would be halted, by force if necessary. This might be related to a parliamentary statement given by Commander Anderson, the Ulster Unionist (Stormont) MP for Londonderry City and Senior Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Home Affairs, in the week after Bloody Sunday:1

“A counter-demonstration was arranged for that day. I went to the people concerned and I am very glad to say that they had a sense of responsibility. They realised how this could be used for other purposes and they did not proceed with the parade. It would have been a lawful meeting. I want to say publicly that I am indebted to them for the step they took; it kept another section of our people off the streets of Londonderry.”


1 KM9.16

9.737 On 30th January 1972 the Sunday News newspaper reported the cancellation of the rally, and the response of a government spokesman who denied that a deal had been done with the DUA organisers. The spokesman was quoted as saying: “They were simply told that by going ahead with their rally they were only making the job of the security forces more difficult.” No indication is given as to who passed on this message, or by what means.1

1 L21

9.738 It was submitted on behalf of the family of one of those who died on Bloody Sunday that:1

“The Tribunal may reasonably conclude that the person who most probably spoke to the DUA on behalf of the government was Commander Anderson, the MP for Derry, and that he did so at the behest of the JSC after hearing from the GOC concerning the potential for a shooting war.”


1 FS4.71

9.739 There is some doubt as to whom Commander Anderson approached, and whether they were members of the local DUA, or the provincial Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The Reverend James McClelland told us that Commander Anderson had not spoken to him, and suggested that he might have approached the Reverend William Beattie, the DUP’s Deputy Leader and then the Stormont member for South Antrim.1However, the Reverend James McClelland also said he had a vague recollection of the DUP’s Chairman, Desmond Boal, telephoning him to urge him to cancel a counter-demonstration (which he presumed was the one arranged for 30th January 1972) as “we do not need this kind of brinkmanship at this time”.2Unfortunately, due to the Reverend James McClelland’s apparently poor memory of events, we were unable to place much reliance on his evidence.

1 KM9.9-10; Day 220/15-16 2 Day 220/16-18

9.740 Regardless of whom it was that Commander Anderson contacted, we are not persuaded that his approach was made at the “behest of the JSC” or that it was in any way authorised by the Stormont Government. Commander Anderson attended the JSC meeting of 27th January 1972 (the last before Bloody Sunday), yet the minutes record no instruction or invitation to Commander Anderson to intervene, and indeed no discussion of any such idea.1There is no other direct evidence of official support for assurances given to the DUA or the DUP to persuade them to call off the counter-demonstration, other than the words attributed to the Reverend James McClelland when announcing the cancellation.

1 G76.463-466

9.741 In contrast, there are strong reasons to conclude that any steps taken by Commander Anderson (or anyone else) were the result of a personal, unsanctioned initiative. We accept as accurate the evidence of Brian Faulkner’s Principal Private Secretary, Dr Robert Ramsay, that there was a clear policy to have no dealings with Dr Ian Paisley outside formal parliamentary channels, as “the Prime Minister felt that Dr Paisley had a rather idiosyncratic concept of truth”.1 Dr Ramsay explained that this policy would have applied to the issue of the Londonderry DUA’s proposed demonstration, and Commander Anderson’s possible mediation on this matter.2

1 Day 215/40 2 Day 215/48-49

9.742 Dr Ramsay also pointed out that Commander Anderson was the local MP for Londonderry City, and that he might have used local contacts to urge the DUA to cancel its rally.1This is possible, as is an approach via the Reverend Beattie or Desmond Boal. Whatever the means, it seems likely that during the conversation that Commander Anderson (who is deceased and gave no evidence to this Inquiry) had with “the people concerned”, something was said that caused the Reverend James McClelland to announce the cancellation of the rally, and to claim that this was being done on the grounds that the march would be stopped by force if necessary. There is no evidence, nor anything to suggest, that the DUA was given any information of any nature about a proposed arrest operation. In any event, the lack of an official record reinforces the finding that Commander Anderson acted in a private capacity and on his own initiative. We are confident that no deal was done, and that no assurances were given by the Government that led the DUA to cancel its protest.

