Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry volume 2

14.2 The march set off at about 2.45pm, taking a roundabout route through the Creggan, down Central Drive, to the east along Linsfort Drive, into Iniscarn Road and Rathlin Drive, then into Southway and along into Lone Moor Road. The march turned at the Brandywell Recreation Ground into Brandywell Road and then up Lecky Road, turning left up Westland Street, into Lone Moor Road and then past St Eugene’s Cathedral and down William Street to the junction with Rossville Street. The route of the march to this point is depicted on the following map and photograph.

14.3 The day was cold but bright and sunny. Many witnesses described the march as having a carnival atmosphere, though some were apprehensive and many regarded it as a serious matter because of the importance of its political message.1A lot of people were well dressed (many having previously been to church) and there was singing of “We shall overcome” and the like. Several witnesses said that they had no qualms about participating despite the risk of a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for doing so, believing, as they did, that the Government had no right to ban them from marching in their own city, and sensing that this would be an historic day in which popular protest against perceived injustice could make its point by sheer weight of numbers. Many of those who attended were seasoned marchers; others attended for the first time because they saw it as important to stand up and be counted. In some cases their willingness to take part was strengthened by the fact that respected community figures were going on the march and that Lord Brockway, a life peer and civil rights campaigner, was to speak. The majority of people on the march were intent on making a peaceful protest. They came from all walks of life, including people with no political persuasion and those accompanied by their children. As well as Londonderry residents, marchers came from Belfast and elsewhere. Kevin McCorry, the chief organiser, came from Belfast.

1 In his first written statement to this Inquiry, Charles McDaid said that an anonymous female caller had telephoned his wife on the morning of 30th January 1972, leaving a warning that he should not attend the march because “the paras are coming in and coming in shooting” (AM161.1). In his oral evidence, he said that he knew the identity of the caller; she was Jean Manning who, he said, was in January 1972 a telephonist employed by the RUC at Strand Road Barracks (Day 60/126-128). Subsequently, the Inquiry obtained evidence that indicated that Jean Manning (who is now deceased) had not commenced employment as a police telephonist until March 1973. Jean Manning’s sister confirmed that Ms Manning had not been in any form of employment in January 1972 (AS47.1; Day 422/75). We are accordingly of the view that there was no such conversation and consider that Charles McDaid’s memory must have been playing tricks on him. We are sure that Jean Manning made no such telephone call.

14.4 At the same time there were a substantial number of people on the fringes of the march who saw it not as a means of protesting for civil rights, but as an opportunity to engage in rioting against the troops. As one witness put it:1 “My attitude to the march was ‘fuck civil rights, fuck the British army we are going to the Guildhall’.” Others said that they had “no intention of poncing about on a march”,2 for example, and were intent on rioting because they wanted revenge for what had happened at Magilligan Strand the previous weekend. So they marched with clubs and similar weapons, concealed under coats, because had the weapons been seen by other people on the march “we would have been lynched ”.3 According to a note in the Sunday Times newspaper archive,4 Bernadette Devlin (now Bernadette McAliskey) expressed the view that it was obvious from the word go at Bishop’s Field that half the people on the march were aiming on violence. In her evidence to us, Bernadette McAliskey denied that she had said any such thing, but in our view she may well have done so.5

1 AM97.1

2 AM37.6

3 AM421.1
4 KD4.5

5 Day 112/41-43


14.5 A flatbed coal lorry initially led the march. This was driven by Thomas McGlinchey, from a well-known republican family and at the time also a member of the Provisional IRA.1 It seems that the lorry had originally belonged to his brother, who had been interned in August 1971; the lorry had then been acquired or used by Thomas McGlinchey for the family coal business.2 There were several people on the lorry, some holding up a Civil Rights Association banner. The marchers increased in number as the march proceeded, particularly when it got to the Brandywell area of the city, where it met with a large crowd. There is no doubt that those organising the march wanted the lorry to continue to lead, but despite efforts by stewards to achieve this, at about this stage many joined the march in front of the lorry, as can be seen in the following photograph.3

14.6 Many witnesses were surprised by the size of the turnout, though the estimates of the numbers who marched varied. Daniel McGuinness, who was on the march, told us1 that he had made an estimate based on the fact that when he reached the bottom of Westland Street, the banner at the head of the march was turning right along Lone Moor Road, and that when he got to the top of Westland Street and looked back, the end of the column of people was just entering the bottom of Westland Street. Judging the distance from the bottom to the top of Westland Street to be about 500 yards, and taking the marchers to be about 15 across the street, and at intervals of a yard, he reached a figure of about 15,000 marchers. Others gave a similar figure, and the RUC put the number at 10,000,2 though a report from Colonel Welsh in the helicopter at 1542 hours described the crowd as very spread out and in his view numbering only in the region of 2,000.3 In the light of all the evidence, we are satisfied that well over 10,000, and possibly as many as 15,000, marched in Londonderry on that day, many joining the march along its route.

1 Day 96/36

2 W124 serials 302 and 305
3 W124 serial 326


14.7 As the march reached the end of Lone Moor Road, turned right into Creggan Street and approached William Street, it got close to Army Barriers 7, 9 and 11. Here stewards lined up along the side of William Street to prevent the crowd from approaching these barriers, and though the soldiers there were subjected to jeers and insults from the crowd, there were no reported incidents of violence.1

1 Day 298/64; W121 serial 251; W122 serials 257-259 and 262

14.8 The following photograph, taken from William Street, shows the marchers passing the end of Francis Street. Barrier 9 can be seen in the background.

14.9 The march entered William Street from Creggan Street at about 3.15pm. Among the famous photographs of the march coming down William Street is the following.



14.10 The soldiers closed the barriers as the march approached. Barriers 7, 9 and 11 were closed at about 1526 hours and Barriers 12 and 13 at about 1531 hours.1 Barriers 14, 15, 16 and 17 seem to have been closed a short time earlier.2

1 W121 serials 248 and 253
2 W120 serial 229

Report of the The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
- Volume II - Chapter 15


15.1 As already noted,1the organisers had advertised the march as going to Guildhall Square (Shipquay Place), where speakers would address the marchers. However, on the morning of the day (and probably not until about noon) the organisers took the final decision not to seek to go to Guildhall Square, as this would inevitably lead to a confrontation with the security forces.2Instead, they decided that the marchers would be turned right at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street and would go along Rossville Street to Free Derry Corner to hear the speakers there. However, there was some evidence that it was also planned that two of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) Executive members should go on down William Street to make a formal protest to the security forces barring the way to Guildhall Square.

1 Paragraphs 9.730–733 2 Day 125/27; Day 125/30

15.2 Kevin McCorry told this Inquiry that the organisers decided not to make a public announcement of the change of route because “we were not prepared for the authorities to define what we could do”, but that they did pass the message about the change to the stewards “by word of mouth”.1In his oral evidence Kevin McCorry agreed that this meant that it was “on the cards” that some of the crowd would think that the march was still going to its advertised destination.2

1 KM2.17
2 Day 129/72


15.3 It was submitted to this Inquiry on behalf of NICRA that in addition to the political reason for not announcing the change of route at the outset, there was a safety reason, namely “the danger that elements of the crowd would leave the field and proceed in an unorganised manner in the direction of Guildhall Square”.1However, we have found nothing in the evidence that indicates to us that this was or might have been a reason for the decision not to announce the change of route at the outset.

1 FS10.102; FR10.48

15.4 In the course of Kevin McCorry's oral evidence, there was this exchange:1

“Q. I take it from all that you have been telling us so far that you realised, by ‘you’ I mean you and other members of the Executive Committee, that the route of the march might be blocked so that you would not be able to reach the Guildhall?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Did you also appreciate, given that Derry was somewhere where there was pretty regular rioting and this was likely to be a huge march, that there was a risk that there would be a violent confrontation between some of the marchers and the army at whatever place the march was stopped at?

A. Certainly there was always that, that was always in the – a factor taken into consideration, yes.

Q. Did you have any plans to prevent that confrontation?

A. Yeah, well the plans involved the, what we hoped – the way that the stewards would control the situation at that particular time, yes.