1 Day 245/49

9.743 In our view a counter-demonstration was probably announced in order to put pressure on the authorities to ensure that the NICRA march was stopped. Why the rally was cancelled remains in doubt, as we do not know what was said by Commander Anderson.

9.744 One further issue that arises from the DUA counter-demonstration and its cancellation is the extent to which, if at all, Dr Ian Paisley and the central DUP were aware of the activities of the Reverend James McClelland and the Londonderry DUA in this regard. On this point, the evidence the Reverend James McClelland and Dr Ian Paisley gave to the Inquiry differed markedly.

9.745 The Reverend James McClelland stated that the DUA was in effect a local arm of the DUP and that there was little the local association could do of which Dr Ian Paisley would not be aware if it was likely to attract media attention.1 At that time the question of marches and the ban on them was at the centre of media interest and debate across Northern Ireland, and indeed beyond. The Reverend James McClelland told us that he therefore assumed that Dr Ian Paisley would have been aware of the Londonderry DUA’s proposed rally. He initially insisted that he “definitely” had had no contact with Dr Ian Paisley on the question of the rally, but when reminded that he had himself told the Tribunal that he had no recollection even of the proposed counter-demonstration, he modified his answer by saying that he had no recollection of having had any contact with Dr Ian Paisley.2We gained the strong impression that the Reverend James McClelland disapproved of this Inquiry and was not disposed to go out of his way to assist us.

1 KM9.2; KM9.4; KM9.9; Day 220/10; Day 220/21 2 Day 220/10-11

9.746 Dr Ian Paisley told this Inquiry that he knew nothing about the Londonderry DUA’s planned rally other than that which he read in the press. He stated that he did not talk to the Reverend James McClelland or other local DUA members about their plans for the event, and he knew of no contact between the Government or Commander Anderson and the DUA that led to its cancellation.1However, he commented that the organisers’ public call for support on the basis that “the Queen’s writ must run in every part of the city and the law must be administered fairly to all sections of the community” was in line with the contemporary policy of the DUP.2 We gained the same impression of the attitude of this witness to this Inquiry as we had of the Reverend James McClelland. As to both these witnesses, we concluded that it would be unwise to rely on the evidence that they gave to us about the announced rally and its cancellation.

1 Day 205/10-18 2 Day 205/11-12

The Dungannon to Coalisland march

9.747 On 29th January 1972, demonstrators gathered in Dungannon for the scheduled anti-internment march to Coalisland, a reversal of the route of the August 1968 civil rights march, which was recognised as the first such event in Northern Ireland. The Dungannon march had been organised by the Tyrone Central Civil Resistance Committee, an umbrella group comprising several local civil rights organisations and activists, some of whom were also affiliated to NICRA.1 The security forces blocked off the planned assembly point in the town’s Market Square as part of an effort to stop the procession at source. However, a large section of the crowd managed to evade blockades by taking to waste ground, fields and at one stage a disused railway track. As these areas did not constitute public highways, marching on them was not prohibited. Throughout the day protesters and the security forces appear to have shadowed one another, with various efforts made by the former to return to the roads, and by the latter to disperse the crowd. A significant number of marchers completed the journey to Coalisland, but the security forces pointed out that they had been diverted from their intended and illegal route.2

1 G66.410; AR38.1; AR38.5; AD189.19
2 AR38.1-2; AR38.5; AD189.19; KD4.2-3; KB2.20; KD4.3; V26; G111.694


9.748 A number of those who participated on the march later complained about the allegedly heavy-handed methods employed by the security forces.1 In contrast, the official accounts of the day given by and to the relevant authorities emphasised that the event passed off relatively quietly, although there was some rioting and some arrests were made for disorderly behaviour.2 In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, the issue of the policing of this incident did not excite significant public interest.