Q. What are you referring to?

A. Well, specifically, as it worked out, it was the question of the role of the stewards (a) at the William Street/Rossville Street junction, and then, if necessary, what did subsequently happen in terms of the stewards going down and interposing themselves between the youths and the barrier and try and push them back to the main demonstration.

Q. Can I understand it: if you were barred from going to the Guildhall, the lorry would turn to its right down Rossville Street at the junction with William Street; is that right?

A. That is correct, yeah.

Q. And what about the east end of William Street, that is to say from the junction with Rossville Street towards the Guildhall, were people to be allowed to go down that end?

A. No, the object of the exercise would be to ensure that the body of the march followed the lorry to the destination – to the Free Derry Corner, where the meeting was to be held.

Q. How were people to be stopped from going down the east end of William Street?

A. By placing the stewards there, would be the – probably the – yes.

Q. That was something that was thought about, was it, before?

A. No, I am not, I mean I am speculating on that, I mean, but that would have been – what would have been – we would have wanted to do was to make sure that the vast bulk, obviously the optimum scenario would be that the entire march followed the lorry to the meeting at Free Derry Corner and that the stewards would ensure this.

Q. Forgive me, you were the chief steward; I do not quite know why you need to speculate. Was it or was it not the plan that stewards would prevent people from going down to the east end of William Street from the junction?

A. It would have been it, yes, it would have.

Q. We have heard from Edwina Stewart that there may have been a plan for two people, herself and Jimmy Doris, who in the event did not make it to the march, to go and make a formal protest at the barrier if the march was stopped from going to the Guildhall; were you aware of that?

A. I have seen that in the sort of the references to it, but I do not recall that, but certainly that would have – that would be the sort of thing to take the heat out of the situation, that would have made sense.”


1 Day 129/48-51

15.5 Thomas McGlinchey (the lorry driver) told us in his evidence that he believed that he had been told to go to Free Derry Corner from the outset.1 This may well be so, but it is clear that many, if not most, marchers (and a number of the stewards) were unaware of the change of plan. There was no public announcement of the change when the march began, though the word was passed to some stewards. Even when the march got to William Street, there were stewards who remained unaware that the route had been changed.2

1 AM249.1
2 Day 153/122; Day 176/53-54; Day 176/58

The junction of William Street and Rossville Street

15.6 As the march approached Abbey Taxis in William Street (ie the derelict building to which Machine Gun Platoon of Support Company was sent a few minutes later), the photographs below show that there was a line of stewards (identifiable by their white armbands) facing the marchers.

15.7 The march reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street at or shortly before 3.35pm.1 By this time, the line of stewards seems to have dispersed or been outflanked, for the following photographs taken by Colonel Tugwell from the Embassy Ballroom OP show no body, line or cordon of stewards awaiting the arrival of the marchers.

1 W158; W169

15.8 Patrick McCallion, who was on the march, told us that he saw about five stewards at the junction who were linked arm-in-arm trying to stop people going to Barrier 14, but that there were not enough of them to hold back all the marchers trying to get past them. However, Patrick McCallion also told us that he was about 100–200 yards behind the lorry as it went along William Street, and that by the time he got to the junction the lorry had already turned into Rossville Street.1 It seems therefore that he was not describing the scene at the time the lorry arrived at the junction. We can see no stewards in Colonel Tugwell's photographs standing arm-in-arm or otherwise. Even if there were some stewards there at this time, they clearly had had little success in diverting people into Rossville Street. The organisers intended the marchers to follow the lorry, which did turn into Rossville Street despite shouts and screams from some marchers for it to continue down William Street, but the youths who had been in front of the lorry lost no time in running on towards Barrier 14, which was some 120 yards further along William Street. Many marchers followed them, as can be seen in the following photographs.

1 AM74.1; Day 71/140

15.9 Those running on towards Barrier 14 included seasoned rioters who were holding sticks and stones and were clearly intent on engaging the soldiers at Barrier 14. Someone shouted “charge!” at this time.1

1 AM97.1; AM146.1-2; AP18.1-2; M79.1

15.10 In our view what happened was that by the time the lorry had reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street many people were in front of the lorry. Despite appeals through the loudspeaker on the lorry for people to turn right and go along Rossville Street to Free Derry Corner, a sizeable body of people, marchers as well as those intent on rioting, continued down William Street. The result was that soon afterwards that part of William Street between the junction with Rossville Street and Barrier 14 became full of people. Kevin McCorry, who was on the lorry, told us that this happened because the lorry did not stop at the junction, but turned right before stopping in Rossville Street. However, though this may have been a contributory cause, it seems to us that the failure to inform the marchers that the destination had been changed to Free Derry Corner, and the absence of any, or any sufficient number, of stewards at the junction or in William Street, were at least equal causes of marchers (as opposed to those intent on rioting) continuing along William Street. Kevin McCorry told John Barry of the Sunday Times that “the problem was that no stewards had been taken and given the specific responsibility of being on that corner”.1 Kevin McCorry acknowledged to us that there was a “momentary” loss of control of the march at that point.2

1 KM2.6; Day 129/117-118
2 Day 129/61-62


15.11 As to those intent on rioting, it was submitted on behalf of some of the soldiers that if it had been the intention of the march organisers to prevent the occurrence of rioting at the Army barriers, it was self-evident from the rioting at Barrier 14 (which we discuss in detail below) that either the number of stewards was inadequate, or the available stewards were inappropriately positioned.1

1 FS8.919

15.12 In our view there is no doubt that the organisers of the march wanted to have a large and peaceful procession. It also appears from the evidence given by Kevin McCorry that it was appreciated that if the march were stopped from going to Guildhall Square, the occasion was likely to lead to rioters accompanying the march and seeking to attack soldiers at the barriers. Kevin McCorry’s evidence was to the effect that the plan was to have stewards at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street to prevent people going further along William Street; but, assuming this to be so, it seems that none of the stewards was given specific instructions in advance to this effect, with the result that when the front of the march reached the junction there were few if any stewards there and no means of seeking to prevent people from continuing along William Street.

15.13 We consider, therefore, that there were shortcomings in the organisation of the march. However, it seems to us that even if stewards had been stationed at the junction, in view of the wide-open spaces there it would have been difficult if not impossible for them to have stopped all those intent on confronting the soldiers who were blocking access to Guildhall Square. The organisers of the march wanted to make a peaceful protest, but must have known that whatever they did there was likely to be trouble from elements intent on rioting.

Barrier 14

15.14 The people who led the way along William Street stopped short of Barrier 14 at the junction with Chamberlain Street, as can be seen from the following photographs.

15.15 There was at this time some stone-throwing from this group, aimed at the soldiers and police behind Barrier 14, but soon some stewards managed to get in front and tried to prevent the people moving further forward towards Barrier 14, as shown in the photograph below.

15.16 Meanwhile many marchers had either stopped at the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, or continued down William Street, rather than turning right into Rossville Street, as can be seen from the photograph below.

15.17 Some of these marchers brought with them the NICRA civil rights banner that had previously been on the lorry. This can be seen in the following photograph.

15.18 There was a loudspeaker on the lorry. Kevin McCorry told this Inquiry that the plan had been for the lorry to stop briefly at the corner of William Street and Rossville Street and for an announcement to be made from the lorry that the march was going to Free Derry Corner, but this did not happen.1Thomas McGlinchey (the driver) told this Inquiry that he had received no such instructions.2 The lorry (according to what Kevin McCorry told John Barry of the Sunday Times) went round the corner “much too fast”3 and it may be that no announcement was made from it until it had gone some way down Rossville Street. Although Thomas McGlinchey told us that he turned and then went on down to Free Derry Corner without stopping,4 we believe his recollection on this point is likely to be incorrect. There is other 1972 evidence that the lorry, having started down Rossville Street, reversed back towards the junction between William Street and Rossville Street and later went backwards and forwards on Rossville Street with the loudspeaker continuing to be used to appeal to the crowd to go to Free Derry Corner.5