1 KD4.2-3; Day 124/47; KB2.20; AD189.19-20
2 V26; G111.694; G112.697; G113.719; G108B.665.17; G115.746


The night of 29th/30th January 1972

9.749 In his written statement to this Inquiry Sergeant INQ 441, the Commander of Machine Gun Platoon, described the night of 29th January and the early hours of 30th January 1972:1

“8. After the briefings had taken place we were all confined to barracks. This was to ensure that everybody was rested up and ready to make an early start for Londonderry the following day. We were not allowed back into quarters but had to sleep in the barracks themselves. This was quite normal before a big operation as it ensured that there would be no problems the next morning when we prepared to start the operation …

9. I do not remember exactly what time of day we started but it was very early. In terms of the equipment we carried I remember having the usual webbing, our SLRs [self loading rifles], and at least one rubber bullet gun and a tear gas gun per Pig. Some of the platoons may have carried sub machine guns, although most of them would have carried SLRs. We never used batons or shields, although we did have steel helmets with visors. Our helmets were converted parachute helmets, not the standard army issue helmet. We wore our flak jackets under our camouflage uniform but I believe most of the other regiments wore their flak jackets over their camouflage uniform. Each man was allocated a supply of ammunition on the day. I do not remember how much ammunition each man would have been given as this would have been decided by the Company Sergeant Major or Company Commander. The number of rounds would have depended upon the type of operation which had been planned. We would ordinarily have had at least one magazine full of ammunition backed up with bandoliers. A standard number of rounds, including those in the bandolier would have been in the region of 80. The magazine would have been carried in a pouch on our webbing.”


1 C441.2

9.750 He recalled travelling in convoy with the rest of 1 PARA from Palace Barracks to Londonderry.1

1 C441.3

9.751 Major Loden explained to the Widgery Inquiry that on 30th January 1972 he had 102 men under his command. These comprised men from three platoons of Support Company (Anti-Tank Platoon, Machine Gun Platoon and Mortar Platoon) and one “composite platoon”, otherwise known as Guinness Force. The soldiers of Support Company were mounted in a total of six APCs. The members of Composite Platoon travelled in two 4-tonne lorries. In addition, Support Company had an armoured command vehicle, which was escorted by a Ferret scout car. All but three of the men under Major Loden’s command were armed with self-loading rifles (SLRs). The remaining three, all members of Composite Platoon, were each issued with a sub-machine gun. The reason for this was that there were insufficient SLRs available for each man to have one. The three men with sub-machine guns, and 12 of those with SLRs, were also issued with riot guns that fired rubber bullets.1

1 B2246-7

The issue of ammunition

9.752 The Company Sergeant Major of Support Company was Warrant Officer Class II Lewis. On 14th February 1972 he gave a statement to the RMP in which he provided details of the ammunition in the possession of members of Support Company on 30th January. His evidence was that, when ammunition was required, he issued it to the Platoon Sergeants who then issued it to their men and had to account to him for it. His records indicated that on 30th January 1972 the men of Support Company had in their possession a total of 2,950 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition (which was used in SLRs) and 52 rounds of 9mm ammunition. The 7.62mm ammunition was held by 59 men, who were armed with 50 rounds each. The 9mm ammunition was held by two men, each in possession of 26 rounds.1

1 B2030

9.753 Private 203, the arms storeman of Command Company of 1 PARA, issued arms and ammunition to members of Composite Platoon on 30th January 1972. His told the RMP on 14th February 1972 that on 30th January he had issued to 26 men 50 rounds each of 7.62mm ammunition and had issued to one man 40 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. He had also issued 19 men with 25 rounds each of 9mm ammunition and six men with 30 rounds each of 9mm ammunition. He also stated that some members of Composite Platoon had obtained ammunition not from him but from the B Company stores.1

1 B2112

9.754 The arms storeman of B Company, Lance Corporal 206, told the RMP on 14th February 1972 that on the morning of 30th January he had issued weapons and ammunition to members of Composite Platoon who had been unable to obtain arms and ammunition from the armoury. He had not retained records of the issue and could not recall the precise numbers issued. He stated that he had issued to each man 50 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition or 50 rounds of 9mm ammunition.1

1 B2121

The use of the helicopter

9.755 As we have mentioned above, on the morning of 30th January 1972 Brigadier MacLellan ordered Colonel Welsh to observe and report on the march from a helicopter. Colonel Welsh described in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry the task that he was given. His recollection was that he had volunteered for the task:1

“2. On Sunday 30 January I heard that a helicopter was to fly an observer over the march. As some of my own men were involved, I volunteered on that day to act as observer. My task was to report on progress of the march and to raport [sic] on the radio to Brigade Headquarters.

…

4. Before I took off I had an informal briefing from the Brigade Commander. I knew that 1 Para were to mount a snatch operation if a riot situation developed, and if the circumstances made it possible. I was briefed to inform Brigade Headquarters, should a riot situation develop, when the main body of marchers had separated from the rioters. If a riot situation developes one often faces great difficulty in splitting the rioters from spectators. Information on this point was therefore of importance to Brigade Headquarters. I had no knowledge of any detailed orders given to 1 Para or any other possible snatch unit. I assumed that if an adequate separation occurred, a snatch operation might be mounted.”


1 B1334

9.756 Brigadier MacLellan’s evidence to this Inquiry was that he had considered controlling the operation himself from the helicopter but came to the conclusion that he should be in a place at which he could receive all communications and could deal, if necessary, not only with the march but with any paramilitary activity elsewhere.1

1 B1279.035; Day 262/17-18
9.757 Brigadier MacLellan told us that, having decided after the issue of the Operation Order to use a helicopter (and, presumably, after deciding not to be in it himself), he wanted the best officer available to be in the helicopter. His evidence was that he selected Colonel Welsh whom he regarded as extremely reliable.1 Colonel Welsh began his helicopter patrol at 1355 hours on 30th January 1972.2

1 B1279.035 2 WT10.54

General considerations

9.758 In our consideration of the background to Bloody Sunday we have examined what we regard as the relevant events that preceded and led up to that day, including for convenience a little of what happened during the early part of the day. Before dealing in detail with the events of the day itself, we make some general observations.

Political debate

9.759 In terms of politics, there were two principal areas of debate in January 1972: the possibility of a political initiative emanating from Westminster that was timed to coincide with an anticipated lull in terrorist activity; and the question of whether to extend the ban on marches, including, if this was done, how to enforce it more effectively.

9.760 The first of these matters was discussed primarily, and privately, at Westminster. Optimistic reports from the security forces suggested that the level of IRA activity in Belfast (but notably not Londonderry) was as low as was possible without a formal ceasefire. This led ministers to contemplate the possibility of a political initiative timed to take advantage of this “window of opportunity”, which some expected to occur as early as February 1972, during which it was hoped that both sides of the community would be amenable to pressure for compromise. Various proposals were put forward both on the process and substance of any initiative, but none was without its difficulties. Talks were suggested between the United Kingdom Government and the Opposition at Westminster, and it was hoped that these might later be extended to include those parties from Northern Ireland who could be persuaded to take part. However, thought was also given to the possibility of the United Kingdom Government imposing a new system of governance on Northern Ireland, perhaps by temporarily suspending Stormont and replacing it with a commission system of administration. New arrangements would be established before a return to devolved government, including safeguards to ensure minority participation in government. Even if Stormont were to remain unchanged, there were suggestions that it should lose its responsibilities for law and order. The challenge was to find a way forward that would win significant nationalist support without alienating unionist opinion and provoking a feared “Protestant backlash”. Not all leading figures were convinced that this was possible, at least in the timescale envisaged. Some advised that it might be better to do nothing in the hope that some other solution would emerge, rather than embarking on an initiative that might worsen the situation. Meanwhile, suggestions made by the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, that he might put forward public proposals for reform worried politicians and civil servants in London, who feared that this would infuriate unionists and thereby prove counter-productive.