1 Day 129/59-60

2 Day 53/17

3 KM2.6
4 AM249.5; Day 53/18

5 KM2.6; JC4.4-6; WT3.35; JM19.4-5; JH10.2


15.19 Despite these efforts William Street rapidly became blocked with people. This had the effect of pushing the crowd up to Barrier 14, notwithstanding attempts by stewards to hold it back, while further back the marchers coming down William Street towards the junction with Rossville Street came to a halt. There was thus at this stage very considerable confusion and a loss of control of the march, though stewards at the junction continued to try to turn the marchers down Rossville Street by telling people that the meeting was at Free Derry Corner.1The fact that the organisers had chosen not to announce publicly that the march would be going to Free Derry Corner and not Guildhall Square undoubtedly contributed significantly to the confusion at the junction.

1 H1.3; KM2.6

15.20 It was now some time between 3.35pm and 3.40pm. The stewards in front of the crowd at Barrier 14 continued to try to keep control. Some were facing the crowd, but others were insisting to the security forces that the Derry people had the right to march to the Guildhall.1 There was a lull in the stone-throwing but the crowd was hostile. People were shouting abuse at the security forces and spitting across the barrier. One person made an attempt to dismantle the barrier. There were chants of “IRA, IRA”.2 There are photographs (reproduced below) and film footage that show the scene at this time.3

15.21 Barrier 14 was manned by soldiers of A Company 2 RGJ, who, as we have described above, were on the day under the command of 22 Lt AD Regt. In all there were some 40 soldiers at or in the immediate vicinity of this barrier. About 35 Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers were also near the barrier or at the junction of William Street and Waterloo Place.1 Shortly before 3.40pm Inspector Junkin, an RUC officer from Castlereagh, Belfast, who had been detached to Londonderry for the march, used a loudhailer to give two warnings to the crowd to disperse.2 He was standing alongside Major INQ 2079, the Company Commander of A Company 2 RGJ, behind Barrier 14.3 The first warning was met with jeering and abuse and a renewal of stoning, which caused him and the Company Commander to retire behind one of the Army vehicles close to the barrier. After the Inspector had come forward to give the second warning a stone nearly hit him in the face and knocked his cap off. This latter incident can be seen on film.4

The rioting

15.22 At this stage, as a result of continuing efforts by the stewards, some people started to move back from Barrier 14.1 Some went back up William Street and then either down Rossville Street or further west, some went down Chamberlain Street or through an alleyway (Macari’s Lane) that led off William Street to the Eden Place waste ground in front of the Rossville Flats. However, the rioting continued with the soldiers subjected to further substantial stoning.2 After a few minutes of this bombardment the soldiers responded with a volley of some six baton rounds.3 This caused the rioting youths to retire but they soon returned and continued.4 At this stage the soldiers brought up a water cannon that had been held at Waterloo Place (at the end of William Street) and, at or shortly before 3.45pm, began to hose the crowd. As will be seen from the following photographs, there were at this stage substantial numbers of people still in this part of William Street.

1 M4.1; Day 67/34; AM77.9

2 W169-170 serials 93, 99 and 109; W123 serial 284
3 JS10.1; M4.1

4 M4.1

15.23 A BBC cameraman (the late Peter Beggin) gave an account of what he then saw from the Army side of Barrier 14, in his written statement for the Widgery Inquiry:1

“Immediately the water cannon opened fire two canisters of CS gas were thrown from the crowd. One landed underneath the water cannon making it untenable for a short time. We all retreated from that immediate area. Very quickly however the crew got back into the water cannon, backed it round the corner and opened it up to air it. The stoning was resumed and several further volleys of baton rounds were fired by the troops.”


1 M4.1

15.24 As can be seen from film footage and the photographs below the water cannon, which used coloured dye (usually described as purple but sometimes as red) with the object of marking rioters, was initially successful in pushing the rioters back, aided by the CS gas that drifted towards the crowd and affected many people.1

1 Vid 1 02.22; Vid 3 01.51; Vid 1 02.24; Vid 3 02.03; Vid 1 02.46; Vid 1 02.27

15.25 Three photographs taken from the Army side of Barrier 14, reproduced below, show the effect on the soldiers and journalists behind the barrier of the CS gas which had been thrown from the crowd.