9.761 The debate about the possible extension of the ban on marches was more public, and involved both Westminster and Stormont. Most ministers were agreed that the ban, which was due to lapse on 8th February 1972, six months after its implementation, should be renewed, even though they were aware that this would prove unpopular with both communities in Northern Ireland. However, and as was shown by the marches over Christmas and New Year, there was considerable disquiet among unionists about the enforcement of the ban and the feeling that nationalists were flouting it with impunity. This, it was feared, increased tension in Northern Ireland, gave a general impression of lawlessness, and carried the risk that it would provoke further illegal processions or demonstrations. Ministers pushed for greater efforts from the security forces to prevent marches from taking place and to prosecute those who did breach the ban. In response, the Army and RUC issued new joint instructions on dealing with such events, emphasising the importance of the enforcement of the prohibition. However, they also repeatedly argued that for tactical reasons it would not always be possible to stop a march at its source; instead the security forces would chose an appropriate place to block the procession, and would seek to identify and prosecute those involved either by arresting them at the time or, if necessary, by gathering evidence during the march and then taking appropriate action afterwards.

9.762 The political situation in Northern Ireland has been discussed in the course of this part of the report. The views and perceptions of the Northern Ireland Government had not changed in the days immediately preceding Bloody Sunday. Although this Government had advanced modest reform measures, many nationalists still regarded them as token while many unionists became more convinced that the Government was giving in to republican paramilitary violence and eroding their historical political and economic hegemony. The Stormont Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, was caught between strident unionist demands for harsher measures to combat republican paramilitary violence and to prevent nationalist marches and the United Kingdom Government’s desire for significant reform in the hope that nationalist sentiment would turn against the IRA. Overhanging all of this was internment, which prevented dialogue with moderate nationalists, and the threat that direct rule would be imposed by Westminster. In Londonderry, the no-go areas remained intact and the gradual destruction of the commercial district continued. The already tense situation was in the days before Bloody Sunday exacerbated by events the previous Saturday at Magilligan Strand and by the Provisional IRA ambush on the Thursday that left two RUC officers dead and one wounded.

The Army

9.763 As will have been seen, those in command in the area of Londonderry were by January 1972 adopting a low-key response to the unrest and violence in the city as the best (if not the only) way of seeking to calm or at least contain the situation, given the force levels available. General Ford was clearly unhappy with the situation in the city and the attitude of the local commanders. Colonel Wilford, the Commanding Officer of 1 PARA, long afterwards expressed the view to the journalist and writer Peter Taylor that to him and his soldiers the sight on television of soldiers never going forward and just standing like “Aunt Sallies” in the face of hooligans attacking them was “quite horrifying” and that his soldiers were never going to act in that way; though when he gave evidence to us he sought to resile from these remarks.1The Regimental Sergeant Major of 1 PARA expressed the same view in his written statement to this Inquiry, describing the local troops as cowering behind barriers being stoned and petrol bombed.2To our minds the views of their Commander and their Regimental Sergeant Major were likely to have been shared by many others in 1 PARA.

1 B1027-1029; Day 312/6 2 C2037.1

A “plan within a plan”

9.764 During the course of the Inquiry and in their final submissions allegations were made by some of those representing the families that in truth what the politicians and military authorities had planned was not simply to stop the civil rights march on 30th January 1972 and to mount an arrest operation against rioters as set out in Operation Forecast, but to use 1 PARA to carry out some punitive action either designed deliberately to use unwarranted lethal force or at least with reckless disregard as to whether such force was used.1

1 FS4.83; FS4.87; FS4.98-102; FS6.203-212; FS1.772-773

9.765 These allegations are largely based on one of two assumptions, namely that what happened on Bloody Sunday was intended and planned to happen, or was foreseen as what was likely to happen.

9.766 In this regard it was submitted that what happened on the day itself showed that there was such a plan.1 We deal in detail in this report with the events of Bloody Sunday, but should record at this stage that to our minds none of those events demonstrated or indicated the existence of any such plan.

1 FS6.203-212

9.767 We have found no evidence to support either of the assumptions, or any evidence to suggest that there was such an underlying plan. The fact that, as we have said, General Ford was keen to use 1 PARA for an arrest operation and knew of its reputation for using excessive physical force does not suggest to us that accordingly he (or indeed anyone else) either intended those soldiers to use unwarranted lethal force (ie, to shoot people without justification) or was indifferent to them doing so.

9.768 As to the lack of evidence, we are bound to observe that those advancing the allegation of an underlying plan or a “plan within a plan” seemed on occasion to come dangerously close to relying on the proposition that the fact that there was no evidence was itself proof or at least an indication of an underlying plan, on the grounds that those engaged in creating the plan or carrying it out would obviously be at pains to hide their tracks. But this is an untenable proposition, for unless the question is begged (that is, it is first assumed that there was such a plan) the absence of evidence means no more than that there is nothing to support the allegation that a plan existed.

The Ford memorandum

9.769 In his memorandum,1 General Ford recorded that he was coming to the view that the only way to deal with the “Derry Young Hooligans” was to shoot selected ringleaders, using rifles adapted to use .22in ammunition and after giving a warning, though he also acknowledged that any such method of riot control would require authorisation before it could be put into effect.

1 G48.299

9.770 In one sense we can understand how a military man, looking at the continuing problem of the “Derry Young Hooligans”, bearing in mind the lack of success in dealing with this problem over the previous months, and having regard to the limited number of soldiers in the city available for riot control, could conclude that if the hooliganism was to be stopped, this was the only way that this could be done with the existing force levels. What surprises us is that an officer of General Ford’s seniority could form the view that this course of action, although theoretically providing a possible solution to the rioting problem, should seriously be considered as something that could be done. That General Ford did hold this view seems to us evident from the fact that, as the memorandum records, he had put in hand the provision of rifles firing .22in ammunition. What General Ford should have appreciated was that shooting hooligans who were not endangering the lives of soldiers or others represented a wholly unacceptable form of riot control. His conclusion, therefore, should have been that with the force levels available in the city, he could see no acceptable way of preventing the activities of the “Derry Young Hooligans”.

9.771 We are sure that the suggestion to shoot selected ringleaders was not put into effect on Bloody Sunday. There is nothing to indicate that authorisation for this method of controlling rioters (which would have required significant changes to the Yellow Card and indeed to the law itself) was even considered by General Tuzo or politicians. There is also nothing to suggest that any of those shot on Bloody Sunday were given warnings or shot because they were or were believed to be the ringleaders of hooligans, nor that the soldiers who fired used .22in bullets as opposed to the standard 7.62mm rounds.

General perceptions

9.772 As the Labour leader Harold Wilson observed after his visit to Northern Ireland in the autumn of 1971, and as in our view remained the case, “Matters had reached a point when what mattered was not the truth but what people believed.” There were fundamental and irreconcilable differences of perception between some of those present in Londonderry on the day, including both soldiers and civilians. Emotions (particularly fear and hatred) were running high and this inevitably led some of those who gave accounts of the day to recall events in a less than objective way, ascribing nothing but evil intentions and actions to those they regarded as the enemy and nothing but good to those they regarded as on their side. This is something that must be borne in mind when assessing the reliability of the testimony received by the Tribunal, though equally it would be wrong to treat this factor alone as in any way determinative, or to be applied in a blanket fashion regardless of other relevant factors to be considered when weighing the account of the events of the day given by any particular witness.

9.773 Among those other factors is, of course, the passage of time, which can in any case dim or distort recollections and which, in relation to an event like Bloody Sunday, is likely (if not certain) to give rise to myths and legends among both civilians and soldiers that have little or no foundation in fact, but which become perceived as and very difficult to disentangle from the truth.

9.774 We have borne these matters in mind when considering the evidence, particularly that of the events of the day itself. It is to those events that we now turn.